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Abstract
Role-based access control (RBAC) has become today’s dominant access control model,
and many of its theoretical and practical aspects are well understood. However, certain
aspects of more advanced RBAC models, such as the relationship between permission
usage and role activation and the interaction between inheritance and constraints, re-
main poorly understood. Moreover, the computational complexity of some important
problems in RBAC remains unknown. In this thesis we consider these issues, develop
new RBAC models and answer a number of these questions.
We develop an extended RBAC model that proposes an alternative way to dis-
tinguish between activation and usage hierarchies. Our extended RBAC model has
well-defined semantics, derived from a graph-based interpretation of RBAC state.
Pervasive computing environments have created a requirement for access control
systems in which authorization is dependent on spatio-temporal constraints. We de-
velop a family of simple, expressive and flexible spatio-temporal RBAC models, and
extend these models to include activation and usage hierarchies. Unlike existing work,
our models address the interaction between spatio-temporal constraints and inheritance
in RBAC, and are consistent and compatible with the ANSI RBAC standard.
A number of interesting problems have been defined and studied in the context
of RBAC recently. We explore some variations on the set cover problem and use
these variations to establish the computational complexity of these problems. Most
importantly, we prove that the minimal cover problem – a generalization of the set
cover problem – is NP-hard. The minimal cover problem is then used to determine the
complexity of the inter-domain role mapping problem and the user authorization query
problem in RBAC. We also design a number of efficient heuristic algorithms to answer
the minimal cover problem, and conduct experiments to evaluate the quality of these
algorithms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The protection of information in multi-user computer systems has become increas-
ingly important as a result of the rapid development and widespread deployment of
computer systems in our daily life. The most common protection measures used in
computer system are prevention, detection and recovery [46]. Prevention is applied to
prevent information from being damaged. In other words, its purpose is to prevent all
unauthorized access to information. Detection allows us to detect when information has
been damaged, how it has been damaged, and who has caused the damage. Recovery
allows us to restore the information that has been damaged or to assess and repair any
damage to the information. In this thesis, we are only concerned with prevention.
The prevention measure is regarded as the traditional core of computer security,
which usually attempts to achieve three security goals: confidentiality, integrity and
availability. These security goals are concerned with prevention of unauthorized dis-
closure of information, unauthorized modification of information, and unauthorized
withholding of information, respectively [26]. In this thesis, we focus on studying ac-
cess control, one of the most important prevention techniques in computer systems. In
particular, it can help enforce confidentiality and integrity, and can also provide a basis
11
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for availability. For example, an attacker who gains unauthorized access to a sensitive
document is likely to have little trouble making this document unavailable to valid and
authorized users. Generally speaking, access control is concerned with limiting access
by users to protected resources. In multi-user computer systems, some resources may
be publicly accessible by all users, some may only be accessible by a restricted audience,
and some may be private to the user who creates those resources. These requirements
are usually expressed by access control policies that generally specify who is allowed to
access which resources in a computer system. Access control mechanisms are used to
implement access control policies, and ensure that users’ requests to access resources
are only granted if those requests are authorized by the policies.
Access control has been the subject of considerable research and developments over
the last 30 years. The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), com-
monly known as the “Orange Book” [89], defines two different types of access control:
discretionary access control and mandatory access control. Discretionary access con-
trol restricts access to resources based on the identity of users. The two key features of
discretionary access control is that each resource is required to have an owner, and the
owner is able to control who can access the resources she owns. Discretionary access
control is the most widely used form of access control being used in operating systems
such as UNIX and Windows NT. Operating systems usually implement discretionary
access control on the basis of access control lists. That is, each resource in the system
is associated with a list of users who are entitled to access that resource. A request
from a user to access a given resource is granted if the user is in the access control list.
Mandatory access control constrains the interactions of users with resources on
the basis of security attributes associated with users and resources. A request from
a user to access a resource is granted if certain inequalities comparing the security
attributes of the user and the resource are satisfied. Unlike discretionary access control,
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changes to the authorization policies in mandatory access control are controlled by a
higher authority, rather than individual users. In other words, system administrators
define mandatory access control policies that can be centrally enforced for all users.
The Bell-LaPadula model [12] is probably the most widely known security model and
incorporates a mandatory information flow policy for confidentiality [35]. Informally,
the mandatory information flow policy comprises the simple security property and the
*-property. The simple security property requires that a user is only allowed to read
a resource if the security attribute of the user is at least as high as that of resource
being read. Conversely, the *-property requires that a user is only allowed to write
to a resource if the security attribute of the resource is at least as high as that of the
user. These kinds of mandatory access control policies are commonly used in military
applications and commercially sensitive applications.
However, modern business information systems typically comprise millions of re-
sources and thousands of users. The complexity of such systems makes it difficult to
employ discretionary access control that might require the management of millions of
access control lists or other similar access control data structures. Conversely, manda-
tory access control has been found to be too restrictive for general organizational in-
formation systems [39].
Role-based access control (RBAC) [40, 70, 83] has emerged as the primary alter-
native to discretionary access control and mandatory access control, because of its
potential to reduce the complexity and cost of access control administration in organi-
zational systems. The basic idea of RBAC is to introduce the concept of a role, which
acts as a “bridge” between users and permissions1. A user can use a permission by
activating a role to which the user and the permission are assigned. This approach
1Informally, the term permission refers to some combination of resource and action that users
attempts to perform.
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of associating users and permissions with roles greatly simplifies the management of
permissions for which a user is authorized. For example, if an employee is required to
change his position within an organization, we simply assign a new set of roles to this
user without having to directly assign a completely new set of permissions to him.
RBAC further reduces the administrative burden by introducing the idea of a role
hierarchy. The role hierarchy generally supports two different types of inheritance:
permissions are inherited upwards and the set of roles available to a user is aggregated
downwards. For example, if role r is senior to r′ in the role hierarchy, then any permis-
sion assigned to r′ is implicitly assigned to r, and any user assigned to r can activate r′.
These two types of inheritance are called permission usage and role activation respec-
tively. In other words, a role hierarchy can be used to reduce the number of explicit
assignments in the user-role and permission-role relations.
The fundamental concepts of RBAC are now well established and are detailed in the
recent release of the ANSI RBAC standard [2]. RBAC has also been incorporated into
several commercial software products offered by major information technology vendors,
such as Authorization Manager in Windows Server 2003, Oracle Access Manager, IBM
Tivoli Policy Manager [59] and SAM Jupiter [6]. Although RBAC has obtained consid-
erable maturity in many theoretical and practical aspects, the uses of role hierarchies
in RBAC has a number of inconvenient consequences which have not been thoroughly
addressed. In addition, certain aspects of more advanced RBAC models, such as the
relationship between permissions usage and role activation and the interaction between
inheritance and constraints, remain poorly understood. Moreover, the computational
complexity of some important problems in RBAC remains unknown. The main goal of
this thesis is to examine issues noted above, to develop new RBAC models for address-
ing some of these issues, and to analyze and answer a number of outstanding problems
in RBAC.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 15
1.1 Motivation
At the most general level, this thesis is concerned with role hierarchies and the way
in which they interact with other parts of the RBAC model. There is a substantial
body of work in the literature that introduces new hierarchies or constraints, without
ever properly considering the combined effect of these new features or their effect on
the authorization semantics of the resulting models. In this section, we present some
of these problems which provide the motivation for our research in this thesis.
1.1.1 The role hierarchy and inheritance
Role-based access control is one of the most powerful access control paradigms with
many potential applications [39]. An important characteristic that makes RBAC so
attractive is that it can be configured to support a wide variety of access control policies,
including traditional discretionary and mandatory access control policies [39], as well as
organization-specific policies, such as separation of duty policies [39]. However, it has
been observed that the inheritance semantics of the role hierarchy makes it awkward
for RBAC to implement the Bell-LaPadula model and dynamic separation of duty
constraints [29]. We now explain these issues in more detail, and describe how existing
work provides limited solutions to address some of them.
The Bell-LaPadula model
The inheritance of permissions within a role hierarchy is always upwards, that is, if
a permission p is assigned to a role r, any user assigned to a role at least as senior
as r can exercise permission p. This is analogous to the use of read permissions in
the Bell-LaPadula model, where a permission of read access to a resource is available
to any user whose security label is at least as high as that of the resource. However,
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the *-property in the Bell-LaPadula model usually requires that write permissions are
inherited downwards, which can not be directly handled in the standard RBAC model.
There have been several attempts to simulate the Bell-LaPadula model using role-
based approaches [29, 69, 72, 73, 81, 82]. These previous attempts typically require
changes or additions to the underlying RBAC model, such as the inclusion of a second
role hierarchy [73, 81, 82] and the addition of an external data structure for determin-
ing security attributes of users and resources [29, 69, 72]. However, we are unaware
of any attempt to simulate the behaviour of the Bell-LaPadula model using a single
role hierarchy. In particular, it is not possible to support the assignment of “mixed”
permissions in existing work, which include both read and write access to resources.
Furthermore, no work has studied the simulation of the more complex version of the
Bell-LaPadula model that includes the current security function, or provided support
for limited discretionary features of the Bell-LaPadula model in role-based models.
Dynamic separation of duty
Separation of duty requirements are high level organizational policies, which usually
require that sensitive combinations of permissions should not be available to certain
users. Separation of duty has always been an important consideration in RBAC mod-
els. RBAC introduces separation of duty constraints on the authorization of users to
roles [2], which is a means of enforcing such high level policies [65].
Two commonly defined separation of duty constraints in RBAC are static separation
of duty and dynamic separation of duty. The former typically constrains the assignment
of users to roles, while the latter constrains the activation of roles in the run-time
environment. An example of a dynamic separation of duty constraint is that no user
is allowed to activate a particular pair of roles r and r′ in the same session.
However, the inheritance of permissions through a role hierarchy may well conflict
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with the enforcement of dynamic separation of duty constraints. For example, it is
impossible to define a dynamic separation of duty constraint on roles r and r′ that
have a common senior role r′′, because r′′ inherits the permissions of both roles. There
is no means to assign any user to this common senior role r′′ because activation of r′′
will violate the dynamic separation of duty constraint with respect to r and r′.
A solution was proposed by Sandhu et al [82] which makes a distinction between
the permission usage and role activation hierarchies. The resulting model is called ER-
BAC96 (Extended RBAC) that has a separate role activation hierarchy which extends
the permission usage hierarchy. In this model we can define dynamic separation of duty
constraints on roles that have common seniors in the role activation hierarchy, but can
not have common seniors in the permission usage hierarchy. However, we believe it
is unnecessarily complicated to use two hierarchies to enforce dynamic separation of
duty constraints. It is interesting to investigate a simple approach that uses a single
role hierarchy and an alternative approach to permission inheritance to address the
incompatibility between the role hierarchy and dynamic separation of duty constraints.
1.1.2 Extended RBAC
The role hierarchy is central to many theoretical RBAC models, and serves two different
purposes: permission usage and role activation. And as we have seen in the previous
section, it is certainly useful to develop an extended RBAC model that distinguishes
permission usage and role activation hierarchies. Firstly, it addresses the perceived
deficiencies of inheritance with a single role hierarchy, for example, the enforcement
of dynamic separation of duty constraints and the simulation of mandatory access
control using role-based approach as described above. Secondly, the separation of
role activation and permission usage hierarchies allows selective inheritance through
hierarchies, which provides a greater flexibility than standard RBAC model in terms
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of articulating policies.
The two most significant existing approaches that distinguish between activation
and usage hierarchies are the ERBAC96 model [82] and the GTRBAC model [58].
Sandhu introduced the ERBAC96 model that has a separate role activation hierarchy,
a relation which is a superset of the permission usage hierarchy. The motivation for
making such a distinction is supplied by a consideration of implementing dynamic
separation of duty constraints and simulating lattice-based access control [82].
Joshi et al developed a generalized temporal (GTRBAC) model [56, 58] that in-
cludes three different types of role hierarchies: a role activation hierarchy, a permission
usage hierarchy and a general hierarchy that is a combination of the activation and
usage hierarchies. The introduction of these three role hierarchies was influenced by
the ERBAC96 model and the organizational control principles identified by Moffett
and Lupu [67].
We believe that the way in which both ERBAC96 and GTRBAC treat multiple
hierarchies suffers from some deficiencies. One of the problems we consider in this
thesis is the most appropriate design for multiple hierarchies and, more importantly,
the constraints that must be imposed on the relationship between those hierarchies and
the authorization semantics induced by those hierarchies.
1.1.3 Spatio-temporal RBAC
In ubiquitous and mobile computing, access control requirements may incorporate some
considerations of contextual information, such as the location of the user and the time
at which access requests are made. For example, it is natural to limit the hours during
which the role of night-nurse can be activated by a user, and location in which a user
assigned to the role night-nurse can access health records.
In the last few years, a number of context-aware RBAC models [13, 14, 28, 43, 49,
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58, 76, 86] have been developed to capture these contextual access control requirements.
Essentially, all of these models are concerned with the specification of general contextual
constraints [28, 43, 86], temporal constraints [13, 58], spatial constraints [14, 49], or
spatio-temporal constraints [76] on various components of the standard RBAC model.
However, the syntax for these models is rather complicated and the semantics defining
the interaction between spatio-temporal constraints and the role hierarchy are not
clearly defined. In other words, no existing work has clear authorization semantics
in terms of how access requests will be answered in the presence of a role hierarchy
and spatio-temporal constraints. Moreover, no existing work assesses the difficulties of
implementing these models in practical applications.
We believe that it is important to consider the effect of spatio-temporal constraints
on RBAC. In particular, we believe that any spatio-temporal RBAC model should have
clear and unambiguous semantics. Hence, it is important to examine the question of
how can we develop new spatio-temporal RBAC models with simple syntax and ap-
propriate semantics which explicitly consider the relationship between spatio-temporal
constraints and role hierarchies. Having developed spatio-temporal RBAC models, it
is also crucial to consider the implementation of these models in practical settings.
1.1.4 Computational problems in RBAC
Just as the development of new RBAC models has led to interesting questions about
authorization semantics, new applications and models for RBAC have given rise to a
number of interesting computational problems. Joshi et al recently raised an important
problem – the inter-domain role mapping (IDRM) problem [36] – when GTRBAC is
employed in distributed environments. Their statement of the IDRM problem is to find
a set of roles of minimal cardinality such that the authorized permissions for that set of
roles is precisely the set of requested permissions. This problem was further extended
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to the user authorization query (UAQ) problem [94, 96].
On the other hand, Li et al recently studied a number of interesting problems
with regard to separation of duty constraints and their enforcement in the context of
RBAC [65]. One of the problems – the role-based static separation of duty constraint
(RSSoD) generation problem – is of particular importance when translating restrictions
on permissions expressed in separation of duty constraints to restrictions on role mem-
berships in RBAC. The RSSoD generation problem asks given a set of permissions,
find all possible sets of roles such that each set of roles is collectively authorized for the
given set of permissions, and any proper subset of that set of roles is not.
However, existing work does not always pose the most appropriate problem, as is
the case with the IDRM problem of Du and Joshi [36]. It is easy to show that the
IDRM problem is not well-defined, in the sense that many instances of the problem
may not have a solution. Moreover, none of the above problems has been properly
analyzed and solved. In particular, the IDRM problem and the UAQ problem were
conjectured to be NP-hard without establishing a formal proof, and directly suggested
heuristic algorithms to produce a solution [36, 94, 96]. Nevertheless, if these problems
have not been proved to be NP-hard, there is no way of ensuring there do not exist
efficient algorithms to solve them. In addition, the computational complexity of the
RSSoD generation problem has not been established. In summary, we are unaware of
any attempt to formally assess the computational complexity of the above problems,
which we believe is an important step in understanding and solving the problems.
1.2 Contributions
There is a substantial body of work on RBAC, much of it involving role hierarchies. As
we described in the previous section, the consequences of including those hierarchies are
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rarely properly explored. In this thesis, we investigate a number of related problems:
the perceived limitations of the inheritance semantics of a role hierarchy, the relation-
ship between permission usage and role activation hierarchies, the interaction between
spatio-temporal constraints and inheritance, and the computational complexity of sev-
eral problems arising in hierarchical RBAC. Unlike existing work in these areas, we
strive for compatibility with RBAC96 and precise authorization semantics. We now
describe the contributions of the thesis, and briefly explain their significance compared
with the existing work.
The oriented permission RBAC model (OP-RBAC) developed by Crampton [29]
proposed a new mechanism for permission inheritance within a role hierarchy, and was
considered to provide more flexibility than standard role-based models. We explore how
OP-RBAC can address the perceived shortcomings of the standard RBAC approach
to inheritance. In particular, we illustrate that OP-RBAC provides a natural way
to simulate a number of Bell-LaPadula models, and to enforce dynamic separation of
duty constraints. The simplicity of our approach compares favourably with previous
attempts, which typically require multiple role hierarchies and support only limited
features of the Bell-LaPadula model.
We then turn our attention to supporting multiple hierarchies in RBAC. We propose
a novel extended RBAC model, called ERBAC07, which defines an alternative way to
distinguish permission usage and role activation hierarchies. Unlike ERBAC96 and
GTRBAC, our approach to defining these hierarchies is based on their inheritance
semantics. The syntax we have chosen for ERBAC07 is consistent with RBAC96, and
the semantics for the model is extended from our graph-based formalism of RBAC96.
In other words, ERBAC07 is compatible with RBAC96 and has a clear authorization
semantics.
Having established an extended RBAC model supporting permission usage and role
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activation hierarchies, it is natural to then address the question of constraints that may
interact with those hierarchies. In particular, we extend the RBAC96 and ERBAC07
models by defining two spatio-temporal constraint specification functions. We use these
two functions to define three spatio-temporal RBAC models with different authorization
semantics. Compared with existing work, such as GTRBAC and the spatio-temporal
model of Ray and Toahchoodee – the only models dealing with multiple role hierarchies
and spatio-temporal constraints – our models are concise and have precise authorization
semantics. We also propose strategies for the use of our spatio-temporal RBAC models
in practical applications, which no existing work has attempted to do.
Finally, we introduce a mathematical framework where we define a number of com-
putational problems that are variations on the standard set cover problem. In partic-
ular, we define the minimal cover problem, and prove that this problem is NP-hard.
This result enables us to establish computational complexity for some important prob-
lems in the context of RBAC. We also design a number of heuristic algorithms for the
minimal cover problem and conduct experiments to evaluate the quality of these algo-
rithms. Our experiment results enable us to identify a good heuristic algorithm with
high success rates to compute an exact solution to the minimal cover problem.
We summarize the contributions of this thesis in Table 1.1 that indicates the section
in which each contribution appears.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, we introduce some prerequisite concepts in access control, RBAC and
complexity theory. In Section 2.1, we make explicit distinctions between access control
policies, states, models and mechanisms, and clarify these distinctions in discretionary
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Section 3.3 Simulating the Bell-LaPadula models using OP-RBAC
Section 3.4.1 Supporting dynamic separation of duty in OP-RBAC
Section 3.4.2 Transforming ERBAC96 into OP-RBAC
Section 4.1 A graph-based formalism of RBAC1
Section 4.2 A new model for extended RBAC
Section 4.3 Spatio-temporal RBAC models and trust entities
Section 4.4 Spatio-temporal extended RBAC models
Section 4.5 Practical considerations of spatio-temporal RBAC models
Section 4.6 Spatio-temporal domains
Section 5.2 A new framework for variations on the set cover problem
Section 5.2.3 Complexity of the minimal cover problem
Section 5.2.4 Complexity of the irreducible cover problem
Section 5.3.1 Complexity of the inter-domain role mapping problem
Section 5.3.2 Complexity of the user authorization query problem
Section 5.3.3 Complexity of enforcing separation of duty constraints
Chapter 6 Heuristic algorithms for the minimal cover problem
Table 1.1: Contributions of the thesis
access control and mandatory access control. In Section 2.2, we introduce RBAC, in
particular, the RBAC96 family models and the ANSI RBAC standard. We conclude the
chapter with a brief outline of complexity theory, which provides a basis for studying
computational problems in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 3, we investigate three useful applications of the OP-RBAC model. More
specifically, we demonstrate how OP-RBAC can be configured to support a number of
different Bell-LaPadule models, dynamic separation of duty constraints, and features of
ERBAC96 respectively. In the course of this chapter we examine some existing work:
ERBAC96 and GTRBAC, which leads naturally to the material in Chapter 4 where we
develop new RBAC models for the distinction between activation and usage hierarchies,
and the specification of spatio-temporal constraints.
In Chapter 4, we develop a number of advanced RBAC models that deal with
role hierarchies and spatio-temporal constraints. We firstly introduce a graph-based
formalism of RBAC96 that defines a simple way of evaluating requests in RBAC96.
This graph-based formalism provides a basis for the development of ERBAC07 and
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spatio-temporal RBAC models in this chapter. We also suggest some approaches to
facilitate the implementation of our spatio-temporal RBAC models.
Joshi et al [36] introduced the inter-domain role mapping problem in the context
of multiple role hierarchies and temporal constraints. The analysis of this problem
motivates us to study some computational problems in Chapter 5. We firstly define
some variations on the standard set cover problem, and establish their computational
complexity. Then we apply these complexity results to some important problems in
RBAC, including the inter-domain role mapping problem, the user-authorization query
problem and the separation of duty constraints enforcement problem.
As the minimal cover problem defined in Chapter 5 has been proved to be NP-
hard, Chapter 6 is concerned with the design and evaluation of heuristic algorithms for
solving the problem.
Finally, in Chapter 7, we review the contributions of the thesis and discuss oppor-
tunities for future work.
1.4 Publications
A list of publications describing some of the research results contained in this thesis is
provided below.
• L. Chen and J. Crampton. Applications of the oriented permission role-based
access control model. In proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Performance
Computing and Communications Conference, pages 387-394, 2007.
• L. Chen and J. Crampton. Inter-domain role mapping and least privilege. In Pro-
ceedings of the 12th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies,
pages 157-162, 2007.
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• L. Chen and J. Crampton. On spatio-temporal constraints and inheritance in role-
based access control. In Proceedings of the 2008 ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communications Security, pages 205-216, 2008.
• L. Chen and J. Crampton. Set covering problems in role-based access control. In
Proceeding of the 14th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security,
pages 689-704, 2009.
Chapter 2
Background
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce relevant background material. In
Section 2.1 we give a brief introduction to some basic concepts and earlier developments
in access control. In particular, we introduce the two best known types of access
control – discretionary access control and mandatory access control – which serve as
a motivation for role-based access control and inform the material in Chapter 3. In
Section 2.2 we introduce role-based access control and review the RBAC96 family of
models and the ANSI RBAC standard, which is fundamental to the remainder of this
thesis. We conclude the chapter with a brief outline of complexity theory that will
be required in Chapters 5 and 6 when we study some computational problems in the
context of role-based access control.
2.1 Access control
One of the essential security services in (multi-user) computer systems is access con-
trol, a mechanism for constraining the interaction between (authenticated) users and
protected resources. In the context of computer systems, access control may also be
referred to as authorization. Generally, access control is concerned with controlling
26
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which users have access to which resources in computer systems. Given a computer
system, access control can be implemented in many places and at different levels [3, 39].
Operating systems implement access control to limit access to files, directories and de-
vices. Database management systems apply access control to regulate access to tables
and views. Sensitive applications incorporate access control to ensure some application
functions are only available to certain users and other applications. Moreover, access
control can take many forms, which means in addition to checking whether a user is
authorized to access a resource, access control may also be concerned with constrain-
ing when, where and how a resource can be used. For example, in the context of the
financial sector, (i) financial managers might have access to some sensitive reports only
during working hours and at certain offices, and (ii) to prevent fraud, we may require
that a financial manager is not allowed to approve a loan that was created by herself.
When implementing access control in computer systems, it is important to un-
derstand and distinguish four concepts: access control policies, access control states,
access control models and access control mechanisms [32, 34, 78]. Access control is
often “policy-based” in the sense that a user’s request to access a resource (an access
request) is checked to see if it is authorized by a policy. Access control policies gen-
erally specify who is authorized to access which resources under what circumstances.
In other words, access control policies define rules for deciding whether access requests
should be granted or not. The conditions that determine whether an access request is
authorized are usually defined in terms of the (access control) state or configuration
of the computer system. The state of the system is a snapshot of all security-relevant
information at a point in time; the state may change over time. Consider, for example,
the simple security property defined in the Bell-LaPadula access control model [12],
which says that a user u is authorized to read a document d only if λ(u) > λ(d), where
λ : U ∪D → L is a labeling function and (L,6) is a lattice of security labels. Infor-
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mally, the policy states that a user is authorized to read a document only if the user’s
security level is at least as high as that of the requested document. The state is defined
by the security lattice L and the security function λ. Crampton recently defined the
distinction between access control policy and state as shown in the following quote [32].
“An access control policy is a specification of decision-marking function that
takes a request query and access control state as inputs and returns an access
control decision.”
By definition, the evaluation of an access control policy is dependent on the access
request and the current access control state of the system. An obvious example is
the Chinese Wall policy [18], which is designed to prevent a user from accessing docu-
ments whose owners belonging to a conflict interest class. The evaluation of this policy
depends on the mutable system state: namely, historical information about which doc-
uments the user have previously accessed.
In summary, it is important to make a clear distinction between policy and state, be-
cause such distinction provides reuse of already existing authorization decision functions
(policies) and separates the specification of access control state from policy semantics.
We use the term authorization syntax for the language that is used to specify states,
and authorization semantics for the effect of evaluating a policy for a given request and
state. Equivalently, we could regard the semantics of a state (with respect to a fixed
policy) to be the set of requests that are authorized by the state.
An access control model is an abstract mathematical description of authorization
syntax, together with a definition of authorization semantics. More specifically, it
defines a collection of sets, functions and relations that provide a method for encoding
access control states, and specifies the conditions that must be satisfied for an access
request to be granted [31]. The RBAC96 model is a typical example of an access
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control model, which we will introduce in Section 2.2. Informally, an access control
model provides a blueprint for the implementation of access control systems. It may
also provide assurances of security for an implemented system, an example being the
famous security theorem of the Bell-LaPadula model [12].
An access control mechanism (also known as a reference monitor or an authoriza-
tion service) is a computer function that implements the controls formally stated in
the access control model. However, it is often difficult to provide an access control
mechanism that correctly and completely implements the access control model. In gen-
eral, any access control mechanism includes two distinct components: the authorization
enforcement function (AEF) and the authorization decision function (ADF) [51].1 Fig-
ure 2.1 illustrates the generic architecture for an access control mechanism. The AEF
intercepts all access requests and forwards them to the ADF. The ADF decides whether
an access request is authorized by consulting relevant access control states, and returns
a binary decision (grant or deny) to the AEF. The AEF then enforces that decision
by either making the resource available to the requestor or letting the requestor know
the access is unauthorized. In short, the AEF is responsible for ensuring that every
access request is evaluated to determine whether it is authorized, while the ADF is an
implementation of a access control policy [32], which queries the access control states
and decides whether the request is authorized.
The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), commonly known as
the “Orange Book” [89], defines two fundamental types of access control: discretionary
access control and mandatory access control, which are widely used in commercial
and government sectors today. We now briefly introduce discretionary and mandatory
access controls, and present models and mechanisms associated with them.
1The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 2.0 specification [71] introduced the
terms policy enforcement point (PEP) and policy decision point (PDP) which are equivalent to AEF
and ADF respectively.
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Figure 2.1: The generic architecture of an access control mechanism
2.1.1 Discretionary access control
Discretionary access control usually requires each resource to have an owner, and the
owner of a resource is able to authorize access to the resource for other users [89]. In
other words, an individual user is able to decree who is allowed to have access to the
resources she owns. A request to access resources is evaluated based on the identity of
the requesting user or the group to which the user belongs. Therefore, discretionary
access control is also called identity-based access control [17].
The first discretionary access control model was introduced by Lampson [63], and
was further refined by Graham and Denning [48]. The Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman (HRU)
model [50] is the most widely known discretionary access control model and provides
a basis for subsequent research [79]. All these discretionary access control models
introduce the formal notions of subject, object and access right, and use an access
control matrix as a structure to represent access control states.
A subject is usually an active system entity that initiates requests to perform some
actions on resources. The subjects are generally considered to be users, but more
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precisely, they are processes or threads that execute under the control of a computer
system. An object is usually a passive system entity that can be any resource to which
access should be retrieved. Typical examples of objects in operating systems include
files, directories and printers. An access right is an action that is invoked by subjects
on objects. Typical examples of access rights in an operating system include read, write
and execute.
An access control matrix M (also known as a protection matrix ) has rows indexed
by subjects and columns indexed by objects. The matrix entry for subject s and object
o, denoted Ms,o, contains a set of access rights for which s is authorized with respect
to o. An access request is modeled as a triple (s, o, a), and is authorized if, and only if,
a ∈Ms,o. Table 2.1 represents a simple access control matrix, where the file diary.doc
can be read and written by Bob while Alice has no access at all. In addition, Bob is an
owner of diary.doc and he can allow Alice to read diary.doc by entering the right
read into the entry [Alice, diary.doc] in the matrix.
bill.doc diary.doc install.exe
Bob {read} {own, read, write} {execute}
Alice {read, write} – {execute}
Table 2.1: An access control matrix
An access control matrix will become very large and the non-empty entries will be
sparse in a computer system with large numbers of users and resources. In this case,
it might not only cause performance problems but also be vulnerable to administrative
errors. Therefore, an access control matrix is rarely implemented in a computer system.
Instead, two popular discretionary access control mechanisms store the access control
matrix either by columns (access control lists) or rows (capability lists).
An access control list is associated with an object, and consists of zero or more access
control entries. Each access control entry specifies a subject and the set of access rights
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for which that subject is authorized. In contrast, a capability list is associated with a
subject, and contains a list of permissions. Each permission identifies an object and a
set of access rights that have been assigned to the subject for that object. In Figure 2.1,
for example, principal Bob has the capability to read object bill.doc. In other words,
an access control list is concerned with what may be done with an object. In modern
operating systems, access control lists are commonly used to protect files and resources.
On the other hand, a capability list is concerned with what a subject is allowed to do.
It is usually incorporated in application-oriented IT systems that focus on controlling
the actions of subjects.
2.1.2 Mandatory access control
Mandatory access control is deployed when the use of resources is determined by the
characteristics of the resource and the subject, not the wishes of the owner. The
characteristics of the subject and the object are often represented by security levels
assigned to subjects and objects in the system. The security level of a subject, also
called the clearance level of the subject, reflects the level of trust assigned to the subject,
while the security level of an object, also called the classification level of the object,
reflects the level of sensitivity of the contents of the object. The set of security levels is
partially ordered and is often assumed to form a lattice [80]. Thus, a computer system
that implements mandatory access control is often called a multi-level secure system.
The act of accessing an object can be regarded as initiating an information flow. In
particular, read access can be seen as a flow of information from object to subject, while
write access is a flow of information from subject to object. An mandatory information
flow policy for confidentiality requires that high level information cannot flow to a lower
level.2 In other words, the information flow policy requires that a subject is only allowed
2To safeguard the integrity of information, Biba proposed a dual policy that low level integrity
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to read an object if the subject’s security level is at least as high as that of the object,
and a subject is only allowed to write an object if the object’s security level is at least
as high as that of the subject. These two requirements are usually called “no-read-up”
policy and “no-write-down” policy, respectively. In practice, in order to define all the
authorization requirements of a computer system, mandatory information flow policy
is usually augmented with a discretionary access control policy that is defined by the
object owners and implemented using a protection matrix [12].
The Bell-LaPadula model has been the subject of extensive research in several
seminal papers [8, 10, 11, 12] and is perhaps the best known of all access control models.
It provides a combination of mandatory access control and discretionary access control.
We formally introduce a simplified version of the Bell-LaPadula model [10, 11] by
defining a set of subjects S, a set of objects O, an access control matrixM with columns
indexed by O and rows indexed by S, a partially ordered set of security labels (L,6), a
security function λ : S∪O→ L3, and a set of access rights A = {read, append, write},
where read denotes read only access, append denotes write only access and write
denotes both read and write access. The state of a Bell-LaPadula system is defined
to be (V,M), where V represents the set of active triples of the form (s, o, a), where
s ∈ S, o ∈ O, and a ∈ {read, append, write}; that is, the set of access requests that
have been granted by the access control mechanism [10].
To enforce a mandatory information flow policy and a discretionary access control
policy, every state of a Bell-Lapadula system must satisfy three security properties: the
simple security property, the *-property and the discretionary security property.
• A state (V,M) satisfies the simple security property if for all (s, o, read) ∈ V ,
information is not allowed to flow to a higher level [16]. In this chapter, we only consider information
flow policies in the Bell-LaPadula model, because the formulation of the Biba integrity model is the
dual of that in the Bell-LaPadula model.
3We assume that the labelling of entities is performed by a single security function λ, and the
security function λ is fixed
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λ(s) > λ(o). In other words, the simple security property is satisfied if every
granted read access (that is, belongs to V ) was authorized by the “no-read-up”
policy.
• A state (V,M) satisfies the *-property if for all (s, o, append) ∈ V , λ(s) 6 λ(o).
In other words, the *-property is satisfied if every granted append access was
authorized by the “no-write-down” policy.4
• A state (V,M) satisfies the discretionary security property if for all (s, o, a) ∈
V , a ∈ Ms,o. In other words, every access request that has been granted was
authorized by an appropriate entry in the access control matrix.
In actual fact, the Bell-LaPadula model [12] makes use of three security functions to
label subjects and objects, and the simple security property and the *-property are
defined in terms of those three security functions. We will introduce a more complete
version of the Bell-LaPadula model in Chapter 3 when studying the simulation of the
Bell-LaPadula models using role-based methods.
The Bell-LaPadula model has been implemented in military applications and com-
mercially sensitive applications [17]. Multics is considered to be the best example of an
operating system built for security [17], in which the protection mechanisms basically
implement the Bell-LaPadula model.
2.2 Role-based access control
Role-based access control has received considerable attention in recent years, and is
widely accepted as an alternative to discretionary and mandatory access controls [39].
4The *-property in the original formulation of the Bell-LaPadula model [10] requires that for all
(s, o, read) ∈ V , and for all (s, o′, append) ∈ V , λ(o) 6 λ(o′). The *-property we introduce here is the
most commonly accepted version (see [73, 80]), and is slightly stronger than the *-property defined
in the original Bell-LaPadula model [10]. In Chapter 3, we consider more complex version of the
*-property.
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The motivation for the development of role-based access control is to address the per-
ceived deficiencies of existing discretionary and mandatory access control models in
terms of specification and enforcement of organization-specific access control policies,
and to reduce the complexity and cost of administering systems based on these mod-
els [44]. In other words, neither discretionary nor mandatory access control is suffi-
ciently suitable for the needs of most commercial systems. More specifically, discre-
tionary access control, for example, permits users to grant or revoke access to any of
the objects they owned. However, for many organizations within industry and civilian
government, the corporation or agency is the owner of system objects, rather than the
end users [44]. Hence, it is not appropriate to allow users to pass access rights on the
objects to other users in these organizations. Mandatory access control that focuses
on preserving confidentiality is too restrictive and therefore inappropriate for these or-
ganizations as well. In addition, in an organization with a large and dynamic user
population, it is time-consuming and error-prone to manage an access control system
based on access control lists. In particular, it is extremely difficult to revoke a user’s
access permissions, because it involves checking the access control lists of all objects in
the system.
The central concept of role-based access control is that of a role that can be seen
as a job or position within an organization. Role-based access control also introduces
the notion of a permission or privilege that refers to some combination of access rights
and objects. The internal structure of a permission depends on the implementation
details of a role-based access control system [81]. Informally, roles form an intermediate
layer between users and permissions. More specifically, permissions are associated with
roles based on work-related activities, and users are assigned to roles based on their
job duties, qualifications or competencies. Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between
users, roles and permissions, where double-headed arrows indicate a many-to-many
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relationship. For example, a user can be assigned to one or more roles, and a role can
have one or more user members. This arrangement of controlling access through roles
provides great flexibility and simplifies the management of access controls. For example,
within a large organization, as job assignments and organizational functions change,
we can simply adjust user-role association and permission-role association respectively,
rather than allocating permissions to each user on an individual basis.
Users Roles Access rightsObjects
Permissions
Figure 2.2: A simple relationship between users, roles and permissions
Role-based access control has been the subject of considerable research in the last
decade, resulting in the development of a number of different role-based access control
models. Ferraiolo and Kuhn developed the first formal role-based access control model
in 1992 [40], and then introduced further refinement in 1995 [38]. Nyanchama and
Osborn proposed a role graph model [70] that organizes roles using a graph, and the
role graph model has led to subsequent research over the years [92, 93]. The RBAC96
family of models [83], due to Sandhu et al , is undoubtedly the most well known model
for RBAC, and provides the basis for the recent ANSI RBAC standard [2]. In this
thesis, we will focus on the RBAC96 model and the ANSI RBAC standard.
2.2.1 RBAC96
The RBAC96 family of models consists of four conceptual models that form a hierarchy
as shown in Figure 2.3. The simplest model, RBAC0, introduces the basic features of
role-based access control. RBAC1 and RBAC2 extend RBAC0 through the addition of
role hierarchy and constraints respectively. RBAC3 includes all the features of RBAC1
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and RBAC2.
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Figure 2.3: The RBAC96 family of models
RBAC0
RBAC0 defines a set of users U , a set of roles R, a set of permissions P , a user-role
assignment relation UA ⊆ U×R and a permission-role assignment relation PA ⊆ P×R.
We refer to such sets and relations as components of RBAC0. We write Roles(u) for
the set of roles to which a user u is explicitly assigned by the UA relation; that is,
Roles(u) = {r ∈ R : (u, r) ∈ UA}. Similarly, we write Roles(p) for the set of roles to
which a permission p is explicitly assigned by the PA relation; that is, Roles(p) = {r ∈
R : (p, r) ∈ PA}. Given r ∈ R, we write Prms(r) to denote the set of permissions for
which r is explicitly assigned, and for R′ ⊆ R, we write Prms(R′) to denote the set of
permissions for which the roles in R′ are explicitly assigned. That is,
Prms(r) = {p ∈ P : (p, r) ∈ PA} and Prms(R′) =
⋃
r∈R′
Prms(r).
RBAC0 also introduces the concept of a session that is synonymous with a subject in
traditional access control models. When a user logs in to a computer system (employing
a role-based access control mechanism), the user can establish a session during which
she can activate a subset of roles to which she is explicitly assigned. A user may run
multiple sessions simultaneously, and each session may have a different combination
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of active roles. We denote the set of sessions by S, and the user who established the
session s ∈ S by User(s). We write Roles(s) for the set of roles activated in a session s,
that is, Roles(s) ⊆ Roles(u), where u = User(s). A request by u to invoke permission p
in session s is granted if u has activated one of p’s explicitly assigned roles in s, that
is, Roles(s) ∩ Roles(p) 6= ∅.
RBAC1
RBAC1 introduces the concept of a role hierarchy, which is modeled as a partial order
on the set of roles. In other words, the role hierarchy is a binary relation RH ⊆ R×R
that is reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive. We write r 6 r′ if (r, r′) ∈ RH and
r < r′ if r 6 r′ and r 6= r′. The role hierarchy is used to reduce the administrative
burden by reducing the number of explicit assignments in the UA and PA relations.
That is, if (u, r) ∈ UA and r′ 6 r, then u is implicitly assigned to r′; and if (p, r) ∈ PA
and r 6 r′ then p is implicitly assigned to r′.
Given r ∈ R, we write ↓r to denote the set of all elements in R that are less than or
equal to r: that is, ↓r = {r′ ∈ R : r′ 6 r}. Similarly, we write ↑r = {r′ ∈ R : r 6 r′}.
We write ↓Roles(u) to denote the set of roles explicitly and implicitly assigned to u,
that is
↓Roles(u) = {r′ ∈ R : ∃r ∈ Roles(u), r′ 6 r}.
Similarly, we write ↑Roles(p) to denote a set of roles explicitly and implicitly assigned
to p, that is
↑Roles(p) = {r′ ∈ R : ∃r ∈ Roles(p), r 6 r′}.
Note that henceforth we will write “authorized” to mean “explicitly and implicitly
assigned”. We write Prms(↓r) for the set of permissions for which r is authorized.
We now analyze the use of sessions in RBAC1. A user u is allowed to establish
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a session s to activate a set of roles that can be any subset of roles for which she is
authorized, that is, Roles(s) ⊆ ↓Roles(u), where u = User(s). A request by u to invoke
permission p in session s is granted if u has activated one of p’s authorized roles in s, that
is Roles(s) ∩ ↑Roles(p) 6= ∅. Providing that RH = {}, we have Roles(s) ⊆ ↓Roles(u) =
Roles(u) and ↑Roles(p) = Roles(p). In this case, we recover RBAC0 authorization
semantics. In other words, RBAC0 is a special case of RBAC1 in which the hierarchy
relation is empty.
RBAC2
RBAC2 extends RBAC0 by introducing constraints, which usually specifies a set of
forbidden configurations of an access control system. RBAC2 informally discussed three
types of constraints that can be defined over the components of RBAC0: dependency
constraints, cardinality constraints and separation of duty constraints. Dependency
constraints may specify that certain roles can be activated only if the requesting user has
already activated some other roles. Cardinality constraints may specify the maximum
number of users that can be assigned to or activate a role, and the maximum number
of roles that can be activated in a session by a user. Dependency and cardinality
constraints in role-based access control have received little attention in the literature,
and support for these constraints was dropped in the ANSI RBAC standard.
Separation of duty is a widely recognized business principle that is used to prevent
conflict of interests arising or to prevent fraudulent actions. It requires that more than
one user be involved in the execution of two or more tasks in a business process, which,
if performed by the same user, could expose the process to misuse. Early work on
separation of duty constraints in computer systems includes the Chinese Wall security
policy, which prohibits any user from having access to documents belonging to two
different competitors [18]. In RBAC2, separation of duty constraints are supported by
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defining mutually exclusive roles. Generally, the set of permissions that are required
to perform sensitive tasks are assigned to mutually exclusive roles, and no user can be
assigned to more than one role in the mutually exclusive set, or no user is allowed to
activate more than one role in the set. Simon and Zurko [84] refer to the former as
static separation of duty, and to the latter as dynamic separation of duty. The research
community has since taken an active interesting in proposing specification schemes for
separation of duty constraints in role-based access control [1, 15, 30, 45, 52, 70, 84],
and suggesting models for enforcing such constraints [15, 30, 65, 70, 84].
RBAC3
RBAC3 incorporates the features of RBAC1 and RBAC2. It is known that there exists
a certain “tension” between separation of duty constraints and a role hierarchy. In the
simplest case, if p and q are mutually exclusive permissions, then p and q should be
assigned to two different incomparable roles r and r′. The separation of duty between
two roles r and r′ is impossible to realize if r and r′ have a common senior role r′′,
because r′′ inherits the permissions of both roles. If we require that no user is allowed
to be assigned to or activate r′′, then there is no point in having the “unassignable”
role r′′ in the role hierarchy. A number of extended role-based access control models,
which we discuss in Chapter 3 and 4, have been introduced to address this shortcoming
of RBAC3.
2.2.2 ANSI-RBAC
The American National Standard Institute (ANSI) standard for role-based access con-
trol (RBAC) [2] provides a consistent and uniform definition of RBAC features, and
gives information technology vendors a guideline for designing RBAC products. The
ANSI RBAC standard includes three components: Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC,
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and Constrained RBAC.
Core RBAC defines the basic building blocks of a RBAC system: a set of basic
element sets U , S, R and P , a set of relations UA and PA, and a set of mapping
functions shown in the top part of Table 2.2. The table uses ANSI RBAC syntax
rather then the RBAC96-style syntax we used in the previous section, but we can
easily extend our notation to define these functions if desired.
Core Component
assigned users(r) = {u ∈ U : (u, r) ∈ UA}
assigned permissions(r) = {p ∈ P : (p, r) ∈ PA}
session users(s) = u
session roles(s) ⊆ {r ∈ R : (session users(s), r) ∈ UA}
avail session perms(s) =
⋃
r∈session roles(s) assigned permissions(r)
Hierarchical RBAC
authorized users(r) = {u ∈ U : r 6 r′, (u, r′) ∈ UA}
authorized permissions(r) = {p ∈ P : r > r′, (p, r′) ∈ PA}
Proposed extensions for Hierarchical RBAC
session roles(s) ⊆ {r ∈ R : r 6 r′, (session users(s), r′) ∈ UA}
avail session perms(s) =
⋃
r∈session roles(s) authorized permissions(r)
Table 2.2: ANSI-RBAC mapping functions
Hierarchical RBAC introduces role hierarchies that are intended to reflect the hier-
archical nature of many organizations and thereby simplify access control management.
There are two types of role hierarchies defined in the hierarchical component: general
role hierarchies and limited role hierarchies. The general role hierarchy is an arbitrary
partial order on the set of roles R. The limited role hierarchy is defined to be an
inverted tree structure, where each role has only a single immediate child. It is inter-
esting to note that separation of duty constraints are compatible with the limited role
hierarchy: the separation of duty constraint between two incomparable roles r and r′
can be enforced, because there does not exist a common senior role r′′ of r and r′ in
the limited role hierarchy.
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In addition, the hierarchical component defines two functions authorized users
and authorized permissions, shown in the second section of Table 2.2. The standard
states that r 6 r′ only if authorized permissions(r) ⊆ authorized permissions(r′)
and authorized users(r′) ⊆ authorized users(r). The core component defines func-
tions avail session perms and session roles, shown in the first section of Table 2.2,
but no analogous function is defined for the hierarchical component, which is a cu-
rious omission. We propose new definitions for the functions session roles and
avail session perms for the hierarchical component. These definitions are shown in
the third section of Table 2.2. Note that in core RBAC, assigned permissions(r) =
authorized permissions(r) for all r. Hence, our definition is consistent with that given
in the core component.
Constrained RBAC introduces two types of separation of duty constraints: Static
Separation of Duty (SSD) and Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSD). A SSD constraint
is specified as a pair (R′, n), where R′ ⊆ R and 2 6 n 6 |R′|, and can be defined in
Core RBAC and Hierarchical RBAC. The SSD constraint (R′, n) is satisfied by Core
RBAC if no user is assigned to n or more roles in the set R′, while the SSD constraints
(R′, n) is satisfied by hierarchical RBAC if no user is authorized for n or more roles
in the set R′. Like SSD, a DSD constraint is written as (R′, n), where R′ ⊆ R and
2 6 n 6 |R′|, which limits the roles that a user can activate in one session. Specifically,
the DSD constraint is satisfied if no user may simultaneously activate n or more roles
from R′ in one session. Clearly, satisfaction of a SSD constraint is simply enforced by
checking the number of roles in R′ for which each user is authorized. Similarly, it is
simple to check whether a DSD constraint is satisfied by computing the number of roles
in R′ that is activated in each session.
Li et al recently identified a number of design flaws and technical errors for the ANSI
RBAC standard and suggested some improvements to the standard [64]: the standard
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should remove the notion of sessions from the core component, and specify only one
role can be activated in a session; the standard should introduce a new approach for
modelling the role hierarchy so as to facilitate the changes to the role hierarchy; and
the standard should clearly specify and discuss the semantics of role hierarchy in terms
of user inheritance, permission inheritance and activation inheritance. The authors of
the original proposal for the ANSI-RBAC standard responded to each suggestion and
clarified the rationale for the choices they made in the standard [41].
2.3 Complexity theory
In this section, we give a brief introduction to compleixity theory, which provides a basis
for studying some fundamental problems in role-based access control in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6.
The study of computational problems is one of the main subjects in theoretical
computer science. In general, a (computational) problem φ can be expressed in terms
of some relation φ ⊆ Iφ × Sφ, where Iφ is the set of problem instances and Sφ is the
set of problem solutions. A (deterministic) algorithm is said to solve a problem φ if
that algorithm is guaranteed always to produce a solution for any instance i of φ.
Given a problem φ, clearly, we are interested in finding the most efficient algorithm for
solving the problem. The efficiency of an algorithm can be measured by the time and
memory required to execute the algorithm. In this thesis, we only concentrate on time
requirements when measuring the efficiency of algorithms.
The worst-case time complexity for an algorithm is a function ψ : N → R that
expresses the largest number of operations needed by the algorithm to solve a problem
instance of size n.5 The average-case time complexity of an algorithm is described in
5We assume the time complexity of an algorithm is independent of the encoding of the input and
the underlying computation model that executes the algorithm.
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terms of the average number of operations needed by the algorithm to solve all problem
instances of size n. In this thesis, we shall concentrate on finding only worst-case time
complexity for algorithms. The (worst-case) time complexity of an algorithm is often a
complex expression, which is simplified by using “big-O” notation that only considers
the highest order term of the expression, and discards both the coefficient of that
term and any lower order terms. We formalize this notation in the following definition
(see [42], for example).
Definition 2.3.1 Let f and g be functions f, g : N → R+. We say f(n) = O(g(n)) if
there exist positive integers c and n0 such that f(n) 6 c · g(n) for all n > n0.
For instance, an algorithm that uses 50n3+20n2+n operations to solve a problem
instance of size n has time complexity O(n3). With the help of big-O notation, we can
determine whether it is practical to use a particular algorithm to solve a problem as
the size of the problem instance increases.
A polynomial time algorithm is defined to be one whose time complexity function
is O(p(n)) for some polynomial function p, where n denotes the size of the input to the
algorithm. Polynomial time algorithms are normally regarded as desirable algorithms,
and henceforth we may refer to polynomial time algorithms as efficient algorithms. A
problem is said to be tractable if there is a polynomial time algorithm that can solve
the problem.
A problem is said to be intractable if there is no polynomial time algorithm that
can solve the problem. Given a hard problem, proving its intractability is just as
hard as finding a polynomial time algorithm for it. However, the theory of NP-
completeness [27, 42, 60] provides techniques for proving that the given problem is
as hard as some problem for which no efficient algorithm is believed to exist, despite
extensive research. Indeed, there exists a list of complexity classes, including P, NP,
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NP-complete and NP-hard, where each class identifies a set of problems of related
time complexity.
Reduction is a basic tool for relating the time complexities of different problems.
Basically, a reduction from a problem φ to a problem φ′ presents a method for solving
φ using an algorithm for φ′. Before defining two important types of reductions, we
introduce the concept of a decision problem on which the complexity classes P, NP
and NP-complete are based.
We define a decision problem φ to be a predicate φ : Iφ → {0, 1}. In other words,
every instance of the decision problem has one of two solutions. A decision problem φ
is said to be in P if there exists a polynomial time algorithm that solves φ.
In order to define NP we introduce the concept of a nondeterministic algorithm.
A nondeterministic algorithm for a decision problem φ takes a problem instance i ∈
Iφ as input, and executes the following two stages: (i) nondeterministically guess a
structure S (also called certificate) from i, and (ii) verify deterministically whether S
can prove that the answer for i is 1. The algorithm outputs “yes” if there exists S that
proves that the answer for i is 1 and outputs “no” otherwise. The computation of an
nondeterministic algorithm is a tree whose branches correspond to different possible
guesses, and each independent guess is verified concurrently. The time complexity of a
nondeterministic algorithm is defined to be the time used by the longest computation
branch [85], that is the largest number of operations used to verify a particular guess.
A nondeterministic algorithm is said to solve a decision problem φ in polynomial time
if there exists a polynomial p such that, for any problem instance i ∈ Iφ of size n, there
exists at least one guess S which leads the algorithm to return “yes” with the time
complexity O(p(n)) if and only if the answer for i is 1.6 A decision problem φ is said
6Clearly, this definition imposes that the size of the guessed structure S is polynomially bounded,
because the algorithm should be able to check that guess in polynomial time.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 46
to be in NP if it can be solved by a polynomial time nondeterministic algorithm.
Consider the set cover problem: given a universe U , a collection C of subsets of U
such that U =
⋃
C∈C C, and an integer k, does C contain a cover of U having size k or
less, that is, a subset D ⊆ C such that
⋃
D∈DD = U and |D| 6 k? There is no known
polynomial time algorithm for solving the set cover problem. We can easily obtain an
exponential time algorithm for this problem by searching every possible subset of C until
one with the desired property is found. However, we can construct a nondeterministic
algorithm that simply guesses a subset D of C and checks in polynomial time whether
the union of D’s elements equals U and whether D has no more than k elements.
Clearly, for any instance (U, C, k) of the set cover problem, there will exist a guess that
leads the nondeterministic algorithm to produce an output of “yes” if and only if there
exists a cover for the instance (U, C, k). Therefore, the set cover problem is in NP.
The question of whether P = NP is one of the greatest unsolved problems in the-
oretical computer science. It is easy to see that P ⊆ NP, because a deterministic
algorithm is just a special case of a nondeterministic one, in which no guess is per-
formed [42]. However, it is not known whether NP ⊆ P. Most researchers believe that
NP * P, because no polynomial time algorithm has been found for certain problems
in NP such as the set cover decision problem. The concept of NP-completeness is
very useful when considering the question of whether P = NP. Informally, the NP-
complete problems are the “hardest” problems in NP in the sense that they are the
ones most likely not to be in P.
Definition 2.3.2 Given two decision problems φ and φ′, we say there is a polynomial
transformation from φ to φ′ (written φ ∝ φ′) if there is a polynomial time function
f : Iφ → Iφ′ such that for all i ∈ Iφ, φ(i) = 1 if and only if φ
′(f(i)) = 1.
A decision problem φ is said to be NP-complete if φ is in NP, and for every
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problem φ′ inNP there exists a polynomial transformation of φ′ to φ. Since polynomial
transformation is transitive, we can also say that a decision problem φ isNP-complete if
φ is in NP, and there exists a polynomial transformation from a known NP-complete
problem φ′ to φ. If an NP-complete problem can be solved by a polynomial time
algorithm, then all the problems in NP are tractable. Thus, the question of whether
P = NP is reduced to the question of whether NP-complete problems are tractable.
The techniques for proving NP-completeness can be used to prove the hardness for
some problems outsideNP. The basic idea is to generalize the notion of the polynomial
transformation in such a way that a set of problems other than decision problems can
be shown at least as hard as the NP-complete problems.
Definition 2.3.3 An oracle for problem φ is an abstract device that is capable of re-
turning a solution for any instance of φ. It is assumed that the oracle returns the
solution in just one computational step.
Definition 2.3.4 Given two problems φ and φ′, we say
• there is a polynomial time Turing reduction from φ to φ′ (written φ ∝T φ
′) if
there is a polynomial time algorithm f which solves φ by querying an oracle for
φ′.
• φ and φ′ are polynomial time Turing equivalent (written φ =T φ
′) if φ ∝T φ
′ and
φ′ ∝T φ.
We are not concerned with the way the oracle determines its responses. We can
imagine the oracle for φ′ as a subroutine someone gives to us. We don’t know how
it works, we just know what it returns. What we need to do is to write a program
f to solve φ in polynomial time by invoking the subroutine for φ′ many times in the
program f (though no more than a polynomially bounded number of times). Now we
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say that a (general) problem φ is NP-hard if there exists a polynomial time Turing
reduction from aNP-complete problem φ′ to φ. If there is a polynomial time algorithm
for any NP-hard problem, then there are polynomial time algorithms for all problems
in NP, and hence P = NP. Note that, if P = NP, it does not mean that all NP-
hard problems are tractable, because some NP-hard problems may be harder than
NP-complete problems.
However, it is important to prove that the hard problem is NP-complete or NP-
hard, because it provides a better understanding of the problem and leads algorithm
designers to work on productive algorithms. For example, we can stop searching for a
polynomial time algorithm that computes an exact solution to the problem. Instead,
we might look for a heuristic algorithm that runs in polynomial time and computes a
solution that is “close” to the exact one. The quality of a heuristic algorithm is usually
evaluated and compared through empirical experiments [47]. Alternatively, we might
design an approximation algorithm that extends the heuristic algorithm with the worst
case guarantees on the quality of the solution produced by the algorithm [5].
Further detail about the theory of NP-completeness and approximation algorithms
can be found in [5, 42, 91], for example. In Chapter 5 we will use the theory of
NP-completeness to prove the complexity results for some computational problems in
role-based access control, and design a number of heuristic algorithms to solve one of
those problems in Chapter 6.
Chapter 3
The Oriented Permission RBAC
Model and its Applications
Role-based access control and role hierarchies have generated considerable research
activity in recent years. Crampton [29] suggested a role-based access control model that
adopts a similar approach to RBAC96 with respect to the role hierarchy and the user-
role assignment relation, but proposed a new approach to permissions and permission
inheritance within the role hierarchy. In particular, permissions are oriented and can be
inherited in one of three ways within the hierarchy: by more senior roles, by less senior
roles and by no other roles. The motivation for this model is to address the deficiencies
of the standard RBAC approach to inheritance and to offer certain advantages over
existing role-based models. Hereafter we refer to this model as OP-RBAC (Oriented
Permission RBAC).
The main contribution of this chapter is to investigate various applications of OP-
RBAC. Since the introduction of RBAC, several authors have discussed the relationship
between RBAC and the Bell-LaPadula model [69, 72, 73, 81]. Osborn et al [73] show
that information flow policies in a number of different Bell-LaPadula models can be
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implemented in RBAC by the addition of a second role hierarchy and some constraints
on the RBAC relations. However, these approaches are somewhat artificial and limited.
The model for permission inheritance in OP-RBAC provides an alternative way of
implementing these mandatory policies within the context of RBAC. We believe that
this new approach is simpler, more natural, and more flexible than existing work in
this area.
Separation of duty has always been an important consideration in RBAC models.
However, the standard RBAC model is not without its problems in this area. It is
impossible for a user to activate any role that is senior to any pair of roles that appear
in a dynamic separation of duty constraint. Existing work, such as ERBAC96, requires
a distinction to be made between role activation and permission usage hierarchies to
solve this impasse. We will show how to use OP-RBAC to solve this problem without
having to use a second hierarchy.
It has been shown that there are situations where it is useful to distinguish between
role activation and permission usage inheritance [82]. Such a distinction has been made
in both the ERBAC96 model [82] and the GTRBAC model [58], by introducing distinct
role hierarchies. The final contribution of this chapter is to prove that any instance
of the ERBAC96 model can be transformed into an instance of the OP-RBAC model,
which requires a single role hierarchy.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we
formally present OP-RBAC and inter-relationships among the different components of
the model. In Section 3.2, we briefly summarize the Bell-LaPadula model and introduce
its extensions. In Section 3.3, we illustrate how OP-RBAC can be used to implement a
number of different Bell-LaPadula models with the addition and modification of a few
constraints to the basic model. We also discuss related work in this area and compare it
to our approach. In Section 3.4, we consider two other applications of OP-RBAC: one
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is to show that dynamic separation of duty constraints can be defined and enforced in a
hierarchical RBAC model; the other is to demonstrate how to implement the ERBAC06
model using OP-RBAC. A preliminary version of this chapter appeared in 2007 [20].
3.1 The OP-RBAC model
The OP-RBAC model is a role-based access control model that contains a novel ap-
proach to permission inheritance. As we shall see, this model offers certain advantages
over existing standard role-based models. We now formally introduce the characteristic
features of OP-RBAC.
We assume the existence of a partially ordered set of roles (R,6), a set of users U
and a user-role assignment relation UA ⊆ U × R. These components are identical to
the ones in RBAC1. We also assume the existence of a set of permissions P and define
the permission-role assignment relation PA ⊆ P ×R.
The distinctive feature in OP-RBAC is that each permission is “oriented” with
respect to inheritance and can be either “up”, “down” or “neutral”. That is, P is the
disjoint union of P+, P− and P 0, where P+ is the set of up permissions, P− is the
set of down permissions and P 0 is the set of neutral permissions. We denote the set
of roles explicitly assigned to p by Roles(p) and the set of roles authorized for p by the
function RolesE : P → 2
R, where
RolesE(p) =


↑Roles(p), if p ∈ P+,
↓Roles(p), if p ∈ P−,
Roles(p), if p ∈ P 0.
.
We say that RolesE(p) is the (set of) effective roles for p.
CHAPTER 3. THE OP-RBAC MODEL AND ITS APPLICATIONS 52
Given a session s in which a set of roles activated Roles(s) ⊆ ↓Roles(u), where
u = User(s), a request by user u to invoke permission p in session s is only granted if
u has activated one of p’s effective roles in s, that is Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. Hence,
RBAC1 is a special case of OP-RBAC in which all permissions are up permissions, that
is, RolesE(p) = ↑Roles(p) for all p.
3.2 The Bell-LaPadula model and extensions
The Bell-LaPadula model (BLP) is probably the most widely known security model
and implements an information flow policy designed to preserve the confidentiality of
information. To meet security requirements in different contexts, several versions of
BLP have been developed, which differ in the use of security functions for labelling
entities, and the definitions of the simple security property and the *-property. We
assume the existence of a set of security functions Λ. A particular version of BLP
chooses a subset of Λ for assigning security levels to subjects and objects, and defines
the simple security property and the *-property with respect to the chosen security
functions.
Table 3.1 summarizes the various BLP models in the literature, where piss denotes
the simple security property and pi∗ denotes the *-property. We also write pissi to denote
the simple security property in BLPi, and pi
∗
i to denote the *-property in BLPi. Note
that all BLP models include the discretionary security property, which we denote by
pids. It requires that all requests are authorized by the protection matrix M . Recall
that V models the authorizations that have been granted and not yet revoked by the
system. BLP0 corresponds to the simple version of BLP introduced in Chapter 2.
Note that as a consequence of piss0 and pi
∗
0 , a subject s is authorized to write (that
is, simultaneously read and append access) an object o only if λ(s) = λ(o). BLP1
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introduces the strict *-property (λ(s) = λ(o) for append access) that is used to prevent
integrity or covert channel problems due to write up [81]. In order to give subjects
more power than allowed by piss0 and pi
∗
0, BLP2 associates a pair of security labels λr(s)
and λa(s) with each subject and requires that λr(s) > λa(s). The simple security
property is applied with respect to λr(s) and the *-property to λa(s). Consequently,
any subject s is allowed to write an object whose security label is in the trust range
of labels between λr(s) and λa(s) [9]. It can be seen that the information flow policy
implemented in BLP2 is partly relaxed to achieve selective downgrading of information
from a high security level to a low security level.
Model Λ piss pi∗
BLP0 λ : S ∪O → L
∀(s, o, read) ∈ V,
λ(s) > λ(o)
∀(s, o, append) ∈ V,
λ(s) 6 λ(o)
BLP1 λ : S ∪O → L
∀(s, o, read) ∈ V,
λ(s) > λ(o)
∀(s, o, append) ∈ V,
λ(s) = λ(o)
BLP2
λ : O → L
λr : S → L
λa : S → L
∀s ∈ S, λa(s) 6 λr(s)
∀(s, o, read) ∈ V,
λr(s) > λ(o)
∀(s, o, append) ∈ V,
λa(s) 6 λ(o)
BLP3
ST ⊆ S
S′ = S \ ST
λ : S ∪O → L
λc : S → L
∀s ∈ S, λc(s) 6 λ(s)
∀(s, o, read) ∈ V,
λ(s) > λ(o)
∀(s′, o, read) ∈ V,
λc(s
′) > λ(o)
∀(s′, o, append) ∈ V,
λc(s
′) 6 λ(o)
∀(s′, o, write) ∈ V,
λc(s
′) = λ(o)
Table 3.1: A summary of the different Bell-LaPadula models
BLP3 is a modified Bell-LaPadula model [8, 12] that introduces two important
concepts: current security label of subjects and trusted subjects. When a user u logs in
to a computer system, a subject s is created and operates at a current security label
λc(s), where λc(s) 6 λ(u). We define λ(u) = λ(s), which means the clearance level of
u is recorded as the maximum level of s. The *-property (pi∗3) is defined in terms of the
current security label of subjects for read, append and write access. As an immediate
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consequence of pi∗3 , if a subject is simultaneously reading and appending to two different
objects, the object o that is being appended to will have at least as high a security
label as the object o′ that is being read.
Trusted subjects ST are those subjects not constrained by pi
∗
3. In other words, a
trusted subject is one assumed not to copy high level information into a low level object
even if it is possible [12]. Hence, pi∗3 is applied only to untrusted subjects.
On the other hand, the simple security property (piss3 ) is applied to (trusted and
untrusted) subjects S, and is defined with respect to λ(s) for read access. It is worth
noting that given a set of untrusted subjects S′, the satisfaction of pi∗3 with respect to
S′ implies the satisfaction of piss3 with respect to S
′ [66]. This is because if pi∗3 is satisfied
with respect to s′ ∈ S′ then we have λc(s
′) > λ(o) for read access, and by definition
λ(s′) > λc(s
′).
3.3 Implementing BLP using OP-RBAC
We now demonstrate how, with the addition and subsequent modification of a few
constraints, OP-RBAC can be used to implement the BLP models described in Sec-
tion 3.2. The most important contribution is that OP-RBAC provides a more direct
implementation of the BLP models than has previously been possible using role-based
models [72, 73]. In addition, OP-RBAC supports the assignment of compound permis-
sions (write permissions) which include both read and append access to objects.
We define the state of an OP-RBAC system to be a tuple (W, (UA,RH ,PA)). The
set (UA,RH ,PA) models the access control state, which is used to compute those access
requests that are authorized and would be granted by the access control mechanism.
The set W ⊆ U × P models the set of permissions that are currently “active”; that
is, those permissions that have been granted to users by the access control mechanism.
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Initially we ignore pids as it is common to all BLP models. In Section 3.3.7 we discuss
how limited support for pids can be provided in OP-RBAC, unlike existing RBAC
approaches [73], which do not consider this aspect of BLP at all.
3.3.1 Security labels
Crampton [29] discussed why the set of roles assigned to a user can be interpreted as a
security label for that user, while the set of roles assigned to a permission does not have
the same interpretation. We now briefly describe this interpretation, which inspires us
to consider how we might define suitable security labels for users, permissions and
objects in a role-based model.
Let (R,6) be a partially ordered set of roles and let Roles(u) denote the set of
roles explicitly assigned to the user u. Let L(R) = {↓S : S ⊆ R}, then (L(R),⊆) is
the lattice of order ideals in R.1 We can regard ↓Roles(u) in (L(R),⊆) as the actual
security label of u. For example, Figure 3.1 depicts a role hierarchy (R,6) and the
associated lattice (L(R),⊆). If Roles(u) = {r3}, then ↓Roles(u) = {r1, r2, r3} can be
regarded as a security label of u. A user u can activate a session s using some subset
of the roles authorized for u, that is Roles(s) ⊆ ↓Roles(u). We can regard the label
↓Roles(s) in (L(R),⊆) as the current security label of u. For example, a user assigned
to r3 can create a session using role r1, thereby creating a current security label of
{r1}. In short, we interpret the user’s security label in terms of his explicit user-role
assignment(s) in the UA relation, and the user’s current security label in terms of the
roles he has chosen to activate in a session.2 In other words, the user’s security label is
system-defined and the current security label is chosen by the user, which corresponds
closely to λ and λc in BLP3.
1If X is a poset then Y ⊆ X is an order ideal if for all y ∈ Y , x ∈ X, x 6 y implies x ∈ Y .
2In actual fact, we associate the sets Roles(u) and Roles(s) with the respective security labels
↓Roles(u) and ↓Roles(s) in L(R).
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Figure 3.1: A role hierarchy and the associated lattice
However, we can not define the security label of a permission in terms of the set of
roles explicitly assigned to the permission, because permission usage in RBAC model is
incompatible with BLP. In RBAC models, permission usage is based on an existential
criterion; a user u is authorized for permission p if there exist roles r and r′ such that
(u, r) ∈ UA, (p, r′) ∈ PA and r′ 6 r. In BLP, permission usage is based on a universal
criterion; a user u is authorized for permission p (to read an object) if the security label
of u dominates the security label of p. In other words, if we interpret the security label of
a permission to be ↓Roles(p), we would require that ↓Roles(p) ⊆ ↓Roles(u). Consider the
following situation: Roles(u) = {r1} and Roles(p) = {r1, r2}. In RBAC, u is authorized
for p, because there exists a role r1 that both u and p are assigned to. However, in
BLP, u is not able to perform p, because ↓Roles(u) = {r1} ⊆ ↓Roles(p) = {r1, r2}.
The incompatibility can be resolved by assigning each permission p to a unique
role r. That is Roles(p) = {r} for some r ∈ R (as is assumed in existing approaches).
In this case, the security label of the permission is ↓r. Moreover, we require that all
permissions for a particular object be assigned to the same role r, thereby the security
label of the object is ↓r.
The limitation of this approach is that we need to construct an additional lattice of
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security labels based on the partially ordered set of roles. For each user and permission,
we are also required to map the set of roles associated with the user or the permission
to a security label in the lattice.
An alternative approach is to introduce more restrictive user-role assignment and
permission-role assignment relations in OP-RBAC. We assume that user-role assign-
ment and permission-role assignment are functions, that is, for all u ∈ U and p ∈ P ,
Roles(u) = r and Roles(p) = r′ for some r, r′ ∈ R. Hence, roles r and r′ can be in-
terpreted as the security labels for user u and permission p respectively. Note that
this approach of defining security labels of a user and of a permission is adopted by
most existing work [73, 81], because the simplicity of this approach provides a natural
implementation of BLP models, although it would be a significant restriction in general
RBAC models. Along with this approach, we now demonstrate how OP-RBAC can be
constrained to simulate BLP0, BLP1, BLP2, and BLP3.
3.3.2 BLP0
Recall that a BLP0 system is defined by (L,6) and λ : U ∪O → L. Granted requests
must satisfy piss0 and pi
∗
0 . In order to implement BLP0 using OP-RBAC, we set (R,6)
equal to (L,6). In addition, we define the following constraints:
Constraint 3.3.1 UA is a function; in other words, each user is assigned to a unique
role. The security label of u is defined to be r, where (u, r) ∈ UA.
Constraint 3.3.2 A user u has no choice when running a session; the unique role to
which he is assigned is activated.
Constraint 3.3.3 PA is a function; each permission is assigned to a unique role.
Constraint 3.3.4 Each permission has the form (o,m), where m ∈
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{read, append, write} and o is an object. We require that all three permissions
are assigned to the same role r. The security label of o is defined to be r.
Constraint 3.3.5 If p = (o, read) then p ∈ P+.
Constraint 3.3.6 If p = (o, append) then p ∈ P−.
Constraint 3.3.7 If p = (o, write) then p ∈ P 0.
We now prove that given a BLP0 system, we have an OP-RBAC system with
appropriate constraints defined above that is equivalent to the BLP0 system, in the
sense that the same set of requests is authorized.
Theorem 3.3.1 Given a BLP0 system Σ defined by (L,6) and λ, and an OP-RBAC
system Σ′ that satisfies constraints 3.3.1–3.3.7, then a request (u, p) is authorized in Σ
(by satisfying piss0 and pi
∗
0) if and only if (u, p) is authorized in Σ
′.
Proof We first prove the “if” condition.
LetW ⊆ U×P be the set of permissions that have been granted to users in the OP-
RBAC system Σ′. Let (u, p) ∈ W , where p = (o, read), (p, r) ∈ PA, and (u, r′) ∈ UA.
By Constraint 3.3.5, we have RolesE(p) = ↑r. Moveover, since (u, p) ∈ W , there exists
a session s activated by u such that Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. By Constraint 3.3.2,
Roles(s) = {r′}. Hence r′ ∈ ↑r; that is r′ > r. By Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) = r′, and by
Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = r; that is λ(u) > λ(o). Hence piss0 is satisfied.
Let (u, p) ∈ W , where p = (o, append), (p, r) ∈ PA, and (u, r′) ∈ UA. By Con-
straint 3.3.6, we have RolesE(p) = ↓r. Moveover, since (u, p) ∈ W , there exists a
session s activated by u such that Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. By Constraint 3.3.2,
Roles(s) = {r′}. Hence r′ ∈ ↓r; that is r′ 6 r. By Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) = r′, and by
Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = r; that is λ(u) 6 λ(o). Hence pi∗0 is satisfied.
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Let (u, p) ∈ W , where p = (o, write), (p, r) ∈ PA, and (u, r′) ∈ UA. By Con-
straint 3.3.7, we have RolesE(p) = {r}. Moveover, since (u, p) ∈ W , there exists a
session s activated by u such that Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. By Constraint 3.3.2,
Roles(s) = {r′}. Hence r′ = r. By Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) = r′, and by Constraint 3.3.4,
λ(o) = r; that is λ(u) = λ(o). Hence piss0 and pi
∗
0 are satisfied.
We now prove the “only if” condition.
Let V be the set of requests that have been granted in the BLP0 system Σ. Let
(u, p) ∈ V , where p = (o, read). By piss0 , λ(u) > λ(o). By Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) =
Roles(u) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.2, u can only activate r′ in a session s, that is
Roles(s) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = Roles(p) = r, and by Constraint 3.3.5,
RolesE(p) = ↑Roles(p) = ↑r. Since λ(u) > λ(o), r
′ ∈ ↑r. Hence Roles(s)∩RolesE(p) 6= ∅.
Therefore u is authorized for p in Σ′.
Let (u, p) ∈ V , where p = (o, append). By pi∗0 , λ(u) 6 λ(o). By Constraint 3.3.1,
λ(u) = Roles(u) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.2, u can only activate r′ in a session s, that
is Roles(s) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = Roles(p) = r, and by Constraint 3.3.6,
RolesE(p) = ↓Roles(p) = ↓r. Since λ(u) 6 λ(o), r
′ ∈ ↓r. Hence Roles(s)∩RolesE(p) 6= ∅.
Therefore u is authorized for p in Σ′.
Let (u, p) ∈ V , where p = (o, write). By piss0 and pi
∗
0 , λ(u) = λ(o). By Con-
straint 3.3.1, λ(u) = Roles(u) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.2, u can only activate r′ in
a session s, that is Roles(s) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = Roles(p) = r, and
by Constraint 3.3.7, RolesE(p) = Roles(p) = r. Since λ(u) = λ(o), r
′ = r. Hence
Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. Therefore u is authorized for p in Σ
′. 
Remark 3.3.1 Previous work in this area can not deal with write permissions [73, 81],
something we believe detracts significantly from the utility of existing approaches. An
important consequence of Theorem 3.3.1 is that for any write permission to be granted,
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the user must have exactly the same security label as the object. In other words, our
approach deals with write permissions appropriately, and in the manner intended by the
original BLP model. For this reason alone, we believe our approach is to be preferred
to existing work in the literature.
3.3.3 BLP1
The use of the strict *-property in BLP1 requires a simple modification to Con-
straint 3.3.6.
Constraint 3.3.8 If p = (o, append) then p ∈ P 0.
By Constraint 3.3.8, a user is allowed to perform an append permission only if
the user has activated the role to which the append permission is assigned. This is
analogous to the strict *-property in BLP1 where a user must have the same security
label as an object in order to append to it.
Theorem 3.3.2 Given a BLP1 system Σ defined by (L,6) and λ, and an OP-RBAC
system Σ′ that satisfies constraints 3.3.1–3.3.5 and 3.3.7–3.3.8, then a request (u, p) is
authorized in Σ (by satisfying piss1 and pi
∗
1) if and only if (u, p) is authorized in Σ
′.
The proof of this result is similar to that of Theorem 3.3.1 and is omitted.
3.3.4 BLP2
In the trusted network interpretation of multi-level security (BLP2), each user is as-
sociated with a pair of security labels λr(u) and λa(u), where λa(u) 6 λr(u). The
simple security property piss2 is applied with respect to λr(u) and the *-property pi
∗
2
with respect to λa(u). As a consequence, the user can invoke a write permission on an
object whose security label is contained in the range [λa(u), λr(u)]. Clearly, BLP0 is a
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subcase of BLP2, where λr(u) = λa(u). To implement BLP2 in OP-RBAC, we replace
Constraints 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 with the following constraints.
Constraint 3.3.9 Each user u is assigned to at most two roles ra and rr with ra 6 rr.
That is Roles(u) = {ra, rr}, where rr corresponds to λr(u) and ra corresponds to λa(u).
Constraint 3.3.10 A user assigned to roles ra and rr has no choice when running a
session; the roles in [ra, rr] are activated.
Theorem 3.3.3 Given a BLP2 system Σ defined by (L,6), λr, λa and λ, and an OP-
RBAC system Σ′ that satisfies constraints 3.3.3–3.3.7 and 3.3.9–3.3.10, then a request
(u, p) is authorized in Σ (by satisfying piss2 and pi
∗
2) if and only if (u, p) is authorized in
Σ′.
Proof We first prove the “if” condition.
Let (u, p) ∈ W , where p = (o, read), (p, r) ∈ PA, (u, rr) ∈ UA, and (u, ra) ∈ UA.
By Constraint 3.3.5, we have RolesE(p) = ↑r. Moveover, since (u, p) ∈ W , there exits
a session s activated by u such that Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅; that is, there exists
r′ ∈ Roles(s) such that r′ > r. By Constraint 3.3.10, rr > r
′ > ra; that is rr > r. By
Constraint 3.3.9, λr(u) = rr, and by Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = r; that is λr(u) > λ(o).
Hence piss2 is satisfied.
Let (u, p) ∈W , where p = (o, append), (p, r) ∈ PA, (u, rr) ∈ UA, and (u, ra) ∈ UA.
By Constraint 3.3.6, we have RolesE(p) = ↓r. Moveover, since (u, p) ∈ W , there exits
a session s activated by u such that Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅; that is, there exists
r′ ∈ Roles(s) such that r′ 6 r. By Constraint 3.3.10, ra 6 r
′ 6 rr; that is ra 6 r. By
Constraint 3.3.9, λa(u) = ra, and by Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = r; that is λa(u) 6 λ(o).
Hence pi∗2 is satisfied.
Let (u, p) ∈ W , where p = (o, write), (p, r) ∈ PA, (u, rr) ∈ UA, and (u, ra) ∈ UA.
By Constraint 3.3.7, we have RolesE(p) = {r}. Moveover, since (u, p) ∈W , there exits
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a session s activated by u such that Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅; that is, there exists
r′ ∈ Roles(s) such that r′ = r. By Constraint 3.3.10, ra 6 r
′ 6 rr, by Constraint 3.3.9,
λr(u) = rr and λa(u) = ra, and by Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = r; that is λa(u) 6 λ(o) 6
λr(u). Hence pi
ss
2 and pi
∗
2 are satisfied.
We now prove the “only if” condition.
Let V be the set of requests that have been granted in the BLP2 system Σ. Let
(u, p) ∈ V , where p = (o, read). By piss2 , λr(u) > λ(o). By Constraint 3.3.9, λr(u) =
rr ∈ Roles(u). By Constraint 3.3.10, u must activate a set of roles including rr in a
session s, that is rr ∈ Roles(s). By Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = Roles(p) = r, and by
Constraint 3.3.5, RolesE(p) = ↑Roles(p) = ↑r. Since λr(u) > λ(o), rr ∈ ↑r. Hence
Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. Therefore u is authorized for p in Σ
′.
Let (u, p) ∈ V , where p = (o, append). By pi∗2, λa(u) 6 λ(o). By Constraint 3.3.9,
λa(u) = ra ∈ Roles(u). By Constraint 3.3.10, u must activate a set of roles including
ra in a session s, that is ra ∈ Roles(s). By Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = Roles(p) = r, and
by Constraint 3.3.6, RolesE(p) = ↓Roles(p) = ↓r. Since λa(u) 6 λ(o), ra ∈ ↓r. Hence
Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. Therefore u is authorized for p in Σ
′.
Let (u, p) ∈ V , where p = (o, write). By piss2 and pi
∗
2 , λa(u) 6 λ(o) 6 λr(u).
By Constraint 3.3.9, Roles(u) = {rr, ra}, where rr = λr(u) and ra = λa(u). By
Constraint 3.3.10, u must activate all roles [ra, rr] in a session s, that is Roles(s) =
[ra, rr]. By Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = Roles(p) = r, and by Constraint 3.3.7, RolesE(p) =
Roles(p) = r. Since λa(u) 6 λ(o) 6 λr(u), r ∈ [ra, rr]. Hence Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅.
Therefore u is authorized for p in Σ′. 
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3.3.5 BLP3
BLP3 introduces the current security function λc to simplify the evaluation of the *-
property pi∗3
3, and to improve usability by allowing a user to downgrade his security
level. In addition, BLP3 introduces trusted subjects that are allowed to operate without
the extra encumbrance of pi∗3. Typical examples of trusted subjects in the context of
operating systems are device drivers and memory management software.
In order to provide close correlations between BLP3 and OP-RBAC, from now on,
we assume that no subject in BLP3 could be trusted not to copy high level information
into low level objects. In other words, all subjects in BLP3 are untrusted subjects
who subject to piss3 and pi
∗
3 . In this case, as we discussed in Section 3.2, pi
∗
3 implies
piss3 . Hence, a request from a subject to access an object is granted in a BLP3 system
only if this request satisfies pi∗3 . In order to implement BLP3 in OP-RBAC, we replace
Constraint 3.3.2 with the following constraint.
Constraint 3.3.11 Each user u can only activate a single role r′ ∈ ↓Roles(u) = ↓r
when running a session s. The current security label of u is defined to be Roles(s) = {r′}
for some r′ 6 r.
Theorem 3.3.4 Given a BLP3 system Σ defined by (L,6), λc, and λ, and an OP-
RBAC system Σ′ that satisfies constraints 3.3.1, 3.3.3–3.3.7 and 3.3.11, then a request
(u, p) is authorized in Σ (by satisfying pi∗3) if and only if (u, p) is authorized in Σ
′.
Proof We first prove the “if” condition.
Let (u, p) ∈ W , where p = (o, read), (p, r) ∈ PA, and (u, r′) ∈ UA. By Con-
straint 3.3.5, we have RolesE(p) = ↑r. Moveover, since (u, p) ∈ W , there exists a
session s activated by u such that Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. By Constraint 3.3.11,
3The *-property in the earlier formulation of the Bell-LaPadula model [10, 11] requires that the
decision whether to grant a request from a subject to write an object, for example, can only be made
by considering the security labels of all objects the subject has previously read.
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Roles(s) = {r′′}. Hence r′′ ∈ ↑r; that is r′′ > r. By Constraint 3.3.11, λc(u) = r
′′, and
by Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = r; that is λc(u) > λ(o). By Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) = r
′,
and by Constraint 3.3.11, r′′ 6 r′; that is λc(u) 6 λ(u). Hence the first part of pi
∗
3 is
satisfied.
Let (u, p) ∈ W , where p = (o, append), (p, r) ∈ PA, and (u, r′) ∈ UA. By Con-
straint 3.3.6, we have RolesE(p) = ↓r. Moveover, since (u, p) ∈ W , there exists a
session s activated by u such that Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. By Constraint 3.3.11,
Roles(s) = {r′′}. Hence r′′ ∈ ↓r; that is r′′ 6 r. By Constraint 3.3.11, λc(u) = r
′′,
and by Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = r; that is λc(u) 6 λ(o). Obviously, r
′′ 6 r′, hence
λc(u) 6 λ(u). Hence the second part of pi
∗
3 is satisfied.
Let (u, p) ∈ W , where p = (o, write), (p, r) ∈ PA, and (u, r′) ∈ UA. By Con-
straint 3.3.7, we have RolesE(p) = {r}. Moveover, since (u, p) ∈ W , there exists a
session s activated by u such that Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. By Constraint 3.3.11,
Roles(s) = {r′′}. Hence r′′ = r. By Constraint 3.3.11, λc(u) = r
′′, and by Con-
straint 3.3.4, λ(o) = r; that is λc(u) = λ(o). Obviously, r
′′ 6 r′, hence λc(u) 6 λ(u).
Hence the third part of pi∗3 is satisfied.
We now prove the “only if” condition.
Let V be the set of requests that have been granted in the BLP3 system Σ. Let
(u, p) ∈ V , where p = (o, read). By pi∗3 , λ(o) 6 λc(u), and λc(u) 6 λ(u). By
Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) = Roles(u) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.11, u can only acti-
vate a role r′′ in a session s, that is λc(u) = Roles(s) = r
′′, where r′′ 6 r′ corre-
sponds to λc(u) 6 λ(u). By Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = Roles(p) = r, and by Con-
straint 3.3.5, RolesE(p) = ↑Roles(p) = ↑r. Since λc(u) > λ(o), r
′′ ∈ ↑r. Hence
Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. Therefore u is authorized for p in Σ
′.
Let (u, p) ∈ V , where p = (o, append). By pi∗3 , λc(u) 6 λ(o), and λc(u) 6 λ(u).
By Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) = Roles(u) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.11, u can only activate
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a role r′′ in a session s, that is λc(u) = Roles(s) = r
′′, where r′′ 6 r′ corresponds to
λc(u) 6 λ(u). By Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = Roles(p) = r, and by Constraint 3.3.6,
RolesE(p) = ↓Roles(p) = ↓r. Since λc(u) 6 λ(o), r
′′ ∈ ↓r. Hence Roles(s)∩RolesE(p) 6=
∅. Therefore u is authorized for p in Σ′.
Let (u, p) ∈ V , where p = (o, write). By pi∗3, λc(u) = λ(o) and λc(u) 6 λ(u). By
Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) = Roles(u) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.11, u can only activate a
role r′′ in a session s, that is λc(u) = Roles(s) = r
′′, where r′′ 6 r′ corresponds to
λc(u) 6 λ(u). By Constraint 3.3.4, λ(o) = Roles(p) = r, and by Constraint 3.3.7,
RolesE(p) = Roles(p) = r. Since λc(u) = λ(o), r
′′ = r. Hence Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅.
Therefore u is authorized for p in Σ′. 
3.3.6 BLP4
A further extension of BLP0, which we call BLP4, associates each object with two
different security labels, λr(o) and λa(o); pi
ss
4 is defined using λr(o) and pi
∗
4 is defined
using λa(o). We might require, by analogy with BLP2, that the “append-level” of an
object is higher than the “read-level”; that is λa(o) > λr(o). In this case, a subject
whose security label is contained in the range [λr(o), λa(o)] can have write access to
the object. This is the analogue of the trusted range of subjects in the trusted network
interpretation (BLP2).
However, note that we can support some useful access control policies if we drop
the requirement that λa(o) > λr(o), in which case no user can both read and append
(write) that object o. Consider an object such as an audit log file f : we require that
low level users must append to f , while high level users can read f but must not to be
able change it. We can implement these requirements simply by making λa(f) < λr(f).
Hence, in BLP4, we do not insist that λr(o) 6 λa(o). Table 3.2 summarizes BLP4.
To implement BLP4 in OP-RBAC, we replace Constraints 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 with the
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Model Λ piss pi∗
BLP4
λ : S → L
λr : O → L
λa : O → L
∀(s, o, read) ∈ V,
λ(s) > λr(o)
∀(s, o, append) ∈ V,
λ(s) 6 λa(o)
Table 3.2: BLP4
following constraint.
Constraint 3.3.12 If p = (o,m), where m ∈ {read, append}, p is assigned to a unique
role, but permissions for the same object, (o, read) and (o, append), may be assigned to
different roles. The assignment of a write permission for the same object, (o, write),
depends on the ordering between roles to which (o, read) and (o, append) are assigned.
More specifically, for each object o such that ((o, read), rr), ((o, append), ra) ∈ PA, the
permission (o, write) should assigned to all roles in [rr, ra] if rr 6 ra. In the case that
rr 
 ra, this permission can not be assigned to any role. Hence, rr corresponds to λr(o)
and ra corresponds to λa(o).
Theorem 3.3.5 Given a BLP4 system Σ defined by (L,6), λr, λa and λ, and an OP-
RBAC system Σ′ that satisfies constraints 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.5–3.3.7, and 3.3.12, then
a request (u, p) is authorized in Σ (by satisfying piss4 and pi
∗
4) if and only if (u, p) is
authorized in Σ′.
Proof We first prove the “if” condition.
Let (u, p) ∈ W , where p = (o, read), (p, rr) ∈ PA, and (u, r) ∈ UA. By Con-
straint 3.3.5, we have RolesE(p) = ↑rr. Moveover, since (u, p) ∈ W , there exists a
session s activated by u such that Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. By Constraint 3.3.2,
Roles(s) = {r}. Hence r ∈ ↑rr; that is r > rr. By Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) = r, and by
Constraint 3.3.12, λr(o) = rr; that is λ(u) > λr(o). Hence pi
ss
4 is satisfied.
Let (u, p) ∈ W , where p = (o, append), (p, ra) ∈ PA, and (u, r) ∈ UA. By Con-
straint 3.3.6, we have RolesE(p) = ↓ra. Moveover, since (u, p) ∈ W , there exists a
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session s activated by u such that Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. By Constraint 3.3.2,
Roles(s) = {r}. Hence r ∈ ↓ra; that is r 6 ra. By Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) = r, and by
Constraint 3.3.12, λa(o) = ra; that is λ(u) 6 λa(o). Hence pi
∗
4 is satisfied.
Let (u, p) ∈ W , where p = (o, write) and (u, r) ∈ UA. Let
((o, read), rr), ((o, append), ra) ∈ PA. By Constraint 3.3.12, Roles(p) = [rr, ra]. By
Constraint 3.3.7, we have RolesE(p) = Roles(p) = [rr, ra]. Moveover, since (u, p) ∈ W ,
there exists a session s activated by u such that Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. By Con-
straint 3.3.2, Roles(s) = {r}. Hence r ∈ [rr, ra]. By Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) = r, and by
Constraint 3.3.12, λr(o) = rr, λa(o) = ra; that is λr(o) 6 λ(u) 6 λa(o). Hence pi
ss
4 and
pi∗4 are satisfied.
We now prove the “only if” condition.
Let V be the set of requests that have been granted in the BLP4 system Σ. Let
(u, p) ∈ V , where p = (o, read). By piss4 , λ(u) > λr(o). By Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) =
Roles(u) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.2, u can only activate r′ in a session s, that is
Roles(s) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.12, λr(o) = Roles(p) = rr, and by Constraint 3.3.5,
RolesE(p) = ↑Roles(p) = ↑rr. Since λ(u) > λr(o), r
′ ∈ ↑rr. Hence Roles(s)∩RolesE(p) 6=
∅. Therefore u is authorized for p in Σ′.
Let (u, p) ∈ V , where p = (o, append). By pi∗4, λ(u) 6 λa(o). By Constraint 3.3.1,
λ(u) = Roles(u) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.2, u can only activate r′ in a session s,
that is Roles(s) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.12, λa(o) = Roles(p) = ra, and by Con-
straint 3.3.6, RolesE(p) = ↓Roles(p) = ↓ra. Since λ(u) 6 λa(o), r
′ ∈ ↓ra. Hence
Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. Therefore u is authorized for p in Σ
′.
Let (u, p) ∈ V , where p = (o, write). By piss4 and pi
∗
4, λr(o) 6 λ(u) 6 λa(o). By
Constraint 3.3.1, λ(u) = Roles(u) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.2, u can only activate r′
in a session s, that is Roles(s) = r′. By Constraint 3.3.12, λr(o) = rr and λa(o) =
ra. Since rr 6 ra, by Constraint 3.3.12, Roles(p) = [rr, ra]. By Constraint 3.3.7,
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RolesE(p) = Roles(p) = [rr, ra]. Since λr(o) 6 λ(u) 6 λa(o), Roles(s) ∈ [rr, ra]. Hence
Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) 6= ∅. Therefore u is authorized for p in Σ
′. 
3.3.7 The discretionary security property
An information flow policy authorizes access purely on the basis of the labelling of the
subject and object. For example, a subject s is authorized to append to an object o
only if λ(s) 6 λ(o). However, in many situations, it will be undesirable for a user to
append to a file with a higher security label. The protection matrix is usually used
to augment the information flow policy when defining authorization requirements in
computer systems. We might enforce the above requirement in BLP simply by ensuring
that append 6∈Ms,o.
Existing work on implementing BLP using RBAC ignores the discretionary prop-
erty [29, 69, 72, 73, 81], meaning that the range of policies that can be implemented
are somewhat limited. We now show that it is at least possible to implement some
coarse-grained discretionary properties using OP-RBAC.
Suppose that we do not wish users with security label r to be able to append
to objects with security label r′ > r. Constraint 3.3.6 insists that (o, append) is a
down permission. Instead the administrator can define this permission to be a neutral
permission, so that only users with security label r′ can append to o. Of course, the
administrator can also assign this neutral permission to other roles r′′ 6 r′ if desired. In
other words, making certain permissions neutral rather than up or down, gives limited
support for policies defined at the administrator’s discretion. To support discretionary
security we replace Constraints 3.3.5 and 3.3.6 with the following constraints.
Constraint 3.3.13 If p = (o, read) and (p, r) ∈ PA, then either p ∈ P+ or p ∈ P 0
and RolesE(p) ⊆ ↑r.
CHAPTER 3. THE OP-RBAC MODEL AND ITS APPLICATIONS 69
Constraint 3.3.14 If p = (o, append) and (p, r) ∈ PA, then either p ∈ P− or p ∈ P 0
and RolesE(p) ⊆ ↓r.
There is one distinct limitation to this approach. Namely, we cannot define our
policies at the user-level, only at the role-level. This means that it is not possible
to achieve the granularity of policy specification that is available in the BLP model
via the protection matrix.4 This is an inherent limitation of the RBAC paradigm,
not the OP-RBAC model. One advantage of this approach over BLP is that policy
specification is much more economical. This, of course, is one of the advantages of the
RBAC paradigm. It is instructive to note that OP-RBAC can support this level of
discretionary policy specification, while standard RBAC cannot.
3.3.8 Discussion
There have been several attempts to implement BLP models using role-based mod-
els [29, 69, 72, 73, 81]. Osborn et al ’s approach [69, 72, 73] shows how the role-graph
model can be configured to enforce information flow policies.
In their approach the lattice of security labels is defined separately and indepen-
dently from the role graph. Each subject and object is assigned a security label, as in
BLP. Then the r-level of a role r, denoted by r-level(r), is defined to be the least upper
bound of the security labels of the objects for which (o, read) is in the permissions of
the role r; and the a-level of a role r, denoted by a-level(r), is the greatest lower bound
of the security labels of the objects for which (o, append) is in the permissions of the
role r. For all (u, r) ∈ UA, the security level of a user u must be greater than or equal
to the r-level of r, and for all (u, r) ∈ UA, the security level of a user u must be less
than or equal to the a-level of r.
4In fact our approach is equivalent to a BLP model in which the protection matrix has rows indexed
by security levels and columns indexed by objects.
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It has been noted that this approach creates a permission-permission conflict [88].
For example, a role r contains permissions to objects labeled with security labels
(rts, as), where rts denotes “read top secret” and as denotes “append secret”; that
is, r-level(r) is rts and a-level(r) is as. Therefore, the role r cannot be assigned to
any user without violating information flow policies. In addition, we think their ap-
proach for simulating the basic information flow policy using role-based access control
is complicated, because their approach needs to introduce an extra lattice structure
to determine the security labels of users and objects, and requires modification to the
role-graph algorithms to compute the r-level and a-level of each role in the role graph
model.
An alternative approach was developed by Sandhu et al [73, 81]. They introduced
two partial orderings, 6r and 6a, on the set of roles. This gives rise to two hierarchies
RH r and RH a, one for read roles and one for append roles. The append hierarchy
RH a is the dual of the read hierarchy RH r: that is, x 6 y in the append hierarchy
if and only if x > y in the read hierarchy. Figure 3.2 shows a simple example of the
read hierarchy and the corresponding append hierarchy. We write xr for role x in the
read hierarchy and xa for the corresponding role in the append hierarchy. Each pair
of permissions (o, read) and (o, append) is assigned to exactly one matching pair of xr
and xa roles in RH r and RH a respectively. Thereby, the security label of object o is
implicitly defined to be x.
A number of constraints, similar to a number of ours were also defined. Note
that, in BLP, every subject has a unique security label, and the concept of subjects
corresponds to sessions in RBAC96 [83]. Hence, they require that each session has
exactly two matching roles yr and ya. A read permission is granted if yr > xr in RH r
and an append permission is granted if ya > xa in RH a. Since RH a is the dual of RH r,
the condition of granting an append permission is actually ya 6 xa in original lattice
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Figure 3.2: A read hierarchy and the corresponding append hierarchy
structure. We think it is not necessary to use a second hierarchy. More importantly,
this approach can not cope with a compound (write) permission that has both read
and append access rights to an object and does not consider discretionary aspects of
the BLP model. Finally, the simulation of BLP3 is not covered in their approach.
Crampton recently introduced the OP-RBAC model, and illustrated how OP-RBAC
can be used to implement multi-level secure systems with the addition of few constraints
to the basic model. The constrained OP-RBAC model simulates a more “general”
version of BLP, where the read permission p = (o, read) and the append permission
p′ = (o, append) are assigned to the unique roles rr and ra respectively, and the security
label of an object λ(o) is defined to be a range [rr, ra]. Clearly, there are a number of
possibilities for the security label of an object: if rr = ra, λ(o) = rr = ra; if rr < ra,
λ(o) = [rr, ra]; if ra < rr, λ(o) = ∅. However, in the standard BLP models, the security
label of an object is unique, which corresponds to the situation where rr = ra. On the
other hand, it is rare to see any BLP models with the security label of an object being
either ∅ or [rr, ra], which makes it difficult to compare the security label of an object
with the security label of a subject. In other words, the constrained OP-RBAC model
only implements a simple version of BLP, that is, BLP0.
We re-examined OP-RBAC, with the addition and modification of a few constraints,
to provide greater correlation between role-based and mandatory access control. Com-
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pared with previous attempts, our approach provides a more direct implementation of a
number of different BLP models. We do not require an additional hierarchy and are able
to support the assignment of “mixed” permissions (write permissions), which include
both read and append access to objects. In addition, our approach provides a natural
implementation of BLP3 in terms of untrusted subjects, which has not been studied in
most existing work. Perhaps the most significant contribution of the OP-RBAC model
is the support for some limited discretionary policies, something existing work does not
consider and would be ill-equipped to implement. Furthermore, we introduce BLP4,
an additional BLP model, that may provide some useful features unavailable in other
BLP models. We have shown that BLP4 can also be implemented in OP-RBAC.
3.4 Other applications
In this section, we show how OP-RBAC can be used to remove some of the problems
associated with the integration of role hierarchies and separation of duty requirements.
We also investigate how to distinguish role activation and permission inheritance in a
single OP-RBAC hierarchy.
3.4.1 Separation of duty
Separation of duty is widely considered to be a fundamental principle in computer
security [25, 77]. In its simplest form, the principle requires that if a sensitive task
comprises two steps, then the same user can not perform both steps. A typical example
of separation of duty for a purchase order application is the requirement that creating
(p) and approving (q) a purchase order can not be performed by the same user.
Separation of duty has always been an important consideration in role-based access
control models. An approach commonly advocated in standard RBAC is to define
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constraints on the authorizations of users to roles to ensure that no users can invoke
both permissions p and q. This may be done through appropriate configuration of
the UA relation (so called static separation of duty), or by limiting the roles that
can be activated by users in a single session (dynamic separation of duty). Dynamic
separation of duty is claimed to provide greater operational flexibility in practice [2].
Assume that p and q are assigned to roles r1 and r2 respectively, dynamic separation
of duty requires that no user is permitted to activate both r1 and r2 in the course of
any session, although it is possible for a user to be assigned to both roles. However, as
we noted in Chapter 2, the role hierarchy may be incompatible with the enforcement of
dynamic separation of duty constraints. That is, it is not possible to have a role r that
is more senior than two roles r1 and r2 which are in dynamic separation of duty [62].
More specifically, assume that there exists some users who are able to activate roles r1
and r2 in different sessions, there is no means to assign these users to a common senior
role r because activation of role r violates dynamic separation of duty with respect to
r1 and r2. Therefore, these common users have to be explicitly assigned to roles r1 and
r2, which goes against the idea of a role hierarchy to reduce administrative complexity.
OP-RBAC introduced three different types of permissions and proposed a new
mechanism for permission inheritance within a role hierarchy. This new approach of
permission inheritance in OP-RBAC makes it possible to implement dynamic separa-
tion of duty constraints on two roles that have a common senior role and for a user to be
assigned to or activate the senior role. The basic idea is to define sensitive permissions
to be different types of permissions so that these permissions can not be aggregated
to a single role. Formally, we require that RolesE(p) ∩ RolesE(q) = ∅, which means
no single role is authorized for both permissions p and q. Note that this condition
does not exclude the case that there exists a role that is more senior than two roles
to which sensitive permissions p and q are explicitly assigned, and this senior role can
CHAPTER 3. THE OP-RBAC MODEL AND ITS APPLICATIONS 74
be activated by a user without violating dynamic separation of duty constraints on its
junior roles.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the seven ways of ensuring that for mutually exclusive permis-
sions p and q assigned to roles r1 and r2 respectively, RolesE(p) ∩ RolesE(q) = ∅. (The
roles enclosed by a curve illustrate the effective set of roles for each permission.) The
most obvious solution is to make p and q neutral permissions and assign them to roles
r1 and r2 respectively, as shown in Figure 3.3(a). Therefore, u can be assigned to the
more senior role r and activate r without acquiring the mutually exclusive permissions
p and q. In addition, Figures 3.3(b)–3.3(g) shows that it is possible for u to be assigned
to senior roles r or r′ by defining p and q to be other types of permissions.
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(c) p ∈ P 0, q ∈ P+
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(f) p ∈ P+, q ∈ P−
t
r′
@
@
@
@
tr1
 
 
 
 
tr2@@@
@
 
 
 
 
tr
......
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
... ..
..
..
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
....
......
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
... ...
.
..
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
....
(g) p ∈ P−, q ∈ P+
Figure 3.3: Implementing separation of duty using different types of permissions
Of course, we still need to define dynamic separation of duty constraints in OP-
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RBAC to prevent, for example, u from activating roles r1 and r2 in the same session.
5
Formally, we require that for all u ∈ U , either Roles(s) ∩ RolesE(p) = ∅ or Roles(s) ∩
RolesE(q) = ∅, where u = User(s). This conditions means that no user is allowed
to activate a set of roles to which mutually exclusive permissions are assigned in any
session.
3.4.2 Usage and activation hierarchies
In most RBAC models, the role hierarchy serves two distinct purposes.
• A role is assumed to inherit the permissions assigned to roles below it in the
hierarchy; this is called the (permission) usage aspect of role hierarchy. That is,
if r > r′ and (p, r′) ∈ PA, then r is authorized for p.
• A user assigned to a particular role can also activate any subordinate roles in the
hierarchy; this is called the (role) activation aspect of role hierarchy. That is, if
r > r′ and (u, r) ∈ UA, then u may activate (is authorized for) r′.
It has been observed that there are a number of situations where it is necessary to
distinguish between role activation and permission usage [82]. Sandhu introduced an
extended RBAC96 model (ERBAC96) [82] that defines a separate role activation hierar-
chy (denoted RH a), a relation which is a superset of the permission usage hierarchy (de-
noted RH u). Formally, these hierarchies are modelled as two partial orderings, 6a and
6u, on the set of roles, where r 6u r
′ implies that r 6a r
′. In other words, if a user u as-
signed to role r′ can use a permission by virtue of inheritance from role r, then u can also
activate role r. Given R′ ⊆ R, we define ↓aR
′ = {r ∈ R : ∃r′ ∈ R′, r 6a r
′} and we de-
fine ↓u, ↑a and ↑u in an analogous fashion. A user’s interaction with the system is mod-
5We assume that the user u does not terminate a session, and log in with the other role. Auditing or
some other mechanism is required to ensure that this loophole is not exploited when dynamic separation
of duty constraints are used.
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elled by a session s, where a user u activates a set of roles Roles(s) ⊆ ↓aRoles(u). The set
of permissions for which u is authorized in a session s is defined to be Prms(↓uRoles(s)).
A typical application of the ERBAC96 model is to implement dynamic separation
of duties between two roles that have a common senior role in an activation hierarchy.
This has the same effect as OP-RBAC (described in the previous section) for solving the
incompatibility issue that arises when there is a role hierarchy and dynamic separation
of duty constraints. Consider the activation and usage hierarchies of ERBAC96 shown
in Figures 3.4(a) and 3.4(c), respectively. Let us suppose that two roles r2 and r3 are
mutually exclusive roles in a dynamic separation of duty constraint. We observe that
a user assigned to role r1, say, can activate r1 in the activation hierarchy but does
not inherit the permissions of r2, because there is no inheritance relation between r1
and r2 in the usage hierarchy. Hence, a user does not obtain any mutually exclusive
permissions that have been assigned to r2 and r3.
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Figure 3.4: ERBAC96 activation and usage hierarchies
We can implement this distinction between role activation and permission usage in
OP-RBAC using only a single role hierarchy, up permissions and neutral permissions.
Up permissions are inherited by more senior roles and neutral permissions are inherited
by no other roles in the role hierarchy. The type of each permission is determined by the
permission usage hierarchy, and the new permission assignment relation is determined
by the usage hierarchy and the permission type. In particular, we can transform an ER-
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BAC96 system (UA,PA,RH u,RH a, P ) into a OP-RBAC system (UA,PA
′,RH a, P
′)
using the procedure in Figure 3.5.
1. Let P+ denote the set of up permissions and P 0 denote the set of neutral
permissions;
2. Let PA+ denote the permission-role assignments for up permissions and
PA0 denote the permission-role assignments for neutral permissions;
3. For all r ∈ R such that ↑ar 6= ↑ur, and for all p ∈ P such that (p, r) ∈ PA,
we add p to P 0 and (p, r) to PA0, and for all r′ ∈ ↑ur, we add (p, r
′) to
PA0;
4. For all r ∈ R such that ↑ar = ↑ur, and for all p ∈ P such that (p, r) ∈ PA,
we add p to P+ and (p, r) to PA+;
5. Define P ′ = P+ ∪ P 0 and PA′ = PA+ ∪ PA0;
6. For all p ∈ P ′ such that (p, r) ∈ PA0 and (p, r′) ∈ PA+, we remove p
from P+, and for all r′′ ∈ ↑ur
′, we add (p, r′′) to PA0, and remove (p, r′)
from PA+.
Figure 3.5: Transforming ERBAC96 into OP-RBAC
We now show how the transformation works by taking the example of the ER-
BAC96 system illustrated in Figure 3.4 and the permission-role assignment relation in
Figure 3.6(a). Firstly, we consider the example of permission usage hierarchy in Fig-
ure 3.4(b). Let us assume that the first role examined by the transformation procedure
described above is role r4. The first stage (Step 3) is to compute all roles which are
senior to r4 in the activation hierarchy, that is {r1, r2, r3, r4} and all roles which are
senior to r4 in the permission usage hierarchy, that is {r2, r3, r4} . Hence we find that
↑ar4 6= ↑ur4; using Step 3 we define all permissions (only p4 in our example) assigned
to r4 to be neutral permissions and assign all such permissions to r2 and r3. We re-
peat the computations for roles r2, r3 and r1. Finally, we output the set of neutral
permissions {p2, p3, p4}, the set of up permissions {p1} and the new permission-role
assignment relation PA′ shown in Figure 3.6(b), where the third column contains two
symbols: + and 0 that denotes the corresponding permissions are up permissions and
neutral permissions respectively.
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For the second usage hierarchy in Figure 3.4(c), we firstly take the role r4, for
example, to be examined by the transformation procedure. We find that ↑ar4 = ↑ur4
and define p4, assigned to r4, to be an up permission (Step 4). After computing all
roles (r1, r2, r3, r4), we find that (p2, r2) ∈ PA
0 and (p2, r3) ∈ PA
+ (Step 6). Hence, we
add (p2, r3) and (p2, r1) to PA
0 and delete (p2, r3) from PA
+ (Step 6). Finally, the new
permission role assignment relation PA′ is generated as shown in Figure 3.6(c).
r1 p1
r2 p2
r3 p2
r3 p3
r4 p4
(a) PA in ERBAC96
r1 p1 +
r2 p2 0
r2 p4 0
r3 p2 0
r3 p3 0
r3 p4 0
r4 p4 0
(b) PA′ in OP-RBAC for Fig. 3.4(b)
r1 p1 +
r1 p2 0
r2 p2 0
r3 p2 0
r3 p3 +
r4 p4 +
(c) PA′ in OP-RBAC for Fig. 3.4(c)
Figure 3.6: Transforming the ERBAC96 permission set and PA relation
We now prove that the transformed OP-RBAC system is equivalent to the ER-
BAC96 system, in the sense that it returns the same answer as the original ERBAC96
system for all possible access requests.
Theorem 3.4.1 Let Σ = (UA,PA,RH a,RH u, P ) define an ERBAC96 system and
Σ′ = (UA,PA′,RH a, P
′) define an OP-RBAC system derived from the ERBAC96 sys-
tem in the manner described in Figure 3.5. Then for all p ∈ P , ↑uRoles(p) in Σ is equal
to RolesE(p) in Σ
′.
Proof We first prove that ↑uRoles(p) ⊆ RolesE(p). Let r ∈ ↑uRoles(p): then there
exists r′ such that (p, r′) ∈ PA and r >u r
′. There are two cases to consider. If
↑ar
′ 6= ↑ur
′, then by Step 3, (p, r) ∈ PA0 and r ∈ RolesE(p). If ↑ar
′ = ↑ur
′, then by
Step 4, (p, r′) ∈ PA+. Since r >u r
′, by definition of ERBAC96, r >a r
′. Hence, since
RH ′ = RH a, r ∈ RolesE(p). (Note that if (p, r
′′) ∈ PA0 and (p, r′) ∈ PA+, then we
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add (p, r) to PA0, using Step 6, and hence r ∈ RolesE(p).) Therefore, ↑uRoles(p) ⊆
RolesE(p).
We now prove that RolesE(p) ⊆ ↑uRoles(p). Let r ∈ RolesE(p): then there are two
cases to consider. If p ∈ P 0 and (p, r) ∈ PA0, then there exists r′ 6u r and (p, r
′) ∈ PA
(by Steps 3 and 6). By definition, r ∈ ↑uRoles(p). Alternatively, if p ∈ P
+, then there
exists r >a r
′ and (p, r′) ∈ PA+. By Step 4, r >u r
′ and (p, r′) ∈ PA. Again, by
definition, r ∈ ↑uRoles(p). Therefore RolesE(p) ⊆ ↑uRoles(p). The result now follows.
Corollary 3.4.1 User u is authorized for p in Σ if and only if u is authorized for p in
Σ′.
Proof For any session s that user u can create in Σ, u can create exactly the same
session in Σ′, because the activation hierarchy RH a is used in Σ
′. u is authorized for p
in session s by Σ, if and only if there exists r ∈ Roles(s) such that r ∈ ↑uRoles(p). By
Theorem 3.4.1, r ∈ ↑uRoles(p) if and only if r ∈ RolesE(p). 
In summary, permission usage requirements in the ERBAC96 system determine
how to assign different types of permissions to roles in OP-RBAC. In certain situations,
neutral permissions must be assigned to several hierarchical roles, which adds somewhat
to the complexity of permission administration. On the other hand, the approach
adopted in OP-RBAC offers simplicity by using a single role hierarchy. We might expect
that it would be easier to administer an OP-RBAC system rather than an ERBAC96
one, for example. This would be an interesting direction for future work. In addition,
we have shown how an ERBAC96 system can be transformed into an equivalent (in
terms of what requests are authorized) OP-RBAC system.
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3.5 Conclusion
We have considered three applications of the OP-RBAC model, which arise because
of its alternative treatment of permission inheritance. We noted that our approach
provides a more natural implementation of a number of different BLP models using role-
based techniques. Our approach provides the first such implementation that supports
the assignment of compound permissions (both read and append access to objects).
Equally importantly, we demonstrate how it is possible to incorporate limited support
for the discretionary security property of BLP, something that no existing work is able
to do. In addition we described a new version of BLP (that can also be implemented
using OP-RBAC), where each object associates with a read security label and an append
security label. This provides support for some useful separation of duty properties at
the object, where no role can both read and append a file simultaneously.
A second application is to make it possible for a user to be assigned to or activate
a role when it is more senior than two mutually exclusive roles. To our knowledge, no
other RBAC models is able to do this with a single role hierarchy.
Finally, we have described a way of supporting the separation between permission
usage and role activation within a single hierarchy. We have defined a transformation
that generates a OP-RBAC system that is equivalent to a given ERBAC96 system, in
the sense that the same set of requests is authorized. The success of this transformation
is based on the constraint ERBAC96 imposed on the use of role hierarchies, that is, the
usage hierarchy is restricted to be a subset of the activation hierarchy. In contrast, OP-
RBAC can not support any arbitrary configurations of activation and usage hierarchies
which is permitted in the GTRBAC model, for example.
On the other hand, ERBAC96 and GTRBAC certainly have merit and deal sat-
isfactorily with both selective inheritance and dynamic separation of duty constraint
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as we noted in this chapter. However, the motivation for the specific ways in which
these hierarchies are defined is unclear. In addition, GTRBAC introduced temporal
constraints to various components of RBAC, including role hierarchies. The syntax
for the model is rather complicated and the semantics defining the interaction between
temporal constraints on the UA, PA, roles, and role hierarchies are not clearly defined.
In the next chapter, we will consider these issues in more detail and present some
solutions.
Chapter 4
Spatio-Temporal RBAC
Role-based access control has attracted considerable research interest in recent years
due to its potential ability to model organizational structure and to reduce adminis-
trative overheads. The most distinctive and important feature of the RBAC approach
is the role hierarchy, which generally supports two different types of inheritance: role
activation and permission usage. For example, in the RBAC96 model, if a user u is
assigned to role r (that is, (u, r) ∈ UA), then u is implicitly assigned to all roles in the
set ↓r = {r′ ∈ R : r′ 6 r}, and u can create a session by activating the roles in any
subset of ↓r. Similarly, if a permission p is assigned to role r (that is, (p, r) ∈ PA),
then p is implicitly assigned to all roles in the set ↑r = {r′ ∈ R : r′ > r}. Essentially,
the role hierarchy allows the users who activate senior roles to inherit all permissions
of their junior roles, and conversely ensures that the users of junior roles inherit any
prohibitions (constraints) that apply to their senior roles. We believe it is important
to preserve this inheritance semantics when considering extensions to role-based access
control.
There has been some work on extending role-based access control to include mul-
tiple role hierarchies [58, 67, 82]. Sandhu introduced an extended RBAC96 model
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(ERBAC96) [82], in which two different orderings were defined on the set of roles, one
governing role activation and one governing permission usage. In addition, Joshi et
al introduced a generalized temporal RBAC (GTRBAC) model [58] which also dis-
tinguishes between permission usage and role activation by defining three different
orderings on the set of roles. However, we believe the way of defining those role hierar-
chies in both models somewhat ignored the inheritance semantics on the combination
of these hierarchies.
In this chapter, we consider an alternative way of distinguish usage and activation
hierarchies by developing a novel extended RBAC model (ERBAC07). In particular,
the authorization semantics of ERBAC07 is based on our graph-based interpretation of
RBAC1 that is a simple way to see how access requests are evaluated in RBAC96. Com-
pared with ERBAC96 and GTRBAC, ERBAC07 has intuitive inheritance semantics
and clear authorization semantics.
The GTRBAC model caters for time-dependent access control policies. More gen-
erally, the emergence of mobile and ubiquitous computing environments poses new
demands on access control mechanisms, because the decision to grant access may de-
pend on contextual information, such as the location of the user and the time at which
access requests are made. It may be appropriate, for example, to limit the time and
places at which a particular role can be activated.
Several context-based RBAC models have been defined in recent years [13, 14, 28,
43, 49, 58, 76, 86]. Each of these models introduces extensions to the basic role-based
model in which components may be associated with general contextual constraints [28,
43, 86], temporal constraints [13, 58], spatial constraints [14, 49], or spatio-temporal
constraints [76]. However, none of these models accurately captures the interaction
between spatio-temporal constraints and inheritance in the RBAC model: indeed, all
of them have one or more of the following limitations.
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• No existing model has clear semantics for inheritance in the role hierarchy in
the presence of spatio-temporal constraints. This means that there is no way of
designing an algorithm for deciding access requests.
• Existing models are extremely complicated. GTRBAC [58] and the spatio-
temporal RBAC model of Ray and Toahchoodee [76] define a large number of
predicates to specify temporal constraints and spatio-temporal constraints, re-
spectively. The relationship between these predicates is often unclear, again
making it difficult to see how access requests should be evaluated in such models.
• Conflicts and ambiguity may occur in existing models. Conflicts may arise among
the constraints defined in spatio-temporal RBAC [76], for example.
• Existing models lack compatibility with RBAC96 and the closely related ANSI-
RBAC standard. It is not at all clear how to translate the predicates used in
GTRBAC [58] and spatio-temporal RBAC [76], for example, to the entities and
relations used in the ANSI-RBAC standard and RBAC96.
In summary, we would argue that existing models focus far too much on syntax, and
far too little on semantics.
In this chapter, we explore a number of ways to define spatio-temporal constraints on
the RBAC models. The majority of the material in this chapter has already been pub-
lished [21, 22]. We firstly develop three spatio-temporal RBAC models by extending the
basic RBAC1 model with very little additional syntax. The authorization semantics of
these three models are based on the graph-based formalism of RBAC96, and are varied
in the extent to which RBAC entities and relations are constrained by spatio-temporal
restrictions. We also extend these models to include spatio-temporal requirements for
ERBAC07. Compared with GTRBAC and the spatio-temporal RBAC model by Ray
and Toahchoodee, these simple, expressive, flexible spatio-temporal RBAC models have
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clear, well-defined semantics and are designed to be compatible with RBAC96 and the
ANSI-RBAC standard.
Unlike existing work, we consider the practical implications of using our spatio-
temporal models. The introduction of spatio-temporal constraints increases the com-
plexity of evaluating requests, particularly in the presence of a role hierarchy and en-
abling conditions on roles. We suggest pre-computing transitive closure of (part of)
the RBAC graph to improve requests’ response time. On the other hand, the inter-
action between spatio-temporal constraints and inheritance is complex, which makes
it difficult to specify spatio-temporal constraints in the presence of a role hierarchy.
We propose two strategies to mitigate these difficulties: the use of flat spatio-temporal
model and the omission of constraints on roles and the role hierarchy.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce
a novel graph-based formalism to define the semantics of RBAC1. In Section 4.2, we
define the ERBAC07 model with RBAC1-style syntax and graph-based semantics. In
Section 4.3, we formally define the RBAC=ST , RBAC
+
ST and RBAC
−
ST models, and in-
troduce the notion of trusted entities. We also demonstrate the use of RBAC1-style
syntax to encode spatio-temporal RBAC models, and illustrate how to integrate our
spatio-temporal functions into the ANSI-RBAC standard. In Section 4.4, we introduce
the ERBAC=ST , ERBAC
+
ST and ERBAC
−
ST models for ERBAC07. In Section 4.5, we
consider practical implementation of our spatio-temporal RBAC and ERBAC models,
focusing on mitigating difficulties arising from different interactions between spatio-
temporal constraints and a role hierarchy. In Section 4.6, we discuss possible rep-
resentations of spatial and temporal domains, and give concrete examples of spatial
RBAC=ST , temporal RBAC
=
ST and spatio-temporal ERBAC
=
ST . Section 4.7 compares
our work with related work in the literature. Finally, we summarize the work of the
chapter in Section 4.8.
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4.1 Graph-based formulation of RBAC1
Recall that the RBAC1 model defines a set of roles R, a role hierarchy RH ⊆ R×R, a
user-role assignment relation UA ⊆ U×R (where U is a set of users), and a permission-
role assignment relation PA ⊆ P ×R (where P is a set of permissions). We write 6 to
denote the transitive reflexive closure of the RH relation; (R,6) is a partially ordered
set (since the directed graph of the role hierarchy relation is assumed to be acyclic).
We represent RBAC1 state as a tuple (UA,PA,RH ). We now introduce a novel graph-
based formulation of RBAC1, which we believe to be simple and intuitive specification
of the basic components of the RBAC1 model. As we will see, this formulation can be
readily extended to include spatio-temporal restrictions.
We construct an acyclic, directed graph G = (V,E), where V = U ∪ R ∪ P , and
E = UA∪PA∪RH . In other words, each vertex v represents an entity, such as a user
u, a role r or a permission p in a RBAC1 system, and each directed edge e = (vi, vj)
represents a relationship between two entities vi and vj ; specifically, (vi, vj) ∈ E if and
only if (precisely) one of the following conditions holds
(vi, vj) ∈ UA,
(vj , vi) ∈ RH ,
(vj , vi) ∈ PA.
An authorization path (or au-path) between v1 and vn is a sequence of vertices
v1, . . . , vn such that (vi, vi+1) ∈ E, i = 1, . . . , n− 1. Hence, a user u can activate a role
r if there is an au-path between u and r; a role r is authorized for permission p if there
is an au-path between r and p; and a user u is authorized for permission p if there is
an au-path between u and p. To summarize, we introduce the following definition.
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Definition 4.1.1 An entity v ∈ U ∪ R is RBAC1-authorized for v
′ ∈ R ∪ P if and
only if there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′.1
We also explicitly define the RBAC1 (authorization) semantics in terms of the graph
formulation.
Definition 4.1.2 The semantics of a RBAC1 state (UA,PA,RH ), denoted
Auth[UA,PA,RH ], is the set of requests that is authorized by this state. That is,
Auth[UA,PA,RH ] = {(u, p) ∈ U × P : there exists an au-path u, . . . , p}.
4.2 ERBAC07
In this section, we construct the ERBAC07 model, extending the syntax used in
RBAC1. We define the semantics of ERBAC07 by extending the graph-based for-
mulation of RBAC1. In doing so, the ERBAC07 model has a clear and well-defined
semantics, in contrast to many existing RBAC extensions, and provides a context for
studying spatio-temporal requirements in Section 4.4.
4.2.1 Syntax
The ERBAC07 model defines a set of roles R, a user-role assignment relation UA ⊆
U×R, and a permission-role assignment relation PA ⊆ P ×R. We replace the standard
role hierarchy relation in the RBAC1 model with a new relation RH ⊆ R × R ×
{a, u}. We define RH a = {(r, r
′) : (r, r′, a) ∈ RH } and RH u = {(r, r
′) : (r, r′, u) ∈
RH }. We call RH a the (role) activation hierarchy and RH u the (permission) usage
hierarchy. We write 6a to denote the reflexive, transitive closure of RH a and 6u to
denote the reflexive, transitive closure of RH u. In other words, 6a and 6u are modeled
1Note that r ∈ R is RBAC1-authorized for r
′ ∈ R means that r > r′ in the role hierarchy.
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as two partial orderings on the set of roles R. We represent ERBAC07 state as a tuple
(UA,PA,RH a,RH u).
ERBAC96 [82] introduces the distinction between usage and activation hierarchies
and restricts the form that the activation hierarchy can take: r 6u r
′ implies that
r 6a r
′. The effect of this restriction is to guarantee that if r′ inherits permissions
assigned to role r by virtue of the fact that r 6u r
′, then any user that can activate
r′ should also be able to activate role r. However, no particular motivation for this
restriction is provided by Sandhu.
We now consider whether any restriction is necessary and, if so, what form such a
restriction should take. Consider the following statement: if a user can activate role r
and r′ 6a r then the permissions for which r
′ is authorized should not be a superset
of the permissions for which r is authorized. This statement is certainly reasonable at
an intuitive level and an immediate consequence of this statement is that if r′ 6a r
then we require r ≮u r′ (otherwise r′ is implicitly authorized for all the permissions for
which r is explicitly and implicitly authorized). A logically equivalent statement is that
r 6u r
′ implies that r′ ≮a r. In other words, we require that the following constraint
on 6a and 6u be satisfied.
Constraint 4.2.1 If r 6u r
′, then r ‖a r
′ or r 6a r
′, where r ‖a r
′ denotes roles r and
r′ are incomparable in the activation hierarchy.
Clearly, this constraint imposed on ERBAC07 offers more flexibility than ER-
BAC96. We will further compare it with ERBAC96 and GTRBAC in Section 4.2.3. We
now use graph-based formalism to explain the authorization semantics of ERBAC07.
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Figure 4.1: A graphical representation of ERBAC07 states
4.2.2 Semantics
We also use a graph which is a simple and intuitive way to represent features of ER-
BAC07. In order to satisfy Constraint 4.2.1, we construct an acyclic, directed graph
G = (V,E), where V = U ∪ R ∪ P , and E = UA ∪ PA ∪ RH a ∪ RH u. An activation
path (or a-path) between v1 and vn is defined to be a sequence of vertices v1, . . . , vn
such that (v1, v2) ∈ UA and vi+1 6a vi for i = 2, . . . , n − 1. A usage path (or u-path)
between v1 and vn is defined to a sequence of vertices v1, . . . , vn such that vi+1 6u vi
(i = 1, . . . , n− 2) and (vn, vn−1) ∈ PA. In ERBAC07:
• v ∈ U may activate role v′ ∈ R if and only if there exists an a-path v =
v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′;
• v ∈ R is authorized for permission v′ ∈ P if and only if there exists a u-path
v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′;
• v ∈ U is authorized for permission v′ ∈ P if and only if there exists a path
v = v1, v2, . . . , vi, . . . , vn = v
′ such that vi ∈ R for some i, v1, . . . , vi is an a-path,
and vi, . . . , vn is a u-path.
We say v1, . . . , vn is an au-path in ERBAC07 if v1, . . . , vn is either an a-path, or a
u-path, or the concatenation of an a-path and a u-path. To summarize, we introduce
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the following definition.
Definition 4.2.1 An entity v ∈ U ∪R is ERBAC07-authorized for v′ ∈ R ∪ P if and
only if there exists an au-path v = v1, . . . , vn = v
′.
Definition 4.2.2 The semantics of a ERBAC07 state (UA,PA,RH a,RH u), denoted
Auth[UA,PA,RH a,RH u], is the set of requests that is authorized by this state. That
is, Auth[UA,PA,RH a,RH u] = {(u, p) ∈ U × P : there exists an au-path u, . . . , p}.
A typical application of the ERBAC07 model (as for ERBAC96) is to facilitate the
implementation of dynamic separation of duty constraints on roles that have a common
senior role. Consider the activation hierarchy of ERBAC07 shown in Figure 4.1(a).
Suppose that no user should have the permissions of both roles r2 and r3 available in
the course of any session. (That is, the roles r2 and r3 are in dynamic separation of
duty.) In order to achieve this we could define the usage hierarchy of ERBAC07 as
shown in Figure 4.1(b), where a user assigned to the role r1 can activate the role r1
but does not inherit the permissions of r3.
Li et al [64] recently discussed inheritance semantics of a role hierarchy for the ANSI
RBAC standard, and suggested a useful application when only permission inheritance
is used by an RBAC system. Unlike ERBAC96, ERBAC07 allows configurations of
activation and usage hierarchies to achieve the same effect as a single role hierarchy
with only permission inheritance semantics. Consider the configuration of activation
and usage hierarchies shown in Figures 4.1(a) and 4.1(c). A user u who is assigned to
role r3 is authorized for permissions assigned to roles r3 and r4, but u is not authorized
for (or allowed to activate) r4. In other words, u can use permissions assigned to r4
without knowing the existence of r4. This is particularly useful for a system where the
intricate details of how permissions are set up through roles need to be partially hidden
from certain users [64].
CHAPTER 4. SPATIO-TEMPORAL RBAC 91
4.2.3 ERBAC96, GTRBAC and ERBAC07
In this section, we consider the two most significant existing approaches to multiple role
hierarchies, the ERBAC96 model [82] and the GTRBAC model [58], and briefly com-
pare them to our ERBAC07 model. Roughly speaking, we conclude that the ERBAC96
model is too restrictive and that the GTRBAC model is too general.
The ERBAC96 model is identical to the ERBAC07 model in terms of syntax, with
the exception that ERBAC96 has the following constraint: r 6u r
′ implies that r 6a
r′. In other words, the ERBAC96 model introduces a separate activation hierarchy,
a relation which is a superset of the usage hierarchy. The motivation for imposing
such a constraint is to simulate mandatory access control systems using role-based
access control, and to facilitate the implementation of dynamic separation of duty
in hierarchical RBAC. Hence, we think the ERBAC96 model is rather limited and
excludes some configurations of RH a and RH u that might offer useful applications.
In contrast, we develop the ERBAC07 model by considering what are the appropriate
ways to distinguish the activation and usage hierarchies, rather than as a mechanism for
implementing special requirements. In other words, we define a weaker constraint on
RH a and RHu, making ERBAC07 more general than ERBAC96, thereby ERBAC07
inherits all the applications of ERBAC96. Most importantly, the ERBAC07 model
has graph-based semantics that can be naturally extended to include spatio-temporal
requirements, unlike ERBAC96.2
The GTRBAC model defines a “hybrid” role hierarchy that contains three different
types of role hierarchy relationships: activation hierarchy 6a, usage hierarchy 6u and
permission-activation hierarchy 6. Unlike ERBAC07, GTRBAC does not impose any
constraints on the activation and the usage hierarchies. In other words, GTRBAC
allows to define some configurations of RH a and RH u such as r 6a r
′ and r′ 6u r.
2We certainly could define similar semantics for ERBAC96.
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Figure 4.2: Decomposing a GTRBAC hierarchy into ERBAC07 hierarchies
These configurations mean that a user who activates a junior role is able to acquire more
permissions than a senior role, which is counter-intuitive and incompatible with the
inheritance semantics of RBAC96. However, the constraint we introduced in ERBAC07
prohibits the occurrence of these configurations of RH a and RH u.
In addition, the permission-activation hierarchy is redundant in GTRBAC and can
be defined in terms of other two hierarchies, that is x 6 y if and only if x 6a y
and x 6u y. Figure 4.2(a) shows a hybrid hierarchy used previously to illustrate
the GTRBAC model [36]: a solid edge denotes an element of the usage hierarchy;
a dashed edge indicates an element of the activation hierarchy; and a double-headed
arrow indicates an element of the permission-activation hierarchy. It is obvious that
the hybrid hierarchy can be simply expressed by the activation and usage hierarchies
shown in Figures 4.2(b) and 4.2(c).
Furthermore, GTRBAC does not have explicit authorization semantics, which
means it is not clear how access requests are answered in a GTRBAC system. In
contrast, ERBAC07 has a simple method of distinguishing activation and usage hier-
archies, and has clear authorization semantics.
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4.3 Spatio-temporal RBAC
We assume the existence of the usual RBAC1 sets and relations: U , R, P , UA, PA, and
RH ; we write V to denote U ∪R∪P and E to denote UA∪PA∪RH . We also assume
the existence of a spatio-temporal domain D: d ∈ D represents a point in space-time;
D ⊆ D represents a collection of points in space-time.3
4.3.1 RBAC=ST : the standard model
The standard spatio-temporal RBAC model (or RBAC=ST ) augments the RBAC1 model
with a function λ : V → 2D. For v ∈ V , λ(v) ⊆ D denotes the set of points in
space-time at which v is “enabled”. In particular,
• if u ∈ U , then λ(u) denotes the set of points in space-time at which u may create
a session;
• if r ∈ R, then λ(r) denotes the set of points in space-time at which r may be
activated in a session;
• if p ∈ P , then λ(p) denotes the set of points in space-time at which p may be
granted to a user.
Given a path v1, . . . , vn in the labeled graph G = (V,E, λ), we write λ̂(v1, . . . , vn) ⊆
D to denote
⋂n
i=1 λ(vi). In other words, λ̂(v1, . . . , vn) is the set of points at which every
vertex vi is enabled. When the context is clear, we will write λ̂(v1, vn) for λ̂(v1, . . . , vn).
Definition 4.3.1 An entity v ∈ U ∪R is RBAC=ST -authorized for v
′ ∈ R∪P at point
d ∈ D if and only if there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′ and d ∈ λ̂(v, v′).
Remark 4.3.1 Recall that, (v, v′) ∈ E if and only if (v, v′) ∈ UA or (v′, v) ∈ RH
or (v′, v) ∈ PA. Consider a simple example: given (u, r) ∈ UA and λ̂(u, r) = ∅, by
3In Section 4.6 we elaborate on possible representations of D. For the purposes of the discussion in
this section, it is sufficient to assume the existence of some abstract spatio-temporal domain.
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Definition 4.3.1, u is not RBAC=ST -authorized for r at any point d ∈ D. In other
words, u may not activate r if λ(u, r) = ∅, even if (u, r) ∈ UA. Hence, there is no way
to authorize u for r if u and r do not have any common enabling points. In order to
respond to this, more generally, if e = (v, v′) ∈ E, then we assume that λ(v)∩λ(v′) 6= ∅,
otherwise the edge is “wasted” as far as authorization is concerned.
We now introduce a running example, which will be used to motivate the additional
models that we define. Let us assume that we want to express the following spatio-
temporal constraints:
• any user assigned explicitly to role r can only activate this role in spatio-temporal
domain D ⊆ D;
• any user assigned explicitly to role r′ can activate role r from any point d ∈ D;
• any user may activate role r′′ from any point d ∈ D.
For concreteness, r might be a clerical role and users occupying this role may only
activate this role if they are in some particular part of the office building. In contrast,
r′ is a managerial role and a user occupying this role may activate the clerical role when
she is sitting in her own office (or anywhere else); r′′ is a general employee role and can
be activated from anywhere in the office.
Figure 4.3 illustrates six directed graphs for different user-role assignments and
role hierarchies: vertices u and v represent users, and vertices r, r′ and r′′ represent
roles. It is obvious that we can encode the above requirements using RBAC=ST for the
configurations shown in Figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(b). In particular, for Figure 4.3(a), we
could define λ(u) = D or λ(r) = D or λ(u) = λ(r) = D. However, for Figure 4.3(b),
we must define λ(u) = D, as user v, assigned to role r′, is allowed to activate role r at
any d ∈ D.
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Figure 4.3: RBAC1 configurations and their effect on spatio-temporal configurations
Now consider the configuration in Figure 4.3(c), in which u is also assigned to role
r′′. Since u is allowed to activate r′′ at any d ∈ D, we can not define λ(u) = D; nor
can we set λ(r) = D, as v is allowed to activate r at any d ∈ D. Hence, we require a
spatio-temporal constraint on edge (u, r). In other words, RBAC=ST is not sufficiently
expressive for certain RBAC1 configurations and spatio-temporal requirements. For
this reason, we now introduce a second model.
4.3.2 RBAC+ST : the strong model
The strong spatio-temporal RBAC model (RBAC+ST ) augments the RBAC
=
ST model
with a function µ : E → 2D. For e = (v, v′) ∈ E, µ(v, v′) denotes the set of points in
space-time at which the association between v and v′ is enabled. In particular,
• if (u, r) ∈ UA, then µ(u, r) denotes the set of points in space-time at which u is
assigned to r;
• if (r, r′) ∈ RH , then µ(r′, r) denotes the set of points in space-time at which r′ is
senior to r;
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• if (p, r) ∈ PA, then µ(r, p) denotes the set of points in space-time at which p is
assigned to r.
Given a path v1, . . . , vn in the labeled graph G = (V,E, λ, µ), we write µ̂(v1, . . . , vn)
to denote
⋂n−1
i=1 µ(vi, vi+1). Note that the semantics of RBAC
=
ST imply that an edge
can only be enabled if both end points are enabled. Similarly, in RBAC+ST , for e =
(v, v′) ∈ E, we require that µ(v, v′) ⊆ λ(v) ∩ λ(v′). Hence, µ̂(v1, . . . , vn) is the set of
points at which every node and every edge in the path v1, . . . , vn is enabled. When the
context is clear, we will write µ̂(v1, vn) for µ̂(v1, . . . , vn).
Definition 4.3.2 An entity v ∈ U ∪R is RBAC+ST -authorized for v
′ ∈ R∪P at point
d ∈ D if and only if there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′ and d ∈ µ̂(v, v′).
Remark 4.3.2 As in RBAC=ST , if there exists an edge e = (v, v
′) ∈ E such that
µ(v, v′) = ∅, by Definition 4.3.2, v is not RBAC+ST -authorized for v
′. Therefore, if
e = (v, v′) ∈ E, then we assume that ∅ ⊂ µ(v, v′) ⊆ λ(v) ∩ λ(v′).
Note that RBAC=ST is a special case of RBAC
+
ST in which µ(v, v
′) is defined to
be λ(v) ∩ λ(v′). In other words, any spatio-temporal constraints we can encode in
RBAC=ST , we can also encode in RBAC
+
ST .
Consider Figures 4.3(c) and 4.3(d), we can define µ(u, r) = D to express our spatio-
temporal requirements in RBAC+ST . However, neither RBAC
+
ST nor RBAC
=
ST can be
used to express these requirements given the configuration in Figure 4.3(e). In partic-
ular, we cannot define λ(r) = D in RBAC=ST or µ(u, r) = D in RBAC
+
ST because this
will only allow u to activate r′′ at points d ∈ D rather than the requirement d ∈ D. We
now introduce a third model with weaker restrictions on valid authorization paths.
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4.3.3 RBAC−ST : the weak model
Like RBAC=ST , the weak spatio-temporal RBAC model (or RBAC
−
ST ) augments the
RBAC1 model with a function λ : V → 2
D. In RBAC−ST , the authorization semantics
are different from those in RBAC=ST .
Definition 4.3.3 In RBAC−ST :
• a user v ∈ U is RBAC−ST -authorized for role v
′ ∈ R at point d ∈ D if and only if
there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′, and d ∈ λ(v) ∩ λ(v′);
• a role v ∈ R is RBAC−ST -authorized for permission v
′ ∈ P at point d ∈ D if and
only if there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′, and d ∈ λ(v) ∩ λ(v′);
• a user v ∈ U is RBAC−ST -authorized for permission v
′ ∈ P at point d ∈ D if and
only if there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vi, . . . , vn = v
′ such that vi ∈ R for
some i, and d ∈ λ(v) ∩ λ(vi) ∩ λ(v
′).
In other words, an entity v ∈ U ∪ R is RBAC−ST -authorized for another entity
v′ ∈ R ∪ P if v is RBAC1-authorized for v
′, and both entities v and v′ are enabled.4
There is no requirement that all intermediate nodes on the path are enabled. These
semantics appear to be closest to those defined in GTRBAC and the model of Ray and
Toahchoodee. However, we would argue that RBAC−ST has the least intuitive semantics:
why is it appropriate to ignore the enabling conditions on intermediate roles? There
may be occasions when it is convenient to do so, as in Figure 4.3(e), but ignoring the
intermediate roles is unlikely to be appropriate in many situations, and is inconsistent
with the usual interpretation of inheritance in a role hierarchy. We would argue that the
standard or strong models, in which enabling conditions are inherited up the hierarchy,
are more closely aligned with standard RBAC semantics.
4In the case where v ∈ U and v′ ∈ P , we require not only both entities v and v′ are enabled, but
also there exists an enabled role in the au-path from v to v′.
CHAPTER 4. SPATIO-TEMPORAL RBAC 98
Let G = (V,E, λ, µ) be a graph for an RBAC+ST configuration. If a request (u, p)
is RBAC+ST -authorized, then (u, p) is RBAC
=
ST -authorized. And if a request (u, p)
is RBAC=ST -authorized, then (u, p) is RBAC
−
ST -authorized. The former condition is
satisfied because of µ̂(u, p) ⊆ λ̂(u, p), and the latter λ̂(u, p) ⊆ λ(u) ∩ λ(r) ∩ λ(p) for
some role r ∈ R. In other words, given a graph G = (V,E, λ, µ), the authorization
semantics of RBAC−ST (in terms of what requests are authorized) is least restrictive,
and those of RBAC+ST is most restrictive.
Consider Figure 4.3(e). Using the weak model, we can define λ(r) = D to realize
our spatio-temporal requirements. However, we cannot express our spatio-temporal
requirements for the configuration shown in Figure 4.3(f) using any of the models we
have defined so far. If we use RBAC−ST , then we require that λ(r) = D in order to
restrict u’s activation of r. This, in turn means that v is unable to activate r from any
point d 6∈ D. However, if we use RBAC=ST or RBAC
+
ST , we must define λ(u) = D or
µ(u, r) = D, which means that u is unable to activate r′′ from any point d 6∈ D. Hence
we introduce the notion of trusted entities.
4.3.4 Trusted entities
A trusted entity may be a user or a role; we write T ⊆ U ∪ R to denote the set of
trusted entities. For an entity t ∈ T , the enabling constraints on nodes/edges in the
authorization path from t are ignored.5 Trusted entities may be introduced to the
standard, strong or weak model.
Definition 4.3.4 An entity v ∈ U ∪R is RBAC=ST -authorized for v
′ ∈ R∪P at point
d ∈ D if and only if there exists an au-path v = v1, . . . , vj , . . . , vn = v
′ such that vj ∈ T
5The interpretation of a trusted entity is similar to that of a privileged method in the Java runtime
environment (JRE). The stackwalking algorithm, which is used to perform access control in the JRE,
normally examines the permissions of every method on the stack. Access is only granted if every
method on the stack has the requested permission. However, the stackwalk terminates prematurely if
a privileged method is encountered on the stack (thereby ignoring any methods lower down the stack
that may not have the requested permission).
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and d ∈ λ̂(v, vj), or there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′ and d ∈ λ̂(v, v′).
Definition 4.3.5 An entity v ∈ U ∪R is RBAC+ST -authorized for v
′ ∈ R∪P at point
d if and only if there exists an au-path v = v1, . . . , vj , . . . , vn = v
′ such that vj ∈ T and
d ∈ µ̂(v, vj), or there exists an au−path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′ and d ∈ µ̂(v, v′).
Definition 4.3.6 In RBAC−ST :
• a user v ∈ U is RBAC−ST -authorized for role v
′ ∈ R at point d ∈ D if and
only if there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vj, . . . , vn = v
′ such that vj ∈ T
and d ∈ λ(v) ∩ λ(vj), or there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′ and
d ∈ λ(v) ∩ λ(v′);
• a role v ∈ R is RBAC−ST -authorized for permission v
′ ∈ P at point d ∈ D if and
only if there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vj, . . . , vn = v
′ such that vj ∈ T
and d ∈ λ(v) ∩ λ(vj), or there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′ and
d ∈ λ(v) ∩ λ(v′);
• a user v ∈ U is RBAC−ST -authorized for permission v
′ ∈ P at point d ∈ D if and
only if there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vj , . . . , vn = v
′ such that vj ∈ T and
d ∈ λ(v) ∩ λ(vj), or there exists an au-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vi, . . . , vn = v
′ such
that vi ∈ R for some i, and d ∈ λ(v) ∩ λ(vi) ∩ λ(v
′).
Consider Figure 4.3(f). In order to express our spatio-temporal requirements, we
use RBAC−ST and define r
′ (or v) to be a trusted entity and λ(r) = D. Clearly, user v
can activate roles r and r′′ from any point because there exists an au-path v, r′, r (and
the fact that λ(r) = D is ignored).
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4.3.5 A note on RBAC1-style syntax
We currently use the functions λ and µ to define the syntax of our spatio-temporal
RBAC models, and a graph-based formalism to define the semantics of these models.
In this section, we briefly note that we can use RBAC1-style syntax to encode RBAC
+
ST .
(It follows that RBAC−ST and RBAC
=
ST syntax can also be adjusted in the same way.)
The familiar sets and relations from the RBAC1 model – U , R, P , UA, RH and
PA – are adjusted to include an extra entry, corresponding to the set of points for
which the entity or entity relationship is enabled. The set of users U , for example, is
replaced by UST ⊆ U × 2
D; (u,D) ∈ UST means that u is enabled for all points d ∈ D.
The set of user-role assignments UA, for example, is replaced by UAST ⊆ U ×R× 2
D;
(u, r,D) ∈ UAST means that the assignment of user u to role r is enabled for all points
d ∈ D. In RBAC+ST , for example, a user u may activate a role r at point d if there
exist roles r′ = r1, r2, . . . , rn = r, such that (ri+1, ri,Di) ∈ RH ST , (u, r
′,Du) ∈ UAST ,
i = 1, . . . , n − 1, and d ∈ Du ∩D1 ∩ · · · ∩Dn−1.
4.3.6 Integration with ANSI-RBAC
Recall that the core and hierarchical components of ANSI-RBAC standard are defined
by a set of basic element sets U , S, R and P , a set of relations UA, RH and PA, and
a set of mapping functions, shown in the top part of Table 4.1.
The table demonstrates that it is easy to re-define the ANSI-RBAC functions in the
context of RBAC=ST , RBAC
+
ST and RBAC
−
ST . The function session users, defined by
the ANSI-RBAC standard, returns the user associated with a session, and is the same
for all three models, so we omit this function in the rest of Table 4.1. Each function,
when defined for RBAC=ST , RBAC
+
ST and RBAC
−
ST , includes a parameter d ∈ D. For
simplicity we use our original syntax, rather than the RBAC1-style syntax, for defining
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ANSI-RBAC
assigned users(r) = {u ∈ U : (u, r) ∈ UA}
assigned permissions(r) = {p ∈ P : (p, r) ∈ PA}
session users(s) = u
session roles(s) ⊆ {r ∈ R : r 6 r′, (session users(s), r′) ∈ UA}
authorized users(r) = {u ∈ U : r 6 r′, (u, r′) ∈ UA}
authorized permissions(r) = {p ∈ P : r′ 6 r, (p, r′) ∈ PA}
avail session perms(s) =
⋃
r∈session roles(s) authorized permissions(r)
RBAC=ST
assigned users(r, d) = {u ∈ U : (u, r) ∈ UA, d ∈ λ(u) ∩ λ(r)}
assigned permissions(r, d) = {p ∈ P : (p, r) ∈ PA, d ∈ λ(p) ∩ λ(r)}
session roles(s, d) ⊆ {r ∈ R : r 6 r′, (session users(s), r′) ∈ UA, d ∈ λ(session users(s)) ∩ λ̂(r′, r)}
authorized users(r, d) = {u ∈ U : r 6 r′, (u, r′) ∈ UA, d ∈ λ(u) ∩ λ̂(r′, r)}
authorized permissions(r, d) = {p ∈ P : r′ 6 r, (p, r′) ∈ PA, d ∈ λ(p) ∩ λ̂(r, r′)}
avail session perms(s, d) =
⋃
r∈session roles(s,d) authorized permissions(r, d)
RBAC+ST
assigned users(r, d) = {u ∈ U : (u, r) ∈ UA, d ∈ µ(u, r)}
assigned permissions(r, d) = {p ∈ P : (p, r) ∈ PA, d ∈ µ(p, r)}
session roles(s, d) ⊆ {r ∈ R : r 6 r′, (session users(s), r′) ∈ UA, d ∈ µ̂(session users(s), r)}
authorized users(r, d) = {u ∈ U : r 6 r′, (u, r′) ∈ UA, d ∈ µ̂(u, r)}
authorized permissions(r, d) = {p ∈ P : r′ 6 r, (p, r′) ∈ PA, d ∈ µ̂(r, p)}
avail session perms(s, d) =
⋃
r∈session roles(s,d) authorized permissions(r, d)
RBAC−ST
assigned users(r, d) = {u ∈ U : (u, r) ∈ UA, d ∈ λ(u) ∩ λ(r)}
assigned permissions(r, d) = {p ∈ P : (p, r) ∈ PA, d ∈ λ(p) ∩ λ(r)}
session roles(s, d) ⊆ {r ∈ R : r 6 r′, (session users(s), r′) ∈ UA, d ∈ λ(session users(s)) ∩ λ(r)}
authorized users(r, d) = {u ∈ U : r 6 r′, (u, r′) ∈ UA, d ∈ λ(u) ∩ λ(r)}
authorized permissions(r, d) = {p ∈ P : r′ 6 r, (p, r′) ∈ PA, d ∈ λ(p) ∩ λ(r)}
avail session perms(s, d) =
⋃
r∈session roles(s,d) authorized permissions(r, d)
Table 4.1: Spatio-temporal ANSI-RBAC mapping functions
these functions. Note that our spatio-temporal RBAC models can be integrated quite
easily with RBAC96 and the ANSI-RBAC standard.
4.4 Spatio-temporal ERBAC
In this section we extend the spatio-temporal model we have developed for RBAC1 to
include the features defined in ERBAC07.
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4.4.1 ERBAC=ST : the standard model
The standard spatio-temporal ERBAC model (or ERBAC=ST ) combines the features of
RBAC=ST and ERBAC07. In other words, we define the directed labeled graph (V,E, λ),
where E = UA ∪RH a ∪ RH u ∪ PA.
Definition 4.4.1 In ERBAC=ST :
• a user v ∈ U may activate role v′ ∈ R at point d ∈ D if and only if there exists
an a-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′ and d ∈ λ̂(v, v′);
• a role v ∈ R is authorized for permission v′ ∈ P at point d ∈ D if and only if
there exists a u-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′ and d ∈ λ̂(v, v′);
• a user v ∈ U is authorized for permission v′ ∈ P at point d ∈ D if and only if
there exists a path v = v1, v2, . . . , vi, . . . , vn = v
′ such that vi ∈ R for some i,
v1, . . . , vi is an a-path, vi, . . . , vn is a u-path, and d ∈ λ̂(v, v′).
4.4.2 ERBAC+ST : the strong model
The strong spatio-temporal ERBAC model (or ERBAC+ST ) combines the features of
RBAC+ST and ERBAC07. In other words, we have the extended directed labeled graph
(V,E, λ, µ), where E = UA ∪ RH a ∪ RH u ∪ PA.
Definition 4.4.2 In ERBAC+ST :
• a user v ∈ U may activate role v′ ∈ R at point d ∈ D if and only if there exists
an a-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′, and d ∈ µ̂(v, v′);
• a role v ∈ R is authorized for permission v′ ∈ P at point d ∈ D if and only if
there exists a u-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′, and d ∈ µ̂(v, v′);
CHAPTER 4. SPATIO-TEMPORAL RBAC 103
• a user v ∈ U is authorized for permission v′ ∈ P at point d ∈ D if and only if
there exists a path v = v1, v2, . . . , vi, . . . , vn = v
′ such that vi ∈ R for some i,
v1, . . . , vi is an a-path, vi, . . . , vn is a u-path, and d ∈ µ̂(v, v
′).
4.4.3 ERBAC−ST : the weak model
The weak spatio-temporal ERBAC model (or ERBAC−ST ) combines the features of
RBAC−ST and ERBAC07. Like ERBAC
=
ST , we have the extended directed labeled
graph (V,E, λ), where E = UA ∪ RH a ∪ RH u ∪ PA.
Definition 4.4.3 In ERBAC−ST :
• a user v ∈ U may activate role v′ ∈ R at point d ∈ D if and only if there exists
an a-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′, and d ∈ λ(v) ∩ λ(v′);
• a role v ∈ R is authorized for permission v′ ∈ P at point d ∈ D if and only if
there exists a u-path v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = v
′, and d ∈ λ(v) ∩ λ(v′);
• a user v ∈ U is authorized for permission v′ ∈ P at point d ∈ D if and only if
there exists a path v = v1, v2, . . . , vi, . . . , vn = v
′ such that vi ∈ R for some i,
v1, . . . , vi is an a-path, vi, . . . , vn is a u-path, and d ∈ λ(v) ∩ λ(vi) ∩ λ(v
′).
4.5 Practical considerations in spatio-temporal RBAC
The existence of spatio-temporal constraints will generally result in a more complex
access control decision function. In this section, we consider the implementation of our
spatio-temporal RBAC models in practical applications.
4.5.1 Partial transitive closure
In Section 4.3, we developed a number of spatio-temporal RBAC models that pro-
vide different authorization semantics determined by the interaction between spatio-
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temporal constraints and inheritance in the RBAC model. We note that checking
whether a user may activate a role or is granted a permission may be a relatively com-
plex operation when there are spatio-temporal constraints and a role hierarchy. This is
because there may be multiple paths between two roles in a role hierarchy and because
we need to check whether the point at which the access request was made belongs to
each of the enabling conditions on a given path. Hence, we suggest that in practical
implementations, it might be useful to pre-compute the transitive closure of (part of)
the RBAC96 graph.
One possibility is to construct RH ∗, the transitive closure of RH , and assign D ⊆ D
to (r, r′) ∈ RH ∗.
RBAC=ST
In RBAC=ST , for example, this value D would be the union of the individual λ̂ values
computed for each path between r and r′. That is, given r, r′ ∈ R, let Π(r, r′) denote
the set of paths between r and r′, and for pi ∈ Π(r, r′), let λ̂(pi, r, r′) denote λ̂(r, r′) for
path pi. We define λ̂∗ : RH ∗ → 2D, where
λ̂∗(r, r′) =
⋃
pi∈Π(r,r′)
λ̂(pi, r, r′)
Suppose, for example, that r4 < r2 < r1 and r4 < r3 < r1 and that r2 and r3 are
incomparable (as shown in Figure 4.1(c)). Suppose also that λ(ri) = Di. Then
λ̂∗(r1, r4) = (D1 ∩D2 ∩D4) ∪ (D1 ∩D3 ∩D4)
= D1 ∩D4 ∩ (D2 ∪D3).
We represent the partial transitive closure of RBAC=ST as a tuple (V,E
∗, λ, λ̂∗),
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whereE∗ = UA∪RH ∗∪PA, λ : V → 2D and λ̂∗ : RH ∗ → 2D. Given G∗ = (V,E∗, λ, λ̂∗),
a request by u to exercise a permission p at point d is granted if u has activated a role
r1 at d and there exists (r1, rn) and (rn, p) in E
∗ such that d ∈ λ̂∗(r1, rn) ∩ λ(p).
RBAC+ST
Similarly, in RBAC+ST , for pi ∈ Π(r, r
′), let µ̂(pi, r, r′) denote µ̂(r, r′) for path pi. We
define µ̂∗ : RH ∗ → 2D, where
µ̂∗(r, r′) =
⋃
pi∈Π(r,r′)
µ̂(pi, r, r′)
We represent the partial transitive closure of RBAC+ST as a tuple (V,E
∗, λ, µ, µ̂∗),
where E∗ = UA ∪ RH ∗ ∪ PA. Given G∗ = (V,E∗, λ, µ, µ̂∗), a request by u to exercise
a permission p at point d is granted if u has activated a role r1 at d and there exists
(r1, rn) and (rn, p) in E
∗ such that d ∈ µ̂∗(r1, rn) ∩ µ(rn, p).
RBAC−ST
In RBAC−ST , it is not necessary to pre-compute the transitive closure of the role hier-
archy. Given a RBAC−ST configuration G = (V,E, λ) and a request (u, p) at point d,
where (u, r) ∈ E and (r′, p) ∈ E, there might be multiple paths between two roles r
and r′, Π(r, r′), in the role hierarchy. However, the authorization semantics of RBAC−ST
does not require every node on any path pi ∈ Π(r, r′) to be enabled at d for granting
the request (u, p). The request by u to exercise p at point d is granted by G if u has
activated a role r′′ at d and there exists an au-path (r′′, . . . , p) and d ∈ λ(r′′) ∩ λ(p).
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ERBAC=ST
For the models based on ERBAC07, we compute RH ∗a, the transitive closure of RH a,
and RH∗u, the transitive closure of RH u. In ERBAC
=
ST , we define λ̂
∗
a : RH
∗
a → 2
D and
λ̂∗u : RH
∗
u → 2
D, where
λ̂∗a(r, r
′) =
⋃
pi∈Π(r,r′)
λ̂(pi, r, r′) and λ̂∗u(r, r
′) =
⋃
pi∈Π(r,r′)
λ̂(pi, r, r′)
We represent the partial transitive closure of ERBAC=ST as a tuple (V,E
∗, λ, λ̂∗a, λ̂
∗
u),
where E∗ = UA ∪ RH ∗a ∪ RH
∗
u ∪ PA. Given G
∗ = (V,E∗, λ, λ̂∗a, λ̂
∗
u), a request by u to
exercise a permission p at point d is granted if there exists (u, r1), (r1, ri), (ri, rn) and
(rn, p) in E
∗ such that d ∈ λ(u) ∩ λ̂∗a(r1, ri) ∩ λ̂
∗
u(ri, rn) ∩ λ(p).
ERBAC+ST
Similarly, in ERBAC+ST , we define µ̂
∗
a : RH
∗
a → 2
D and µ̂∗u : RH
∗
u → 2
D, where
µ̂∗a(r, r
′) =
⋃
pi∈Π(r,r′)
µ̂(pi, r, r′) and µ̂∗u(r, r
′) =
⋃
pi∈Π(r,r′)
µ̂(pi, r, r′)
We represent the partial transitive closure of ERBAC+ST as a tuple
(V,E∗, λ, µ̂, µ̂∗a, µ̂
∗
u), whereE
∗ = UA∪RH ∗a∪RH
∗
u∪PA. Given G
∗ = (V,E∗, λ, µ̂, µ̂∗a, µ̂
∗
u),
a request by u to exercise a permission p at point d is granted if there exists
(u, r1), (r1, ri), (ri, rn) and (rn, p) in E
∗ such that d ∈ µ̂(u, r1)∩ µ̂
∗
a(r1, ri)∩ µ̂
∗
u(ri, rn)∩
µ̂(rn, p).
ERBAC−ST
As in RBAC−ST , it is not useful to pre-compute the transitive closure of RH a and RH u,
because the semantics of ERBAC−ST is only concerned with the enabling conditions on
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the entities that appear in an access request.
4.5.2 Full transitive closure
RBAC=ST
We now consider the full transitive closure of G, G? = (V,E?), where E? = (UA ∪
RH ∪ PA)?. In RBAC=ST , given v, v
′ ∈ V , let Π(v, v′) denote the set of paths between
v and v′, and for pi ∈ Π(v, v′), let λ̂(pi, v, v′) denote λ̂(v, v′) for path pi. We define
λ̂? : E? → 2D, where
λ̂?(v, v′) =
⋃
pi∈Π(v,v′)
λ̂(pi, v, v′)
We represent the full transitive closure of RBAC=ST as a tuple (V,E
?, λ, λ̂?). Given
G? = (V,E?, λ, λ̂?), a request by u to exercise permission p at point d is granted if there
exists (u, p) in E? such that d ∈ λ̂?(u, p).
RBAC+ST
Similarly, in RBAC+ST , for pi ∈ Π(v, v
′), let µ̂(pi, v, v′) denote µ̂(v, v′) for path pi. We
define µ̂? : E? → 2D, where
µ̂?(v, v′) =
⋃
pi∈Π(v,v′)
µ̂(pi, v, v′)
We represent the full transitive closure of RBAC+ST as a tuple (V,E
?, λ, µ, µ̂?). Given
G? = (V,E?, λ, µ, µ̂?), a request by u to exercise permission p at point d is granted if
there exists (u, p) in E? such that d ∈ µ̂?(u, p).
ERBAC=ST
For the spatio-temporal ERBAC07 models, we consider the full transitive closure of G,
G? = (V,E?), where E? = E?a ∪ E
?
u, E
?
a = (UA ∪ RH a)
? and E?u = (RH u ∪ PA)
?. In
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ERBAC=ST , we define λ̂
?
a : E
?
a → 2
D and λ̂?u : E
?
u → 2
D, where
λ̂?a(v, v
′) =
⋃
pi∈Π(v,v′)
λ̂(pi, v, v′) and λ̂?u(v, v
′) =
⋃
pi∈Π(v,v′)
λ̂(pi, v, v′)
We represent the full transitive closure of ERBAC=ST as a tuple (V,E
?, λ, λ̂?a, λ̂
?
u).
Given G? = (V,E?, λ, λ̂?a, λ̂
?
u), a request by u to exercise permission p at point d is
granted if there exists (u, r) and (r, p) in E? such that d ∈ λ̂?a(u, r) ∪ λ̂
?
u(r, p).
ERBAC+ST
Similarly, in ERBAC+ST , we define µ̂
?
a : E
?
a → 2
D and µ̂?u : E
?
u → 2
D, where
µ̂?a(v, v
′) =
⋃
pi∈Π(v,v′)
µ̂(pi, v, v′) and µ̂?u(v, v
′) =
⋃
pi∈Π(v,v′)
µ̂(pi, v, v′)
We represent the full transitive closure of ERBAC+ST as a tuple (V,E
?, λ, µ, µ̂?a, µ̂
?
u).
Given G? = (V,E?, λ, µ, µ̂?a, µ̂
?
u), a request by u to exercise permission p at point d is
granted if there exists (u, r) and (r, p) in E? such that d ∈ µ̂?a(u, r) ∪ µ̂
?
u(r, p).
Similarly, it is not useful to pre-compute the full transitive closure of RBAC−ST and
ERBAC−ST . Note that computing the full transitive closure will only be practical for
relatively small numbers of users and permissions, so it is likely that computing the
partial transitive closure will be more useful in practice.
4.5.3 Is the use of hierarchies realistic?
The examples in Figure 4.3 illustrate that the presence of a role hierarchy significantly
complicates the specification of spatio-temporal constraints. We argued in Section 4.3
that there were at least three different models that could be used; even then, it was
necessary to introduce the notion of trusted entities for certain scenarios. This suggests
that there are many possible encodings of spatio-temporal restrictions in the presence
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of a role hierarchy. Choosing the appropriate model may well be difficult, and encoding
the desired enterprise security policies within such a model is also likely to be non-
trivial. In the next two sections, we consider two simple strategies that might be used
to mitigate these difficulties.
Flat spatio-temporal RBAC
In practice, it might well be preferable to assume that the set of roles is unordered,
as in core ANSI-RBAC standard or flat RBAC96 (RBAC0). This means, of course,
that the number of user- and permission-role assignments will increase (because such
assignments are often implicitly generated by assignments to other roles in the presence
of a role hierarchy). However, flat RBAC+ST can be used to specify most spatio-temporal
constraints.
Consider the spatio-temporal requirements for the configuration of RBAC in Fig-
ure 4.3(f) on Page 95. We transform the RBAC1 configuration to flat RBAC as follows:
U = {u, v}, R = {r, r′, r′′} and UA = {(v, r′), (v, r), (v, r′′), (u, r), (u, r′′)}. We only
need to define µ(u, r) = D; all other nodes and edges are enabled for any d ∈ D. In
fact, we can encode the spatio-temporal requirements for other configurations of RBAC
in Figure 4.3 using flat RBAC+ST .
To formally illustrate the expressive power of flat RBAC+ST , we now prove how
to transform hierarchical spatio-temporal RBAC, RBAC+ST , RBAC
=
ST , and RBAC
−
ST ,
configurations into an equivalent flat RBAC+ST configuration, where equivalence means
that the same set of requests is authorized by both configurations.
Theorem 4.5.1 Let Σ = (UA,RH ,PA, λ, µ) define an RBAC+ST system. Then there
exists a flat RBAC+ST system Σ
′ = (UA′,PA′, λ′, µ′) such that user u is authorized for
permission p at point d ∈ D in Σ if and only if u is authorized for p at point d ∈ D in
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Σ′.
Proof Given Σ = (UA,RH ,PA, λ, µ), we construct a flat RBAC+ST system Σ
′ =
(UA′,PA′, λ′, µ′) using the following procedure.
1. Construct the full transitive closure of the RBAC+ST system, Σ
? = (E?, λ, µ, µ̂?),
where E? = (UA ∪ RH ∪ PA)? and µ̂? : E? → 2D;
2. For all u ∈ U and for all r ∈ R such that (u, r) ∈ E?, we define (u, r) ∈ UA′ and
µ′(u, r) = µ̂?(u, r);
3. For all p ∈ P and for all r ∈ R such that (r, p) ∈ E?, we define (p, r) ∈ PA′ and
µ′(r, p) = µ̂?(r, p).
4. For all v ∈ V = (U ∪R ∪ P ), we define λ′(v) = λ(v).
We now prove the result about equivalence. If u is authorized for p at d in Σ, then
by Definition 4.3.2, there exists r ∈ R such that u, . . . , r is au-path, r, . . . , p is au-path
and d ∈ µ̂(u, r) ∩ µ̂(r, p) in Σ. By Step 1 and 2, (u, r) ∈ UA′ and µ′(u, r) ⊇ µ̂(u, r).
By Step 1 and 3, (p, r) ∈ PA′ and µ′(r, p) ⊇ µ̂(r, p). Hence, there exists r such that
(u, r) ∈ UA′, (p, r) ∈ PA′ and d ∈ µ′(u, r) ∩ µ′(r, p). Again, by Definition 4.3.2, u is
authorized for p at d in Σ′.
Conversely, if u is authorized for p at d in Σ′, then there exists r ∈ R such that
(u, r) ∈ UA′, (p, r) ∈ PA′ and d ∈ µ′(u, r) ∩ µ′(r, p) in Σ′. By Steps 1, 2 and 3, there
exists an au-path from u to r and an au-path from r to p such that d ∈ µ̂(u, r)∩ µ̂(r, p).
Then u is authorized for p at d in Σ. 
Corollary 4.5.1 Let Σ = (UA,RH ,PA, λ) define an RBAC=ST system. Then there
exists a flat RBAC+ST system Σ
′ = (UA′,PA′, λ′, µ′) such that user u is authorized for
permission p at point d ∈ D in Σ if and only if u is authorized for p at point d ∈ D in
Σ′.
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Proof Given Σ = (UA,RH ,PA, λ), we construct an equivalent RBAC+ST system Σ
′′ =
(UA,RH ,PA, λ, µ), where for all (v, v′) ∈ E = UA ∪RH ∪ PA, µ(v, v′) = λ(v) ∩ λ(v′).
Then by Theorem 4.5.1, there exists a flat RBAC+ST system Σ
′ = (UA′,PA′, λ′, µ′) that
is equivalent to Σ′′. Hence, by transitivity, user u is authorized for p at d in Σ if and
only if u is authorized for p at d in Σ′. 
Theorem 4.5.2 Let Σ = (UA,RH ,PA, λ) define an RBAC−ST system. Then there
exists a flat RBAC+ST system Σ
′ = (UA′,PA′, λ′, µ′) such that user u is authorized for
permission p at point d ∈ D in Σ if and only if u is authorized for p at point d ∈ D in
Σ′.
Proof Given Σ = (UA,RH ,PA, λ), we construct a flat RBAC+ST system Σ
′ =
(UA′,PA′, λ′, µ′) using the following procedure.
1. Construct the full transitive closure of the RBAC−ST system, Σ
? = (E?, λ), where
E? = (UA ∪ RH ∪ PA)?;
2. For all u ∈ U and for all r ∈ R such that (u, r) ∈ E?, we define (u, r) ∈ UA′ and
µ′(u, r) = λ(u) ∩ λ(r);
3. For all p ∈ P and for all r ∈ R such that (r, p) ∈ E?, we define (p, r) ∈ PA′ and
µ′(r, p) = λ(r) ∩ λ(p);
4. For all v ∈ V = (U ∪R ∪ P ), we define λ′(v) = λ(v).
We now prove the result about equivalence. If u is authorized for p at d in Σ,
then by Definition 4.3.3, there exists r ∈ R such that u, . . . , r, . . . , p is au-path, and
d ∈ λ(u) ∩ λ(r) ∩ λ(p) in Σ. By Step 1 and 2, (u, r) ∈ UA′ and µ′(u, r) = λ(u) ∩ λ(r).
By Step 1 and 3, (p, r) ∈ PA′ and µ′(r, p) = λ(r)∩λ(p). Hence, there exists r such that
(u, r) ∈ UA′ and (p, r) ∈ PA′, and d ∈ µ′(u, r) ∩ µ′(r, p). Again, by Definition 4.3.2, u
is authorized for p at d in Σ′.
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If u is authorized for p at d in Σ′, then there exists r ∈ R such that (u, r) ∈ UA′ and
(p, r) ∈ PA′, and d ∈ µ′(u, r)∩µ′(r, p) in Σ′. By Steps 1, 2 and 3, there exists an au-path
from u to r and an au-path from r to p such that d ∈ λ(u) ∩ λ(r) and d ∈ λ(r) ∩ λ(p).
In other words, there exists an au-path u, . . . , r, . . . , p and d ∈ λ(u) ∩ λ(r) ∩ λ(p) in Σ.
Then u is authorized for p at d in Σ. 
We have shown that any spatio-temporal constraints that encoded in hierarchical
spatio-temporal RBAC models (RBAC=ST , RBAC
+
ST and RBAC
−
ST ) can be also encoded
using the flat RBAC+ST model. Note that the authorization semantics of RBAC
=
ST is
exactly same as those of RBAC−ST when the role hierarchy is empty, hence we only con-
sider a single model (flat RBAC=ST ) for defining constraints on the entities of RBAC0.
Furthermore, flat RBAC=ST is a special case of flat RBAC
+
ST , where the enabling con-
ditions of every edge is defined to a set of points at which both end points are enabled.
Figure 4.4 shows a hierarchy that summarizes the comparison of spatio-temporal mod-
els to encode spatio-temporal constraints. For example, we can see that the most
powerful model is flat RBAC+ST that can specify various spatio-temporal constraints
that encoded by its junior models.
tRBAC=
ST
tRBAC+
ST
tRBAC−
ST
tFlat RBAC=
ST
tFlat RBAC+ST
 
 
 
 
 
 
@
@
@
@
@
@
Figure 4.4: A comparison of spatio-temporal models for encoding constraints
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Eliminate enabling restrictions on roles and the role hierarchy
We now propose an alternative approach that is distinct from the strategy advocated in
the previous section by including a role hierarchy and eliminating enabling restrictions
on roles and the role hierarchy: that is, set µ(r, r′) = D for all r, r′ ∈ R. Since
µ(r, r′) ⊆ λ(r) ∩ λ(r′), λ(r) = λ(r′) = D for all r, r′ ∈ R. In other words, all roles
and their associated edges are enabled at all points in the spatial-temporal domain,
and restrictions are only imposed at the outer nodes (users and permissions) and edges
(user-role and permission-role assignments) of the RBAC graph. This approach is
completely contrary to existing approaches, in which roles are usually the only entities
for which such enabling conditions are defined (see [13], for example).
An example that is often quoted in the temporal RBAC literature is that of a
night-doctor role, which should only be enabled during the night shift hours [13]. We
would argue that instead of imposing the enabling condition on the night-doctor role,
we should impose the condition on any assignment of that role to a user. This does not
preclude the same user from also being assigned to the day-doctor role (which would
have a different enabling condition on the user-role assignment).
It would not be difficult to implement this kind of approach. Let us assume that
we have a night-doctor role, which should only be activated during the night shift.
Then, whenever a user is assigned to this role, an enabling condition is automatically
generated for that user-role assignment. (If the intersection of the user’s enabling
condition and this condition is empty, then the assignment fails.)
Let us now consider the impact of setting µ(r, r′) = D for all r, r′ ∈ R in each
of the three spatio-temporal RBAC models. In RBAC=ST , a user u may activate a
role r at point d if there is an au-path u, r1, . . . , rn = r and d ∈ λ(u), a role r is
authorized for permission p at point d if there is an au-path r = r1, . . . , rn, p and
CHAPTER 4. SPATIO-TEMPORAL RBAC 114
d ∈ λ(p), and user u is authorized for permission p at point d if there is an au-path
u, r1, . . . , rn, p and d ∈ λ(u)∩ λ(p). Note that the authorization semantics of RBAC
=
ST
and RBAC−ST coincide with this restriction, which means administrators have fewer
options of encoding spatio-temporal constraints by using this approach.
In RBAC+ST , a user u may activate a role r at point d if there is an au-path
u, r1, . . . , rn = r and d ∈ µ(u, r1), a role r is authorized for permission p at point
d if there is an au-path r = r1, . . . , rn, p and d ∈ µ(rn, p), and user u is authorized for
permission p at point d if there is an au-path u, r1, . . . , rn, p and d ∈ µ(u, r1)∩µ(rn, p).
4.5.4 Concluding remarks
We have developed three spatio-temporal RBAC models and introduced the notion
of trusted entities to specify spatio-temporal requirements in different configurations
of the RBAC1 model. We also extended our models to include spatio-temporal re-
quirements for ERBAC07. All these models study different interactions between a role
hierarchy and spatio-temporal constraints, which might give rise to complex computa-
tions when checking access requests. We suggest that it is appropriate to pre-compute
spatio-temporal constraints over the transitive closure of the role hierarchy to improve
the efficiency of access request checking. On the other hand, it is unlikely that it is
useful to pre-compute spatio-temporal constraints over the full transitive closure of the
RBAC1 graph in many practical systems, because the size of E
? will be very large.
However, deciding access requests can be performed far more quickly than in existing
approaches [58].
On the other hand, the need for different spatio-tepmoral models arises because
once enabling conditions are imposed on roles in the presence of role hierarchy, there
are a number of different choices for the semantics of authorization. In practice, it
is complicated and error-prone to specify comprehensive spatio-temporal requirements
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in a hierarchical RBAC model. Therefore, we proposed two approaches to address
these difficulties: specifying spatio-temporal constraints on flat RBAC, and eliminating
spatio-temporal constraints on roles and the role hierarchy.
We would argue that, in many practical situations, the most appropriate approach
is to use flat RBAC+ST to specify spatio-temporal constraints. We have illustrated that
most hierarchical spatio-temporal RBAC configurations, such as RBAC=ST , RBAC
+
ST
and RBAC−ST can be transformed into a equivalent flat RBAC
+
ST configuration in terms
of what requests are authorized.
However, when there are very large numbers of user and permissions, it may well
be appropriate to use role hierarchies, thereby avoiding large numbers of user- and
permission-role assignments. In this case, it may be appropriate to set µ(r, r′) = D for
all r, r′ ∈ R, and specify enabling conditions on restrictions on outer nodes and edges,
such as users and user-role assignments, of the RBAC graph. We should perhaps note
that the underlying “philosophy” of RBAC is to use roles to reduce the burden of
administration, and that our suggestion of applying enabling constraints to users and
user-role assignment is inconsistent with this basic tenet. As we have seen, however,
many situations may require constraints on users and user-role assignment, rather than
roles. This suggests that incorporating spatio-temporal constraints within RBAC is
likely to require some trade-off between the complexity of policies that can be supported
and the complexity of constraint specification and administration.
4.6 Spatio-temporal domains
Much of the work in extending RBAC to include spatial and temporal restrictions
on entities and entity relationships has spent a considerable amount of time on how
these restrictions might be specified. The authors of GTRBAC, for example, define
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a syntax for temporal restrictions using the notion of calendars [68]. Although we
believe that it is of much greater importance to understand the interaction between
RBAC inheritance and such restrictions, we now briefly consider how sets of points
within a spatio-temporal domain might be specified.
Broadly speaking, there are two possibilities: concrete and symbolic domains. A
concrete domain makes use of actual points in space-time, whereas a symbolic domain
uses labels as synonyms for sets of points in an associated concrete domain. We consider
spatial and temporal domains separately. A single spatio-temporal domain D can be
treated as a pair (S,T ), where S is a spatial domain and T is a temporal domain.
4.6.1 Representing location
A concrete spatial domain is defined by a co-ordinate system: we could use standard
Euclidean space or we may use spherical or cylindrical co-ordinate systems, for example.
The system chosen will be entirely dependent on the method by which user location
is determined. For ease of exposition, we will define the concrete spatial domain to
be S = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ Z}. In other words, points in space are defined by two integer
co-ordinates.
An atomic location is defined to be a rectangle, which is defined by the co-ordinates
of its lower-left and upper-right corners.6 That is, a rectangle is a pair [l, r], where
l, r ∈ S. A location is the union of one or more disjoint atomic locations: clearly, the
set of locations is a subset of 2S and λ maps an entity to a location.
Having defined a concrete spatial domain, we may define a symbolic spatial domain,
in which locations are associated with labels. Symbolic locations may be defined to be
the union of other symbolic locations; these symbolic locations may overlap. Having
6Of course, we could define a location to be a circular region in the concrete spatial domain, by
defining the center c ∈ S and radius r ∈ Z of the circle. Again, the definition of location will be
determined by the method used to identify the position of a user.
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defined a set of symbolic locations, we must define a mapping from the set of symbolic
locations to concrete locations. We may also use λ to map entities to symbolic locations,
and then map the symbolic location to a concrete location.
Let s ∈ S be a point in the concrete spatial domain, and let L ⊆ S be a concrete
location. We write s ∈ L if s belongs to one of the atomic locations contained in L. If
L is a union of symbolic locations, we write s ∈ L to denote that s belongs to at least
one of the symbolic locations contained in L.
4.6.2 Representing time
We assume the existence of a clock, whose ticks are indexed by the natural numbers
N.7 An atomic interval in the concrete temporal domain T = N, is defined by a start
point t1 ∈ T and an end point t2 ∈ T , and written as [t1, t2]. An interval is defined to
be the union of one or more disjoint atomic intervals; λ maps an entity to an interval.
We may also define a symbolic temporal domain, in which intervals are associated
with labels. We could, for example, define the symbolic intervals 21:August:2007,
Mondays:2007, WorkingHours etc. We may use λ to map entities to symbolic intervals.
Let t ∈ T be a point in the concrete temporal domain, and let I ⊆ T be a concrete
interval. We write t ∈ I if t belongs to one of the atomic intervals contained in I. If I
is the union of symbolic intervals, we write t ∈ I to denote that t belongs to at least
one of the symbolic intervals contained in I.
4.6.3 Example
In this section we present examples to illustrate the applications of spatial RBAC=ST ,
temporal RBAC=ST and spatio-temporal ERBAC
+
ST in a practical environment.
7It should be noted that representing time will be more complex than this for many applications;
typically a local time is relative to a location and a time of year. Our representation of time, as for
location, is merely illustrative.
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u1 Alice
u2 Bob
u3 Chris
u4 Diane
r1 Head of department
r2 Academic staff
r3 Admin staff
r4 Student
p1 Access resources via Metalib
p2 Access ACM and IEEE library
p3 Listen to presentations
p4 View staff profile
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(b) Graphical representation of RBAC1 relations
Figure 4.5: An example of an RBAC1 configuration
Spatial RBAC=ST
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 illustrates some of the concept that have been introduced in this
chapter. Figure 4.5(a) lists a number of RBAC entities associated with a computer
science department at a university. Figure 4.5(b) illustrates the relationships between
these entities. A user u2, who is assigned to role r1, is allowed to activate roles r2, r3, r4
in any session. In RBAC1, u2 is authorized to invoke permissions p1, p2, p3, p4 since any
permission can be reached by u2 via a path in the graph.
In order to define spatial constraints for this example, we describe the layout of a
floor in a university computer building (CB), as shown in Figure 4.6(a). Figure 4.6(b)
defines enabling constraints for the RBAC entities in Figure 4.5(a).8 For example,
permission to access the ACM and IEEE libraries (p2) is only allowed if the requester
is in the seminar room (SR), Alice’s office (AO), or Bob’s office (BO). In Diane’s
office, for example, permissions p2 and p3 are not enabled; however, Diane is allowed
to activate r3 (Admin staff), thereby enabling her to view staff profile.
8Note that all roles are enabled everywhere within the computer building, following the approach
suggested in Section 4.5.3.
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Seminar Room
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0
10
20 40 60 80
20
30
(a) Spatial domain
Spatial domain Temporal domain
Entity Symbolic Concrete Symbolic
u1 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] 09:00-17:59
u2 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] 09:00-17:59
u3 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
u4 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
r1 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
r2 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
r3 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
r4 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
p1 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
p2 SR ∪ AO ∪ BO [(10,20),(30,30)] ∪ [(45,20),(80,30)] 09:00-17:59
p3 SR [(10,20),(30,30)] 12:00-13:00
p4 DO [(30,20),(45,30)] Always
(b) Spatial-temporal constraints on nodes
µ((u1, r2)) (CB, 09:00−13:00 ∪ 14:00−17:59)
µ((u2, r1)) (CB, 09:00−13:00 ∪ 14:00−17:59)
µ((u3, r4)) (CB, Always)
µ((u4, r3)) (CB, Always)
µ((r1, r2)) (CB, Always)
µ((r1, r3)) (CB, Always)
µ((r2, r4)) (CB, Always)
µ((r3, r4)) (CB, Always)
µ((r4, p1)) (CB, Always)
µ((r2, p2)) (SR ∪ AO ∪ BO, 09:00−13:00 ∪ 14:00−17:59)
µ((r4, r3)) (SR, 12:00−13:00)
µ((r3, p4)) (DO, Always)
(c) Spatio-temporal constraints on edges
Figure 4.6: An example of the specification of spatio-temporal domains
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Temporal RBAC=ST
Let us consider the graphical formulation of RBAC1 configurations for the computer
building shown in Figures 4.5(a) and 4.5(b). Let us assume that Figure 4.6(b) represents
symbolic temporal domains for all entities of RBAC1 in the computer building example.
Then at a particular point of time 14:00, the permission p3 is not enabled. All other
entities are enabled, and related edges exist at time 14:00. For example, Alice is allowed
to activate role r2 to use the permission p1 that is inherited from role r4 at time instant
14:00.
Spatio-temporal ERBAC+ST
Consider the activation and usage hierarchies of ERBAC07 shown in Figures 4.7(a)
and 4.7(b), respectively, and the user-role assignment and the permission-role assign-
ment are as same as the configurations in Figure 4.5(b). For example, user u2 is
authorized to activate role r1, but is not thereby authorized for permission p4 which is
not inherited by r1 in the permission usage hierarchy. Let us assume that Figure 4.5(a)
represents ERBAC07 entities in the computer building.
Figures 4.6(b) and 4.6(c) represent the spatio-temporal enabling conditions for ER-
BAC07 entities and relations. Note that a user must explicitly activate the Admin
staff role in order to use the permissions associated with this role. Note also that the
specification of spatio-temporal domains on edges observes the consistency constraint
between nodes and edges. At a particular spatio-temporal point (Alice’s office, 13:30),
Alice can not activate the role (Academic staff), because Alice is not assigned academic
staff role at point (AO,13:30) although both user (Alice) and role (Academic staff) are
enabled at point (AO,13:30). On the other hand, at point (Diane’s office, 14:00), Bob
can activate the role r3 (Admin staff) to use the permission p4 (View staff profile).
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Figure 4.7: An example of ERBAC07 activation and usage hierarchies
4.7 Related work
In this section, we review some related work on context-based access control. In par-
ticular, we examine the temporal constraints in the GTRBAC model and the spatio-
temporal RBAC model of Ray and Toahchoodee [76] in more detail. We explain why
we believe that our spatio-temporal models are more attractive than related work ac-
cording to several criteria: well-defined authorization semantics, syntactic completeness
(constraints on all RBAC entities and relations), consistency (absence of conflicts, res-
olution of conflicts), and syntactic simplicity (number of predicates or functions).
Work has been done on spatial constraints in the context of mandatory access con-
trol (MAC) [75], discretionary access control (DAC) [4] and RBAC models [14, 49]. This
work has either studied spatial constraints in traditional access control models [4, 75],
rather than RBAC, or proposed a limited spatially constrained RBAC [49]. GEO-
RBAC [14] introduces a comprehensive spatial RBAC model for specifying spatial con-
straints on roles and treats locations as objects in the RBAC model. The GEO-HRBAC
model defines the role hierarchy based on the containment of locations. Compared with
our models, we believe that GEO-HRBAC is too application-dependent, and focuses
on controlling access on different locations.
There has also been research on more general contextual information to achieve
fined-grained role-based access control. The teaM-based access control (TMAC) ap-
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proach extends RBAC with the notion of team and context-based permission activa-
tion [43, 87]. Covington et al [28] introduce the concept of environment roles in RBAC
which are activated based on the values of environmental conditions. Strembeck et
al [86] introduce the concept of context constraints in RBAC which is used to re-
strict usage of permissions through considering environmental factors in access control
decision. Although all above works attempted to incorporate general contextual in-
formation in RBAC model, none of them has comprehensively studied the impacts of
context on all the components of the RBAC model. We now consider the two most
significant pieces of work on spatio-temporal RBAC.
4.7.1 Temporal constraints in GTRBAC
The temporal-RBAC model (TRBAC) introduces temporal constraints which limit the
time during which a role is enabled and activated [13]. Generalized TRBAC (GTRBAC)
is an extension of TRBAC that applies temporal constraints to the assignment of users
and permissions to roles [58]. GTRBAC does not consider temporal constraints on users
(sessions), permissions and role hierarchical relationships. Moreover, GTRBAC, unlike
our models, does not impose any consistency constraints on the user- and permission-
role assignments and role-role relationships.
In addition to defining the hybrid role hierarchy that contains the role activation
hierarchy 6a, permission-usage hierarchy 6u and permission-activation hierarchy 6,
GTRBAC further sub-divides hierarchies into “weakly” and “strongly” restricted; the
authorization semantics for these hierarchies differ. The weakly restricted semantics
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for permission usage [58, Table 7], are defined by
can be acquired(p, x, t)←∀p, (x >u y) ∧ enabled(x, t)∧
can be acquired(p, y, t). (4.1)
The intuition seems to be that if x is enabled, x >u y and y can acquire permission p,
then x can acquire permission p. To quote Joshi et al : “The weakly restricted hierar-
chies allow inheritance or activation semantics in the nonoverlapping intervals. . . only
role x needs to be enabled at time t for the [usage] inheritance semantics to apply”.
However, there are a number of problems with this definition. The predicate
can be acquired is defined recursively, but there is no base case; in particular, re-
placing x with y (which is legitimate, since y > y) in the rule above means we have
a circular definition. Presumably the base case is that (p, y) ∈ PA, but the presence
of the parameter t in can be acquired suggests that there may be an enabling con-
dition on this assignment. Similar problems exist for weakly restricted semantics for
role activation, and for strongly restricted semantics for permission acquisition and role
activation.
Without a base case, it is impossible to determine the intended meaning of weakly
and strongly restricted hierarchies. Moreover, it seems that any enabling conditions
on roles between x and y are ignored. This makes a direct comparison between our
models and GTRBAC impossible. The strongly restricted semantics require x and
y to be enabled, which suggests that strongly restricted semantics in GTRBAC are
(intended to be) somewhat similar to RBAC−ST .
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4.7.2 Spatio-temporal RBAC
Ray and Toahchoodee developed a spatio-temporal RBAC model [76] that is strongly
influenced by GTRBAC. Indeed, the main novelty of their approach is to introduce
spatial and temporal constraints on all the components of RBAC. They also consider
the consistency of the constraints on user-role and permission-role assignments.
Like ERBAC07, they introduce a role activation hierarchy 6a and a permission
usage hierarchy 6u. They also define temporal constraints, location constraints, and
temporal and location constraints on these two role hierarchies. Let us consider the rep-
resentative example of “time location restricted permission inheritance hierarchy” [76,
Definition 13], where
PermRoleAcquire(p, x, d, l)← ∀p, (x >u y) ∧ PermRoleAcquire(p, y, d, l). (4.2)
Here, d represents a set of time points and l a set of points in space. Again, it is not
clear what the base case is, and intermediate roles between x and y are ignored.
In addition, this definition may give rise to conflicts within the specification of
enabling conditions. If PermRoleAcquire(p, r, d, l) holds then r and p are enabled at
all points within d and l [76, Section 4.5]. Now let us assume that
• RoleEnableLoc(x) = l′ (x is enabled at l′) and RoleEableDur(x) = d′ (x is
enabled during d′),
• PermRoleAcquire(p, y, d, l) holds and x >u y,
• d′ ⊂ d and l′ ⊂ l.
Then we have PermRoleAcquire(p, x, d, l), by (4.2). This implies that x is enabled at
l ⊃ l′ and d ⊃ d′, which contradicts the enabling conditions defined on x. Similar
conflicts exist for weakly temporal and location restricted permission acquisition.
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4.7.3 Summary
We conclude that despite the considerable amount of research on spatio-temporal
RBAC models, existing work suffers from significant shortcomings. These include
poorly defined authorization semantics, syntax that is both complicated and inade-
quate, lack of compatibility with RBAC96/ANSI-RBAC standard and a lack of consis-
tency. The GTRBAC model and that of Ray and Toahchoodee – perhaps the two most
detailed models in the literature – suffer from all of these problems. We have already
noted some of these problems in earlier sections. Comparing the syntactic complexity,
Joshi et al define 23 predicates in GTRBAC, Ray and Toahchoodee define 16, whereas
we supplement RBAC96 with just two functions λ and µ. Perhaps the biggest differ-
ence between our approach and existing work is to focus on semantics, rather than
syntax; we believe the former to be much the harder and less well understood of the
two aspects of a spatio-temporal RBAC model.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed the ERBAC07 model based on RBAC1, and influenced by
existing models such as ERBAC96 and GTRBAC. We constructed a number of spatio-
temporal role-based models based on RBAC1 and ERBAC07 using a simple extension
of the syntax used for RBAC1. We introduced a graph-based formalism to explain the
semantics of RBAC1 and ERBAC07, and used this as a basis for defining the semantics
of our spatio-temporal models. We note, in passing, that these semantics might be a
useful addition to the ANSI-RBAC standard.
We examined the difficulties that arise when enabling constraints are placed on
roles in the presence of a role hierarchy, not only on the complexity of evaluating access
requests, but also on the complexity of defining spatio-temporal RBAC policies. We
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proposed that some pre-computation of enabling conditions on the transitive closure
of (part of) the RBAC graph can be performed to simplify the evaluation of access
requests when there are requirements for a role hierarchy and enabling conditions on
roles.
We also established relationships between our spatio-temporal models in terms of
expressive power of encoding spatio-temporal requirements. Perhaps, the most impor-
tant conclusion of our work is that flat RBAC+ST is the most expressive model in the
sense that it is able to encode all spatio-temporal requirements that can be expressed
in our other models. Therefore, we suggested the use of RBAC+ST to specify spatio-
temporal policies when there are small number of users and permissions. On the other
hand, when it is necessary to use the role hierarchy, it is rarely helpful to impose spatio-
temporal constraints on roles and the role hierarchy; instead, these constraints should
be applied to users and user-role assignments.
All existing models, such as GTRBAC, tend to focus on the syntax of temporal and
spatio constraints, rather than on the authorization semantics. While we believe that
the syntax of temporal and spatial constraints will generally be application-dependent,
we did consider the representation of spatio-temporal constraints, distinguishing be-
tween concrete and symbolic domains. Concrete domains comprise a set of points de-
fined by some numerically-encoded reference system; symbolic domains comprise sets of
labels, each corresponding to one or more points in a concrete domain. In summary, our
approach of representing spatio-temporal domain is considerably simpler than existing
work, such as GTRBAC.
A number of papers have subsequently appeared on GTRBAC, but this work has
ignored temporal constraints and focused on issues related to the multiple role hier-
archies [36, 55, 57, 96]. In particular, Du and Joshi [36] define the inter-domain role
mapping (IDRM) problem in the context of GTRBAC in which temporal considera-
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tions were completely ignored. Moreover, statement of the IDRM problem was not
properly defined. In the next chapter, we will investigate this problem and other re-
lated problems in a very well understood context, such as RBAC96. We can then easily
apply insights or techniques obtained to more complex models, such as ERBAC07 and
spatio-temporal RBAC models that are developed in this chapter.
Chapter 5
Set Covering Problems in RBAC
In this chapter we consider the computational complexity of a number of important
problems in role-based access control. In fact, it was the analysis of the inter-domain
role mapping (IDRM) problem in ERBAC07 and spatio-temporal RBAC models, which
leads us to rephrase this problem in a more abstract form that is close to the standard
set cover problem. Solving the complexity of this problem enables us to solve the IDRM
problem and other similar problems that arise in different types of RBAC models we
introduced in previous chapters. We now briefly introduce those RBAC problems.
Du and Joshi [36] defined the IDRM problem, that is to find a set of roles of minimal
cardinality such that the authorized permissions for that set of roles is precisely the set
of requested permissions. It is easy show that the IDRM problem is not well-defined,
because there may not exist a set of roles that are authorized for precisely the set of
requested permissions. In this chapter, we provide a more accurate formulation of the
IDRM problem from two different perspectives: safety and availability [21]. In terms
of availability, we want to find a set of roles that is collectively authorized for the set
of requested permissions and also minimizes the number of additional permissions that
are granted. Alternatively, from the point of view of safety, we want to find a set of roles
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that grant some maximal set of permissions strictly contained in the set of requested
permissions. We call the former the IDRM-availability problem, and the latter the
IDRM-safety problem.
Zhang and Joshi [96] then extended the IDRM problem to define the user-
authorization query (UAQ) problem, which asks whether there exists a set of roles
that can be activated in a session for a set of permissions requested by a user. This set
of roles must satisfy dynamic separation of duty constraints that impose restrictions
on combinations of roles that may be activated (by any user) in a session. In other
words, the UAQ problem is an extension of the IDRM problem with constraints on
role activation. Wickramaarachchi et al [94] considered a more general definition of
the UAQ problem by including a lower bound and an upper bound for the requested
set of permissions. This general version of the UAQ problem seeks a set of roles such
that the requested user can activate that set of roles in a session, and the authorized
permissions for that set of roles is between the lower bound and the upper bound of
the requested permissions.
On the other hand, Li et al [19, 65] recently studied a number of interesting ques-
tions regarding separation of duty constraints and their enforcement in the context of
role-based access control. A static separation of duty (SSoD) constraint requires that
sensitive combinations of permissions should not be available to fewer than k users, but
most approaches in the RBAC literature specify such constraints in terms of restrictions
on the assignment of users to roles. They mainly showed that SSoD constraints defined
on sets of permissions can be enforced by generating constraints on the assignment of
users to roles, and gives rise to the following problems.
• Given a RBAC state, and a SSoD constraint, is the SSoD constraint enforceable
in the RBAC state, in the sense that, does there exist a set of fewer than k
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roles that are authorized for the set of sensitive permissions defined in the SSoD
constraint?
• Given a RBAC state, and an enforceable SSoD constraint, how to generate a
set of RSSoD constraints (that is, constraints defined on the assignment of users
to roles) that is equivalent to the SSoD constraint, in the sense that the set of
RSSoD constraints is satisfied if and only if the SSoD constraint is satisfied.
We call the former the enforceability of static separation of duty constraints problem,
and the latter the generation of role-based static separation of duty (RSSoD) constraints
problem.
However, existing work does not always determine the computational complexity
of the problem (instead presenting either heuristic [94, 96] or exhaustive algorithms
to compute a solution [65]). All the above problems appear to be related to the well
known set cover problem [42]: the decision version of this problem is NP-complete,
while the optimization problem is NP-hard. In this chapter, we examine the connec-
tions between computational problems arising in RBAC and the set cover problem.
Our most important contribution in this chapter is to define the minimal cover prob-
lem – a generalization of the set cover problem – and use this problem to determine the
computational complexity of the IDRM-availability problem and the user-authorization
query problem. In doing so, we identify some interesting auxiliary problems and es-
tablish their computational complexity. We also establish a vocabulary and a suite
of techniques for handling similar problems that may subsequently arise in the con-
text of RBAC. The material in this chapter is mainly derived from previous published
papers [21, 23].
This chapter is arranged as follows. In the next section we formally define the set
cover problem. Section 5.2 introduces the minimal cover problem and establishes its
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relationship to the basic set cover problem, thereby enabling us to derive its compu-
tational complexity. In Section 5.3, we discuss applications of our results to RBAC,
establishing complexity results for a number of different problems. We also discuss
related work in Section 5.3.
5.1 The set cover problem
Let X be a finite set and let C be a collection of subsets of X such that X =
⋃
C∈C C,
and let D ⊆ C. Then we write UD to denote
⋃
D∈DD. (By definition, UD ⊆ X for any
D ⊆ C; in particular, UC = X).
Definition 5.1.1 Let X be a finite set and let C be a collection of subsets of X such
that UC = X. Let V ⊆ X. We say D ⊆ C is a cover of V if UD ⊇ V ; D is a perfect
cover of V if UD = V .
The definition above is more general than the usual definition associated with the set
cover problem. In particular, our notion of a “perfect cover” is what usually corresponds
to a “cover” in the literature. However, in Section 5.2 we will need to be able to
distinguish between covers and perfect covers, hence the more general definition.
Clearly, there exists at least one perfect cover of X (namely C). Note that any cover
of X is necessarily perfect, since UC = X. The set cover problem can be expressed in
terms of perfect covers.
Problem 5.1.1 (The set cover decision problem) For a given integer k, does
there exist a perfect cover D of X such that |D| 6 k?
Problem 5.1.2 (The set cover optimization problem) What is the smallest in-
teger m for which there exists a perfect cover of X of cardinality m?
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The set cover decision problem is NP-complete [42] with respect to the parameter
|C|. The set cover optimization problem is NP-hard, because there exists a (trivial)
polynomial time Turing reduction from the set cover decision problem to the set cover
optimization problem.1
5.2 Variations on the set cover problem
In this section, we introduce some terminology related to the computation of covers
and perfect covers. We also define a number of new computational problems using this
terminology.
Throughout this section, we assume we are given a universe X and C, a collection
of subsets of X. We define a binary relation ∼ on the powerset of C: D ∼ D′ if and
only if UD = UD′ .
Proposition 5.2.1 ∼ is an equivalence relation.
Proof Given D1,D2,D3 ⊆ C, we show that ∼ is reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
Clearly, ∼ is reflexive, that is D1 ∼ D1, since UD1 = UD1 . If UD1 = UD2 , then
UD2 = UD1 , which implies that if D1 ∼ D2, then D2 ∼ D1. Hence ∼ is symmetric.
Similarly, if UD1 = UD2 and UD2 = UD3 , then UD1 = UD3 . Hence ∼ is also transitive.
The equivalence classes defined by ∼ give rise to a partition of the powerset of
C: the elements of an equivalence class are all subsets of C, and all elements in an
equivalence class are perfect covers of the same subset of X. If there exists a perfect
cover of V ⊆ X – that is, there exists D ⊆ C such that UD = V – then we write [V ] ⊆ C
to denote the equivalence class in which each element of [V ] is a perfect cover of V .
That is, [V ] = {D ⊆ C : UD = V }.
1If we have an oracle that can solve the optimization problem, we can solve the decision problem
by checking whether the solution of the associated optimization problem has cardinality less than or
equal to k.
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We write PCov(X, C) to denote the set of subsets of X for which perfect covers exist
in C. Clearly, (PCov(X, C),⊆) is a partially ordered set. When X and C are obvious
from context, we will simply write PCov for PCov(X, C).
Example 5.2.1 Let X = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let C = {C1, C2, C3, C4}, where C1 = {1},
C2 = {2, 4}, C3 = {3, 4} and C4 = {1, 2, 4}. Then
PCov = {{1}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}
and
[{1}] = {{C1}}
[{2, 4}] = {{C2}}
[{3, 4}] = {{C3}}
[{1, 2, 4}] = {{C4}, {C1, C4}, {C2, C4}, {C1, C2}, {C1, C2, C4}}
[{1, 3, 4}] = {{C1, C3}}
[{2, 3, 4}] = {{C2, C3}}
[{1, 2, 3, 4}] = {{C3, C4}, {C1, C2, C3}, {C1, C3, C4}, {C2, C3, C4}, {C1, C2, C3, C4}}
Figure 5.1 shows a graphical representation of X and C, and a Hasse diagram of the
partially ordered set (PCov,⊆). Clearly, {C3, C4} is a solution to this instance of the
set cover optimization problem.
5.2.1 The kernel and shell
We now introduce the notion of the kernel and shell of V (given X and C). Informally,
the kernel of V represents the largest subset of X that is perfectly covered and is
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Figure 5.1: A graphical representation of X and C, and a Hasse diagram of PCov
contained in V . We shall see that the kernel of V can be computed in polynomial time,
a result that has a number of useful applications. The shell identifies those sets that
could contribute to a cover of V .
Definition 5.2.1 Let V ⊆ X. Define K(V ) = {C ∈ C : C ⊆ V }. Then we call
UK(V ) ⊆ X the kernel of V (with respect to C).
For brevity, we write ker(V ), rather than UK(V ), to denote the kernel of V . Note
that ker(V ) ∈ PCov and ker(V ) ⊆ V , by definition. We now state and prove two
elementary results.
Proposition 5.2.2 Let Z ∈ PCov such that Z ⊆ V . Then Z ⊆ ker(V ).
Proof Since Z ∈ PCov, there exists D ⊆ C such that Z = UD. For any C ∈ D, we
have C ⊆ V (otherwise, Z 6⊆ V ). Hence, C ∈ K(V ) by definition and hence D ⊆ K(V ).
Therefore Z = UD ⊆ UK(V ) = ker(V ). 
Proposition 5.2.3 V ∈ PCov if and only if V = ker(V ).
Proof The result follows immediately if V = ker(V ) since ker(V ) ∈ PCov. Assume
now that V ∈ PCov. Since V ⊆ V , we may apply Proposition 5.2.2 to deduce that
V ⊆ ker(V ). Hence, we have V = ker(V ), since ker(V ) ⊆ V , by definition. 
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Corollary 5.2.1 Let V ⊆ X. Determining whether V ∈ PCov is in P.
Proof By Proposition 5.2.3, V ∈ PCov if and only if V = ker(V ). Clearly, we can
check whether V = ker(V ) in polynomial time with respect to |C| and |V |. 
Definition 5.2.2 Let V ⊆ X. Define S(V ) = {C ∈ C : C ∩ V 6= ∅}. Then we call
US(V ) ⊆ X the shell of V (with respect to C).
Similarly, we write shell(V ) to denote the shell of V . Note that shell(V ) ∈ PCov and
shell(V ) ⊇ V , by definition.
5.2.2 Minimality, optimality and irreducibility
Let us assume that V 6∈ PCov and consider the problem of finding an “approximation”
of V among the members of PCov. (We will formalize the notion of approximation
shortly.) The results above suggest that the best “under-approximation” of V is ker(V ).
It seems natural to consider “over-approximation” in terms of those elements of PCov
that contain V and have minimal cardinality. More formally, we have the following
definitions.
Definition 5.2.3 Given X, C and V ⊆ X such that V 6∈ PCov, we say:
• T ∈ PCov is a container of V if T ⊃ V ;
• T ∈ PCov is a minimal container of V if T is a container of V and for any other
container T ′ of V , |T | 6 |T ′|.2
In other words, T is a minimal container of V if it is perfectly covered by some
subset of C, contains V , but contains as few elements outside V as possible for a set
that is perfectly covered.3
2Equivalently, there does not exist T ′ ∈ PCov such that T ′ ⊇ V and |T ′| < |T |.
3This is important in the context of RBAC because we want to minimize the number of additional
permissions for which a set of roles is authorized outside some specified set of permissions.
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Definition 5.2.4 Given X, C and V ⊆ X such that V 6∈ PCov, we say:
• D ⊆ C is irreducible if for all D′ ⊂ D, UD′ ⊂ UD;
• D ⊆ C is a minimal cover of V if D ∈ [T ] for some minimal container T of V ;
• D ∈ [T ] is an optimal cover of V if T is a minimal container of V and D is
irreducible.
Informally, D is irreducible if there is no redundancy in D: we cannot remove any
element of D without changing UD. Each T ∈ PCov is associated with the equivalence
class [T ], which is a collection of subsets of C, and every member of [T ] is a perfect
cover of T . If T is a minimal container of V , then every element of [T ] is a minimal
cover of V . Each such equivalence class contains at least one irreducible element.
Example 5.2.2 Using our running example, let V = {1, 2, 3}. Then a minimal con-
tainer of {1, 2, 3} is {1, 2, 3, 4}. The irreducible covers in [{1, 2, 3, 4}] (and hence optimal
covers of {1, 2, 3}) are {C3, C4} and {C1, C2, C3}.
Proposition 5.2.4 Given D ⊆ C, we can compute E ⊆ D such that E is irreducible
and UE = UD in polynomial time.
Proof Figure 5.2 illustrates an algorithm called IRR-Gen: on input D ⊆ C, IRR-
Gen returns an irreducible set E ⊆ D such that UE = UD. At the ith iteration, the
algorithm arbitrarily chooses an element C from D, and checks whether the removal
of C from D would affect the set of elements originally covered by D. If it does, C
must be included in E , otherwise C can be ignored. The overall time complexity of the
IRR-Gen algorithm is polynomial in |D| and |X|, that is, there are |D| 6 |C| iterations
of the while loop, and the subset inclusion test can be implemented as a loop of no
more than |X| iterations. 
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Input: D ⊆ C
Output: E
let E = ∅;
while D 6= ∅ {
choose C ∈ D;
D = D \ {C};
if C 6⊆ UD∪E
then E = E ∪ {C};
}
return E
Figure 5.2: The IRR-Gen algorithm
Note that IRR-Gen is non-deterministic (“choose C ∈ D”) and [T ] may contain
more than one irreducible set, so different runs of the algorithm on input D ∈ [T ]
might return different irreducible sets E ∈ [T ] depending on the order in which the
elements of D are processed.
Example 5.2.3 Using our running example, let D = {C1, C2, C3, C4} ∈ [{1, 2, 3, 4}].
Then processing D in the order C1, C2, C3, C4, for example, yields E = {C3, C4},
whereas processing D in the order C4, C3, C2, C1 yields E = {C1, C2, C3}.
Corollary 5.2.2 Given X, C and T ∈ PCov, we can compute an irreducible element
of [T ] in polynomial time.
Proof Since T ∈ PCov, T = ker(T ) by Proposition 5.2.3. K(T ) = {C ∈ C : C ⊆ T}, we
can always compute K(T ) in polynomial time. Moreover, UK(T ) = ker(T ) = T , hence
K(T ) ∈ [T ]. Then we can compute an irreducible element of [T ] using the IRR-Gen
algorithm with input K(T ). 
5.2.3 The minimal cover problem
We can now define the minimal cover problem, and address its computational complex-
ity. This, in turn will allow us to address the IDRM-availability problem.
Let V 6∈ PCov and suppose we are interested in finding a minimal cover of V .
We first state two simplifying assumptions on the problem instance that enable us to
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eliminate “inessential” aspects for finding a minimal cover of V . In other words, we
construct (in polynomial time) a new instance of the problem, by replacing X and C
with X ′ and C′, where |X| > |X ′| and |C| > |C′|. In particular, we omit any C ∈ C such
that
• C ∩ V = ∅ (since any such C cannot contribute to a cover of V );
• C ⊆ V (since, by Proposition 5.2.5, we can compute a minimal cover D of V \
ker(V ) to obtain a minimal cover D ∪ K(V ) of V ).
Proposition 5.2.5 Given X, V and C, define: X ′ = X \ker(V ); V ′ = V \ker(V ); and
C′ = {C \ ker(V ) : C ∈ C, C 6⊆ V }. Then:
1. UC′ = X
′;
2. for all C ′ ∈ C′, C ′ 6⊆ V ′;
3. if D is a minimal cover of V ′, then D ∪ K(V ) is a minimal cover of V .
Proof
1. Since C′ = {C \ ker(V ) : C ∈ C, C 6⊆ V }, UC′ = UC \ ker(V ) = X \ ker(V ) = X
′.
2. If C ′ ∈ C′, then C ′ = C \ ker(V ) for some C ∈ C such that C 6⊆ V . Therefore,
C ′ = C \ ker(V ) 6⊆ V \ ker(V ) = V ′.
3. Suppose, in order to obtain a contradiction, that D∪K(V ) is not a minimal cover
of V . Then, since K(V ) only adds elements from V , D cannot be a minimal cover
of V ′, which is the desired contradiction.

Henceforth, we assume that our problem instance is in this “canonical form”: that
is, C∩V 6= ∅ and C 6⊆ V for all C ∈ C. We now define a number of problems associated
with containers, minimal covers and optimal covers.
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Problem 5.2.1 (The container decision problem) Given X, C, V ⊆ X and an
integer k, does there exist a container T of V such that |T | 6 |V |+ k?
Problem 5.2.2 (The container optimization problem) Given X, C and V ⊆ X,
find a minimal container of V .
Problem 5.2.3 (The minimal cover problem) Given X, C and V ⊆ X, find a
minimal cover of V .
Problem 5.2.4 (The optimal cover problem) Given X, C and V ⊆ X, find an
optimal cover of V .
Theorem 5.2.1 The container decision problem is NP-complete.
Proof It is easy to see that the container decision problem is in NP, because a
nondeterministic algorithm need only guess a subset T of X and check in polynomial
time whether T ⊃ V , ker(T ) = T (that is, T ∈ PCov) and |T | 6 |V |+ k.
We now show a polynomial time transformation from the set cover decision problem
to a special case of the container decision problem. Let (X ′, C′, k) be an instance of the
set cover decision problem. We transform it into an instance (X, C, V, k) of a special
case of the container decision problem in the following way: defineX = X ′∪C′, V = X ′,
and C = {C ′ ∪ {C ′} : C ′ ∈ C′}. This transformation is illustrated in Figure 5.3. It can
be seen that each Ci contains a single element (namely C
′
i) that does not belong to V .
Moreover, each Ci contains at least one element of X
′, since C ′i ∈ C
′ can be assumed to
be non-empty. In other words, the resulting instance is a special case of the container
decision problem (in which each element of C contains precisely one distinct element
that is not in V ).
We now show that there exists a set cover D′ ⊆ C′ of size k if and only if there
exists a container UD of V such that |UD| = |V |+ k. First, suppose D
′ = {C ′1, . . . , C
′
k}
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(b) A special case of the container problem
Figure 5.3: Correspondence between the set cover and container problems
is a set cover (of X ′). Then, by construction, D = {C1, . . . , Ck} is a cover of V = X
′
and |UD| = |V |+ k, as required.
Conversely, suppose there exists a container UD of V with size |UD| = |V | + k.
Then, by construction, D = {C1, . . . , Ck} is a cover of V = X
′. Again, by construction,
D′ = {C ′1, . . . , C
′
k} is a set cover of X
′. 
Corollary 5.2.3 The container optimization problem is NP-hard.
Proof The result follows from the fact that the associated decision problem is NP-
complete (or we can use the construction illustrated in Figure 5.3 to solve the set cover
optimization problem using the container optimization problem). 
Corollary 5.2.4 The minimal cover problem is NP-hard.
Proof We exhibit a polynomial time Turing reduction from the container optimization
problem to the minimal cover problem. Suppose there exists an oracle for the minimal
cover problem. Then given an instance (X, C, V ) of the container optimization problem,
we query the oracle for the minimal cover problem on instance (X, C, V ), to obtain a
minimal cover D ⊆ C of V . Then we simply compute UD ⊆ X, which is, by definition,
a minimal container of V . 
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Corollary 5.2.5 The optimal cover problem is NP-hard.
Proof We show that the minimal cover problem is polynomial time Turing equivalent
to the optimal cover problem. Clearly, any solution for the optimal cover problem is a
solution for the minimal cover problem. We now show a polynomial time Turing reduc-
tion from the optimal cover problem to the minimal cover problem. Given any instance
(X, C, V ) of the optimal cover problem, we query an oracle to obtain a solution D for
the minimal cover problem. We can then compute D′ = IRR-Gen(D) in polynomial
time, which is a solution to the optimal cover problem. 
5.2.4 The irreducible cover problem
In this section, we will not be concerned with containers of V . Instead we will be
concerned with all covers of X that are irreducible. We say D is an irreducible cover
of X if D is irreducible and UD = X.
Problem 5.2.5 (The irreducible cover decision problem) Given X, C and a
positive integer k, does there exist D ⊆ C such that D is an irreducible cover of X
and |D| 6 k?
Problem 5.2.6 (The irreducible cover optimization problem) Given X and C,
find D ⊆ C such that D is an irreducible cover of X and |D| is minimized.
Problem 5.2.7 (The irreducible cover enumeration problem) Given X and C,
find all D ⊆ C such that D is an irreducible cover of X.
Theorem 5.2.2 The irreducible cover decision problem is NP-complete. The irre-
ducible cover optimization and enumeration problems are NP-hard.
Proof It is easy to see that the irreducible cover decision problem is in NP, because a
nondeterministic algorithm need only guess a subset D of C and check whether D is an
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irreducible cover of X and |D| 6 k. Checking whether D is an irreducible cover of X
can be done in polynomial time by checking whether UD = X and checking whether D
is irreducible can be done in polynomial time by confirming whether D = IRR-Gen(D).
Clearly, we can use an algorithm that solves the irreducible cover problem to solve
the set cover problem. It is obvious that there is an irreducible cover of cardinality less
than or equal to k if and only if there is some cover of cardinality less than or equal to
k.
There are trivial polynomial time Turing reductions from the irreducible cover de-
cision problem to both the irreducible cover optimization and irreducible cover enu-
meration problems. In the first case, we query an oracle for the optimization problem
and return “yes” for the decision problem if the cardinality of the cover returned by
the oracle is less than or equal to k. In the second case, let us assume that the oracle
returns a list of irreducible covers, and this list of irreducible covers can be sorted in
order of increasing cardinality in polynomial time. Then to solve the decision problem,
we simply need to determine whether the cardinality of the first element in the list is
less than or equal to k. 
5.3 Covering problems in RBAC
The results of the previous section, particularly those on problems associated with
minimal containers, may be of independent mathematical interest, but in this section
we apply these results to a number of problems in the RBAC literature.
In this section we will assume that the role hierarchy has been “flattened” by encod-
ing all authorized relationships in the user-role and permission-role relations, so that
RBAC state is simply represented by the RBAC0 state (UA,PA). Any RBAC1 state
can be transformed into an equivalent RBAC0 state (in the sense that precisely the
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same set of requests are authorized) in polynomial time, using an algorithm based on
some appropriate graph traversal algorithm.
Given an instance (R,P,PA) of the RBAC0 model and an instance (X, C) of the set
cover problem, P is synonymous with X and {Prms(r) : r ∈ R}4 is synonymous with
C. (This assumes that each role is assigned to at least one permission in P , and each
permission is assigned to at least one role in R.)
Given Q ⊆ P , K(Q) comprises those sets of permissions that are contained within
Q. In other words, K(Q) is synonymous with those roles that are only authorized for
permissions in Q. Similarly, S(Q) is synonymous with those roles that are authorized
for at least one permission in Q.
5.3.1 The inter-domain role mapping problem
In loosely-coupled distributed environments, users’ identities are usually not known in
advance to resource owners. Piromruen and Joshi [74] propose a requirement-driven
interoperation approach that maps requests from users in an external domain to RBAC
policies in the target domain. Hence, the underlying problem is to find a set of hier-
archically related roles in the target domain that are authorized for the requested set
of permissions. In order to observe the principle of least privilege, we want to find a
set of roles such that the set of permissions acquired by activating that set of roles
approximates the set of requested permissions as closely as possible. Du and Joshi [36]
refer to this problem as the inter-domain role mapping (IDRM) problem. Their state-
ment of the IDRM problem is to find a set of roles of minimal cardinality such that the
authorized permissions for that set of roles is precisely the set of requested permissions.
We formally define the problem as follows.
4Recall that Prms(r) = {p ∈ P : (p, r) ∈ PA}.
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Problem 5.3.1 (The IDRM problem) Given R, P , PA ⊆ P ×R and Q ⊆ P , find
S ⊆ R such that Prms(S) = Q and |S| is minimized.
It is worth noting that many instances of the IDRM problem, as defined above, may
not have a solution, since there may not exist S ⊆ R such that Prms(S) = Q. Hence,
we define a preliminary question.
Problem 5.3.2 (The preliminary IDRM problem) Given R, P , PA and Q ⊆ P ,
does there exist RQ ⊆ R such that Prms(RQ) = Q?
We first note that Problem 5.3.2 can be decided in polynomial time, since it can
be answered by determining whether Q = ker(Q). If so, then RQ = K(Q). Having
answered the preliminary IDRM problem, we may then pose the following problems.
Problem 5.3.3 (The exact IDRM decision problem) Given R, P , PA, Q ⊆ P ,
RQ ⊆ R such that Prms(RQ) = Q, and an integer k, does there exist S ⊆ RQ such that
Prms(S) = Q and |S| 6 k.
Problem 5.3.4 (The exact IDRM optimization problem) Given R, P , PA,
Q ⊆ P , and RQ ⊆ R such that Prms(RQ) = Q, find S ⊆ RQ such that Prms(S) = Q
and |S| is minimized.
Clearly, the set cover decision problem is identical to the exact IDRM decision
problem. Given any instance (X, C, k) of the set cover decision problem, we simply set
Q = X, and for each C ∈ C, define rC ∈ RQ and Prms(rC) = C. Then k members
of RQ cover Q if and only if k members of C cover X. In other words, the exact
IDRM decision problem is NP-complete, and the exact IDRM optimization problem
is NP-hard.
It is also worth observing that there appears to be no good reason to minimize
|S| (in the statement of the IDRM problem): it is not clear why S is preferable to
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S′ if Prms(S) = Prms(S′) and |S| < |S′|. Moreover, if there is no solution to the
IDRM problem (that is, there does not exist S ⊆ R such that Prms(S) = Q) then it
is the permissions for which an approximate solution S is authorized that should be of
interest, rather than |S|. In order to address concerns about the appropriateness of the
IDRM problem, we introduced two problems derived from the IDRM problem [21].
Problem 5.3.5 (The IDRM-safety problem) Given P , R, PA and Q ⊆ P , find
S ⊆ R such that Prms(S) ⊆ Q and |Prms(S)| is maximized.
Problem 5.3.6 (The IDRM-availability problem) Given P , R, PA and Q ⊆ P ,
find S ⊆ R such that Prms(S) ⊇ Q and |Prms(S)| is minimized.
The IDRM-safety problem is concerned with ensuring that no permission outside
Q is authorized for any role in S, while authorizing S for as many permissions as
possible in Q. The availability approach to IDRM ensures that all permissions in Q are
authorized for at least one role in S, but seeks to minimize the number of additional
permissions for which S is authorized.
Although there is an obvious correspondence between the exact IDRM problem and
the set cover problem (as we illustrated above), there is no obvious way of transforming
the IDRM-availability problem to the set cover problem, since we are simultaneously
concerned with covering Q while minimizing what is covered outside Q. Clearly, how-
ever, the IDRM-availability problem does map very easily to, and is no harder than, the
minimal cover problem discussed in Section 5.2. More formally, we have the following
result.
Theorem 5.3.1 The IDRM-safety problem is in P; the IDRM-availability problem is
NP-hard.
Proof The largest subset of Q for which a perfect cover exists is, by Proposition 5.2.2,
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ker(Q) which can be computed in polynomial time. Hence, the IDRM-safety problem
is in P.
We now exhibit a polynomial time Turing reduction from the minimal cover problem
to the IDRM-availability problem. Given any instance (X, C, V ) of the minimal cover
problem, we can transform it into an instance (P,Q,R,PA) of the IDRM-availability
problem in polynomial time. In particular, we let X = P , V = Q, and for each C ∈ C,
define rC ∈ R and Prms(rC) = C ⊆ X = P . Clearly, a solution S ⊆ R to this
instance of the IDRM-availability problem provides a solution to the given instance of
the minimal cover problem. 
5.3.2 The user authorization query problem
In an open and distributed system, service providers usually do not know identities of
service consumers or clients in advance, and predefined roles are assigned to users based
on the attributes one or more trust authorities assert they possess. Similarly, clients
usually do not know which roles are assigned to them, and instead directly request
to access resources from service providers. Hence, it is the job of service providers to
check whether clients are authorized to perform all their requested permissions, and
correspondingly return a set of roles for clients to activate, and thereby acquire the
appropriate set of permissions for which they are authorized.
Zhang and Joshi [96] recently defined the user authorization query (UAQ) problem:
that is, given a set of permissions Q ⊆ P and a user u ∈ U , does there exist a set of roles
RQ ⊆ R such that u can activate all roles in RQ and Prms(RQ) is “close” to Q. Their
solution to the UAQ problem is to first use a greedy algorithm to compute a set of roles
RQ such that Prms(RQ) is the best approximation of Q, and then check whether u is
allowed to activate all roles in RQ with regard to constraints defined on role activation.
Clearly, the purpose of the first step is to solve the IDRM-safety and IDRM-availability
CHAPTER 5. SET COVERING PROBLEMS IN RBAC 147
problems. In other words, if we are concerned with under-approximation of Q, we can
find RQ ∈ R in polynomial time by computing RQ = K(Q). On the other hand, it is
difficult to find RQ ∈ R such that Prms(RQ) is the best over-approximation of Q (since
the IDRM-availability problem is NP-hard).
However, there are at least two problems with their approach to solving the UAQ
problem. Since the IDRM-availability problem is NP-hard, there is no guarantee that
their greedy algorithm will produce a most appropriate solution RQ. In addition, it
completely ignores the fact that u may not be able to activate one or more of roles in
RQ which is obtained in the first step. In other words, a lot of effort is expended in
computing an approximate RQ (solving IDRM-availability problem) that may not be
of any relevance to the user anyway.
Wickramaarachchi et al [94] provided a more general definition of the UAQ problem,
which is formally stated below.
Problem 5.3.7 (The UAQ problem) Given P , R, PA and (Pl, Pu, obj), where
Pl, Pu ⊆ P and obj ∈ {max,min}, find S ⊆ R such that the following conditions
hold:
• Pl ⊆ Prms(S) ⊆ Pu and |Prms(S)| is maximized if obj = max;
• Pl ⊆ Prms(S) ⊆ Pu and |Prms(S)| is minimized if obj = min.
5
Let us consider the problem of finding Q ⊆ P such that Q is perfectly covered and
Pl ⊆ Q ⊆ Pu. Then we can find S ⊆ R that solves the UAQ problem in polynomial
time by computing S = K(Q), since ker(Q) = Q.
5In the original paper [94], given a set of constraints C and a user u, they require that u can activate
the set of roles S without violating any constraint in C. There is also an additional condition on the
cardinality of the solution set S (which essentially requires the computation of either a maximal or
minimal element in the appropriate equivalence class). We omit these considerations, which do not
affect the complexity of the problem, for clarity and simplicity.
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First note that we can compute ker(Pu) in polynomial time. Note also that for
any solution Q, we must have Q ⊆ ker(Pu), by Proposition 5.2.2, since Q is perfectly
covered and Q ⊆ Pu. Then three cases must be considered:
1. Pl ⊆ ker(Pu) and obj = max;
2. Pl ⊆ ker(Pu) and obj = min;
3. Pl 6⊆ ker(Pu).
Case (3) means that no such Q can be found, since Q ⊆ ker(Pu). In other words, the
UAQ problem posed by Wickramaarachchi et al only has a solution if Pl ⊆ ker(Pu). For
case (1), we can simply take Q = ker(Pu), by Proposition 5.2.2. Hence, the only form of
the problem that cannot be answered in polynomial time is (Pl, Pu,min). Henceforth,
we restrict our attention to UAQ problems of this form.
Theorem 5.3.2 The UAQ problem and the container optimization problem are poly-
nomial time Turing equivalent.
Proof We first show that there is a polynomial time Turing reduction from UAQ to
container optimzation. We have to find the smallest Q such that Q is perfectly covered
and Pl ⊆ Q ⊆ ker(Pu). We define Rnew = {r ∈ R : Prms(r) ⊆ Pu} and Pnew = ker(Pu).
Then to answer the UAQ instance, we need only answer the container optimization
instance for X = Pnew, V = Pl and C = {Prms(r) : r ∈ Rnew}.
To complete the proof, we show that there is a polynomial time Turing reduction
from container optimization to UAQ. The obvious transformation, previously used in
the proof of Theorem 5.3.1, suffices. 
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5.3.3 Separation of duty
The work of Li et al has been important in identifying and clarifying a number of
issues associated with the enforcement of separation of duty constraints in the context
of RBAC [19, 65]. We define some notations associated with separation of duty and
their precise meanings, which have not been formally defined in the literature [65].
Notation 5.3.1 Given a set of permissions Q ⊆ P and an integer k such that 1 <
k 6 |Q|, ssod(Q, k) is a static separation of duty constraint.
Definition 5.3.1 The constraint ssod(Q, k) is violated by the RBAC state
(PA,UA,RH ) if there exists a set of k − 1 (or fewer) users that are authorized col-
lectively for all permissions in Q.
Notation 5.3.2 Given a set of roles R′ ⊆ R and an integer k such that 1 < k 6 |R′|,
rssod(R′, k) is a role-based static separation of duty constraint.
Definition 5.3.2 The constraint rssod(R′, k) is violated by the RBAC state
(PA,UA,RH ) if there exists a set of k − 1 (or fewer) users that cover R′ in the sense
that every role is assigned to at least one of those users.
Notation 5.3.3 Given a set of roles R′ ⊆ R and an integer k such that 1 < k 6 |R′|,
smer(R′, k) is a static mutually exclusive role constraint.
Definition 5.3.3 The constraint smer(R′, k) is violated by the RBAC state
(PA,UA,RH ) if there exists a user that is assigned to k or more roles in R′.
Li et al were concerned with re-writing an SSoD constraint in terms of SMER
constraints, in such a way that the satisfaction of the SMER constraints implied the
satisfaction of the SSoD constraint. A SSoD constraint is said to be enforceable if and
only if there exists a set of SMER constraints such that the satisfaction of those SMER
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constraints implies the satisfaction of the SSoD constraint. Clearly, a SSoD constraint
ssod(Q, k) is not enforceable if there exists a set of k − 1 roles that are collectively
authorized for all the permissions in Q, because we can assign a different user to each
of the k − 1 roles without violating any SMER constraint we can specify, but results
in violation of the SSoD constraint. Hence, it is of interest to know whether the SSoD
constraint is enforceable using SMER constraints. We now describe three problems
associated with the enforcement of separation of duty constraints.
Problem 5.3.8 (The SSoD enforceability decision problem) Given P , R, PA,
Q ⊆ P and an integer k, does there exist S ⊆ R such that Prms(S) ⊇ Q and |S| 6 k?
Problem 5.3.9 (The SSoD enforceability optimization problem) Given P , R,
PA and Q ⊆ P , find S ⊆ R such that Prms(S) ⊇ Q and |S| is minimized.
Problem 5.3.10 (The RSSoD generation problem) Given P , R, PA and Q ⊆
P , find all S ⊆ R such that Prms(S) ⊇ Q and for any S′ ⊂ S, Prms(S′) 6⊇ Q.
Note that these questions are only concerned with the existence of covers of Q (and
not with any additional permissions that might be authorized for any given cover).
Hence, we may simply set X = Q and C = {Prms(r) ∩ Q : r ∈ S(Q)}. The SSoD
enforceability decision problem is, therefore, identical to the set cover decision problem
(and hence is NP-complete).6
The SSoD enforceability optimization problem is of interest for a number of appli-
cations. For example, given Q, we may wish to know the smallest number of users that
are collectively authorized for Q in order to assess whether this presents some poten-
tial violation of enterprise security policies or statutory requirements. It is clear that
6Li et al showed that the SSoD enforceability decision problem is NP-complete by showing that a
particular subcase is NP-complete [65].
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the SSoD enforceability optimization problem is identical to the set cover optimization
problem, which is NP-hard.
When seeking to enforce an SSoD constraint using SMER constraints, it is necessary
to compute the set of RSSoD constraints [65]. More specifically, Li et al convert an
SSoD constraint into an equivalent set of RSSoD constraints and then find a set of
SMER constraints such that the RSSoD constraints (and hence the SSoD constraint) are
satisfied if the SMER constraints are satisfied. They proposed a method of generating
RSSoD constraints (essentially as described in Problem 5.3.10 above), but provide no
analysis of the complexity of computing the set of all such constraints. Note that an
RSSoD constraint is a set of roles that cover Q and contains no redundancy. In other
words, the RSSoD generation problem is identical to the irreducible cover enumeration
problem and is, therefore,NP-hard (Theorem 5.2.2). The above results are summarized
in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3.3 The SSoD enforceability decision problem is NP-complete; the SSoD
enforceability optimization problem and the RSSoD generation problem are NP-hard.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have defined a number of extensions of the standard set cover
problem. In particular, we have introduced the notions of container, minimal container,
minimal cover, irreducible cover and optimal cover, and established complexity results
for a number of problems associated with these notions. Most significantly, we proved
that the minimal cover problem – a generalization of the set cover problem – is NP-
hard.
Our complexity results for the variations on the set cover problem have established
the computational complexity of a number of fundamental problems in RBAC: in par-
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Problem Name Equivalent Set Cover Problem Complexity
Class
Preliminary IDRM V ∈ PCov? (that is, V = ker(V )?) P
Exact IDRM decision Set cover decision NP-complete
Exact IDRM optimization Set cover optimization NP-hard
IDRM-safety Compute ker(V ) P
IDRM-availability Minimal cover NP-hard
SSoD enforceability decision Set cover decision NP-complete
SSoD enforceability optimization Set cover optimization NP-hard
UAQ Container optimization NP-hard
RSSoD generation Irreducible cover enumeration NP-hard
Table 5.1: A summary of problems in RBAC and their computational complexities
ticular, the IDRM-safety and availability problems, the UAQ problem and the RSSoD
generation problem. We summarize our results in Table 5.1. Clearly, our immediate
priority in future work is to investigate whether our complexity results have other appli-
cations in RBAC and other access control models (or indeed other resource allocation
problems).
We conclude by noting that the complexity result of the minimal cover problem
can be applied to assessing the difficulty of enforcing the principal of least privilege
in a general access control model. Let X represent the set of all resource-action pairs
and let U represent the set of all users. Then an authorization policy may be modeled
as a function p : U → 2X , where p(u) ⊆ X denotes the interactions for which u is
authorized. Given V ⊆ U , we will abuse our notation and write p(V ) to denote the
interactions for which the users in V are collectively authorized.
The principles of least privilege, defined by Saltzer and Schroeder [77], is of particular
importance in access control. Informally, least privilege means that users should be
given no more access to resources than is required for those users to perform their
duties. Given a set of resource-action pairs Y ⊆ X, what is the best choice of users
to cover Y with respect to least privilege. We formally consider the question in the
following form.
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Problem 5.4.1 (The least privilege problem) Given a policy p and Y ⊆ X, find
a subset of users V such that p(V ) ⊇ Y and |p(V )| is minimized.
Given any instance (X, C, V ) of the minimal cover problem, we can simply set
Y = V , and for each C ∈ C, define uC ∈ U and p(uC) = C ⊆ X. The least privilege
problem is, therefore, identical to the minimal cover problem (and hence is NP-hard).
In the next chapter, we will study some heuristic algorithms for solving the minimal
cover problem.
Chapter 6
Heuristic Algorithms for the
Minimal Cover Problem
In the preceding chapter we observed that many relevant optimization problems are
NP-hard, so it is unlikely that we will ever be able to find efficient algorithms for
their exact solution. However, we can focus on finding an algorithm that runs in
polynomial time and that has the property that, for every problem instance, the solution
returned by the algorithm for that instance is “close” to the exact solution. We call
such algorithms heuristic algorithms, and the solutions returned by those algorithms
as approximate solutions.
The quality of a heuristic algorithm is measured by analyzing the “distance” of its
solution to the exact solution for each instance, which we would like to be as small as
possible. The most common approach of measuring the quality of a heuristic algorithm
is to conduct empirical experiments on a large set of instances that can be either
randomly generated or based on instances arising in real problems, and then establish
the average-case performance of the algorithm on this set [5]. From a theoretical point
of view, we might be interested in finding a heuristic algorithm that returns solutions
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with guaranteed performance: that is, the solutions returned by the algorithm for
all instances will never differ from the exact solution by more than some specified
percentage. These heuristic algorithms are usually called approximation algorithms in
the literature.
In Chapter 5, we showed that the minimal cover problem is NP-hard. In other
words, there does not exist a polynomial time (efficient) algorithm that can be used to
solve all instances of the problem. Therefore, we aim to seek a good heuristic algorithm
to solve the minimal cover problem. In this chapter, we design a number of polynomial
time algorithms that compute approximate solutions to the minimal cover problem.
We also conduct a number of experiments to evaluate the quality of those algorithms
in terms of the average case performance.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce a “greedy”
algorithm for the weighted set cover optimization problem, which provides the basis
for the design of our heuristic algorithms for the minimal cover problem. Section 6.2
informally describes a number of ways of designing and evaluating heuristic algorithms
for the minimal cover problem. In Section 6.3 we conduct some experiments to evaluate
the average case performance of the heuristic algorithms, and analyze the results of our
experiments.
6.1 The weighted set cover optimization problem
In this section, we introduce the weighted set cover optimization problem, and explain
the basic structure of the greedy algorithm that is a good heuristic algorithm for the
weighted set cover problem. This, in turn, provides a basic starting point in the design
of heuristic algorithms for the minimal cover problem.
We formally define the weighted set cover optimization problem in the following
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form.
Problem 6.1.1 (The weighted set cover optimization problem) Given a uni-
verse X, a collection C of subsets of X whose union is X, and a weight function
w : C → R+, find a subset D ⊆ C such that
X =
⋃
D∈D
D and
∑
D∈D
w(D) is minimized.
Although the weighted set cover optimization problem is NP-hard1, there exists a
“greedy” algorithm that provides good approximate solutions [24, 53]. This iterative
algorithm sequentially selects elements from C until all the elements of X are covered.
Suppose we have chosen i− 1 sets from C, and let Xi−1 ⊆ X denote set of elements of
X that remain uncovered after the (i− 1)th iteration. At the ith iteration, the greedy
algorithm selects a subset Ci from those remaining in C such that
score(Ci) =
w(Ci)
|Ci ∩Xi−1|
is minimized. In other words, at each iteration, the greedy algorithm computes a
score for each C ∈ C and selects the element of C with the smallest score. The score
is obtained by dividing the “cost” of selecting C by the “benefit”, where the cost is
defined to be the weight of C and the benefit is the number of uncovered elements that
C covers.
The special case where the weight of C is constant for all C ∈ C corresponds to the
standard set cover optimization problem. We can still apply the greedy algorithm to
solve the set cover optimization problem. At each iteration, the algorithm selects an
1The set cover optimization problem is a subcase of the weighted set cover optimization problem,
where the weight of C ∈ C is constant. Therefore, there exists a Turing reduction from the set
cover optimization problem to the weighted set cover optimization problem, and, since the set cover
optimization problem is NP-hard, the weighted set cover optimization problem is NP-hard.
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element C of C with smallest score, where the cost of selecting C is constant.
It has been shown that the greedy algorithm is the best-possible polynomial time
approximation algorithm for the weighted set cover optimization problem [91]. The
weight of the solution produced by the greedy algorithm is guaranteed to be no more
than h(n) times the weight of the optimal solution, where h(n) is the nth harmonic
number and n is the cardinality of X2.
6.2 Designing heuristic algorithms
In this section, we consider a number of possible ways to design heuristic algorithms for
the minimal cover problem. We also discuss two approaches for evaluating average-case
performance of a heuristic algorithm.
6.2.1 Designing an algorithm
The greedy algorithm for the weighted set cover optimization problem is designed to
compute a cover of X and to minimize the weights of sets used in the cover. When
computing a minimal cover, we are concerned with computing a cover of V and mini-
mizing the number of elements outside V that are covered. Using an approach similar
to the greedy algorithm for the weighted set cover optimization problem, we can de-
vise an algorithm that sequentially selects elements of C until all the elements of V
are covered. We define the benefit of C to be |C ∩ Vi−1|, where Vi−1 comprises the
members of V that remain uncovered after the (i− 1)th iteration (as in the algorithm
for the weighted set cover optimization problem). However, we need to consider which
C is most appropriate to be selected at each iteration. This is determined by three
factors: how to appropriately define the cost of C, how to compute the cost of C at
2The nth harmonic number is the sum of the reciprocals of the first n natural numbers, that is,
h(n) = 1 + 1
2
+ 1
3
+ · · ·+ 1
n
=
∑n
k=1
1
k
.
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each iteration, and how to balance the trade-off between cost and benefit of C at each
iteration. We now consider three factors in more detail.
Defining the cost
One obvious possibility is to define the cost of C to be the number of elements in C
multiplied by the number of elements in C but not in V . In this case, the cost of C
become very large if C includes a large number of elements that are both in V and
outside V . Clearly, the benefit of such C is also large, which in turn, means the score
of such C is correspondingly large. In other words, this approach of defining the cost
of C might provide a more direct reflection on the number of elements outside V that
C contains.
Alternatively, we could define the cost of C to be the number of elements that are
in C but not in V . In other words, the cost of C is determined by the extent to which
C is a “bad fit” for the elements that need to be covered.
Finally, we could define the cost of C to be the sum of the weights of the elements
in C that are not in V , where the “weight” of x ∈ C \V is the reciprocal of the number
of elements of C in which x appears. The intuition here is that if x has a low weight,
it belongs to many elements of C, which makes it likely that it will have to be included
in any cover of V . In this case, C will have a low cost if most of its elements are in V
and the reminder belong to many other elements of C.
Example 6.2.1 Let X = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let C = {C1, C2, C3, C4}, where C1 = {1},
C2 = {2, 4}, C3 = {3, 4} and C4 = {1, 2, 4}. Let V = {1, 2, 3}. Consider C4 = {1, 2, 4}
that has three elements and one element 4 outside V which also appears in C2 and C3.
Then, the cost of C4 is 3× 1 = 3 if using the first way of defining the cost. In turn, the
cost of C4 is 1 if using the second way, and the cost of C4 is
1
3 if the third way is used.
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Modifying the target
At each iteration of an algorithm we will add a new C ∈ C, and C may contain an
element x 6∈ V . At the next iteration, therefore, it does not matter if we select C ′ ∈ C
such that x ∈ C ′; we are not adding any additional elements that do not belong to V .
Hence there are two different ways in which we may compute the cost of C: based on V
or based on the union of V and the sets already selected for the cover. For brevity, we
refer to these alternatives as using a static or dynamic “target”, respectively. Clearly,
the third way of defining the cost of C (described above) is only likely to be effective if
we use dynamic targets.
Computing a score
At each iteration, if we attempt to select C ∈ C such that the score of C is minimized,
then there are two different ways in which we can combine the cost and benefit to
compute a score for C: we could divide cost by benefit or we could subtract the benefit
from the cost. Another alternative is to ignore the benefit and focus on minimizing the
cost. If two distinct elements of C have the same cost, then we select the one with the
greater benefit.
6.2.2 Evaluation metrics
We have seen that there are a number of possible scoring functions that we could use
for designing heuristic algorithms for the minimal cover problem. We now consider how
we might evaluate these candidate algorithms.
Given a heuristic algorithm for the minimal cover problem, there are (at least) two
ways we could measure the average case performance of the heuristic algorithm. We
define the following metrics: success rate and mean deviation.
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Definition 6.2.1 Suppose we have m instances of the minimal cover problem
{(X, Ci, V ) : 1 6 i 6 m}, where |X| and |V | are fixed. Let Si denote the solution
computed by algorithm A for problem instance i and let Di denote a minimal cover for
problem instance i. Then we define:
• the success rate of A to be
1
m
|{i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : |USi | = |UDi |}|
• the mean deviation of A to be
1
m
m∑
i=1
(|USi | − |UDi |)
In other words, given a finite number m of instances of the minimal cover problem,
the success rate of a heuristic algorithms indicates the proportion of exact solutions
computed by the algorithm, while the mean deviation of a heuristic algorithm indicates
the average of the difference of the solutions returned by the algorithm and the exact
solution in terms of the number of elements outside V .
6.3 Evaluating heuristic algorithms
In order to find a good heuristic algorithm for the minimal cover problem, we conducted
a number of experiments to analyze the average case performance of a number of
heuristic algorithms derived from the design options described in the previous section.
Firstly, we generate a set of appropriate test data: that is, given a universe X =
{1, 2, . . . , 10}, we generate 10000 different instances of C. We also select a number
of different choices of V ⊆ X where 3 6 |V | 6 7. Finally, we implement 18 different
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heuristic algorithms. For each C and each V , we apply each of these heuristic algorithms
and compute the resulting cover. We then analyze the results of our experiments.
6.3.1 Data generation
We model a collection C of subsets of X as a k×n matrix, where |C| = k and |X| = n.
That is, C[i, j] = 1 if and only if the jth element of Ci belongs to X.
Populating the matrix
We generate the elements of a k × n array by deciding at random which elements to
set to 1. We select a value q, 0 < q < 1, as the probability that an array element is set
to 0. Then, for each element of the array C[i, j], we select r between 0 and 1 uniformly
at random and set C[i, j] = 0 if r 6 q and C[i, j] = 1 otherwise.
We choose q so that the probability of obtaining a row or column of zeroes is smaller
than some threshold t. In particular, if m = min{k, n}, then we require that qm 6 t:
that is, m loge q 6 loge t. Hence, we choose a value of q such that
q 6 e
loget
m .
If, for example, k = n = 10 and t = 0.001, then we choose q = 0.50 (correct to two
decimal places). If, in contrast, k = n = 10 and t = 0.01, we choose q = 0.63. The
proportion of 1s in the matrix increases with p = 1− q and hence the number of 1s, on
average, in row j (which corresponds to the cardinality of Cj) increases as q decreases.
In the experiment, we set X to be {1, 2, . . . , 10}, and randomly choose an element
from {5, 6, . . . , 15} for the cardinality k of C. Hence min{|C| , |X|} = 10. We set q = 0.63
so that the generated k × n array has probability no greater than 0.01 of obtaining a
row or column of zeroes.
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Discarding matrices
Having generated a matrix C, we discard it if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
• It contains a row of zeroes. In this case, one of the elements of the collection of
subsets represented by C contains the empty set.
• It contains a column of zeroes. In this case, an element of X is not covered by
any element of C.
• We have already generated a matrix C′ = C. That is, we remove duplicates.
Each time we generate a matrix that is not discarded for one of the above reasons,
we increment a counter. Once we had generated 10000 matrices we stopped.
6.3.2 Scoring functions
Like the greedy algorithm for the weighted set cover optimization problem, each of our
heuristic algorithms sequentially selects elements from C until V is covered. At each
iteration, we select C ∈ C such that the score of C is minimized, where the score of C is
computed from the cost and benefit associated with C. We define the benefit function
to be benefit : C → R+, where benefit(C) is defined to be |Ui ∩ C|. Here Ui denotes the
set of elements in V that remain uncovered before iteration i. That is, U1 = V and if
the algorithm selects C ∈ C at iteration i, then Ui+1 = Ui \ C.
There are three different ways in which the cost function cost : C × 2X → R+ can
be defined (as discussed informally in Section 6.2).
1. cost1(C, V ) = |C| · |C \ V |
2. cost2(C, V ) = |C \ V |
3. Let f(x), x ∈ X, be the number of elements in C that contain x; that is f(x) =
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|{C ∈ C : x ∈ C}|. Then define
cost3(C, V ) =


0 if C ⊆ V
∑
x∈C\V
1
f(x)
otherwise
Now for each cost function, we may assume that the cost of each element in C is
static during the execution of the algorithm. A natural alternative is to re-compute
the cost of each remaining member of C at each iteration. For example, we define
cost2(C, Vi) = |C \ Vi|, where Vi denotes the set of elements that are permitted to
belong to the cover at iteration i. That is, V1 = V and if the algorithm selects C ∈ C
at iteration i, then Vi+1 = Vi ∪ C. The advantage of recomputing the cost of each
remaining C is that in choosing C, we expand V to V ∪C, and it may be that we can
choose C ′ to cover other elements of V without including any elements outside V ∪C.
Therefore, we may compute each cost function based on a static V = Vi = Vi+1 for all
i or dynamic Vi (where V1 = V and Vi+1 = Vi ∪ Ci).
At each iteration, if we want to simultaneously minimize cost and maximize benefit,
there are two different ways in which we combine cost(C, V ) and benefit(C), that is
cost(C, V )/benefit(C) and cost(C, V )− benefit(C). In addition, we could consider cost
on its own. If there is more than one C ∈ C having minimal cost, we then select the
one with maximum benefit. In other words, the benefit function is used to assist the
algorithm to select a more appropriate C ∈ C when it is necessary. We refer to this
combining method as benefit-assisted-cost.
In summary, there are 18 different possible scoring functions. We write score ijk,
where 1 6 i 6 3, 1 6 j 6 3 and 1 6 k 6 2, to denote the different scoring functions for
each C ∈ C. Each scoring function score ijk is distinguished by assigning corresponding
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values to i, j and k, which indicates the use of different cost functions, different com-
bining methods, and different ways of computing cost respectively. More specifically,
we explain the meanings for each possible values of i, j and k as follows.
i = 1 denotes cost1 function
i = 2 denotes cost2 function
i = 3 denotes cost3 function
j = 1 denotes division combining method
j = 2 denotes subtraction combining method
j = 3 denotes benefit-assisted-cost combining method
k = 1 denotes dynamic V
k = 2 denotes static V
For example, those scoring functions that use cost1 have the form score1jk and are
listed below.
score111(C) =
cost1(C, Vi)
benefit(C)
score112(C) =
cost1(C, V )
benefit(C)
score121(C) = cost1(C, Vi)− benefit(C)
score122(C) = cost1(C, V )− benefit(C)
score131(C) = cost1(C, Vi)
score132(C) = cost1(C, V )
The scoring functions score ijk, i ∈ {2, 3}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and k ∈ {1, 2} are defined in
an analogous way. We will write alg ijk to denote the heuristic algorithm that employs
scoring function score ijk.
6.3.3 Results
Now we have X = {1, 2, . . . , 10} and 10000 distinct test cases C. We choose a number
of different V ⊂ X such that 3 6 |V | 6 7. For each C and each V , we apply each of
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18 different heuristic algorithms to compute a resulting cover, and apply a brute-force
algorithm that considers every possible subset of C to compute a minimal cover.
Table 6.1 summarizes the results for the best three heuristic algorithms for different
choices of |V |. Each row in the table is associated with a choice of V , and indicates
the best three heuristic algorithms for that choice of V . The table is divided into three
sections for the first, second and third best algorithms. Each section has three columns:
the identity of the heuristic algorithm (id), the success rate of the heuristic algorithm
s, and the mean deviation of the heuristic algorithm d.
|V | First Second Third
id s d id s d id s d
3 alg211 88.33% 0.1244 alg221 87.39% 0.1373 alg311 87.12% 0.1402
4 alg211 88.41% 0.1235 alg311 88.17% 0.1250 alg221 87.31% 0.1360
5 alg311 89.91% 0.1054 alg211 89.48% 0.1109 alg221 87.78% 0.1292
6 alg311 92.82% 0.0733 alg211 91.86% 0.0830 alg221 87.48% 0.1307
7 alg311 95.74% 0.0428 alg211 94.42% 0.0563 alg111 91.32% 0.0884
Table 6.1: The results of the best heuristic algorithms for different |V |
We make a number of observations about the results reported in Table 6.1.
• Any heuristic algorithm with static V (that is, k = 2 in alg ijk) is always worse
than any heuristic algorithm with dynamic V (k = 1). It can be seen from
Table 6.1 that no heuristic algorithm with static V appears in the table.
• As |V | increases, the probability of computing the minimal cover for each heuris-
tic algorithm increases, and the sum of the distances (which yields the mean
deviation) for each heuristic algorithm decreases. Intuitively, as the number of
elements outside V decreases, each heuristic algorithm is more likely to compute
the minimal cover, and the mean deviation of each heuristic algorithm decreases.
• For |V | = 3 or |V | = 4, the heuristic algorithm alg211 is best; as |V | increases,
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the best heuristic algorithm becomes alg311.
Table 6.2 summarizes the results for dynamic heuristic algorithms when |V | = 5.
Each row is labelled with a cost function and each column is labelled with a method
for combining cost and benefit (division, subtraction or assistance). An entry in row
cost i and column combinej , indicates the success rate and the mean deviation for
the heuristic algorithm constructed by cost i, combinej (and V is re-computed at each
iteration).
Cost function Division Subtraction Assistance
1 84.19% 0.1684 72.47% 0.3132 64.72% 0.4203
2 89.48% 0.1109 87.78% 0.1292 80.96% 0.2102
3 89.91% 0.1054 76.47% 0.3044 78.38% 0.2397
Table 6.2: The results for dynamic heuristic algorithms when |V | = 5
Table 6.2 has some interesting features, which we summarize below.
• Division is always better than subtraction and assistance when using the same
cost function.
• Subtraction is better than assistance for cost1 and cost2, but not for cost3.
• A dynamic heuristic algorithm with assistance is always worse than a dynamic
heuristic algorithm with division (irrespective of the cost function).
Therefore, these results suggest that we should use division as a method of combining
cost and benefit and use dynamic way of computing cost in the design of a good heuristic
algorithm.
6.3.4 A hybrid algorithm
In the previous section, we identified two heuristic algorithms that performed better
than all others: alg211 and alg311. In particular, alg211 is the best heuristic algorithm
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when |V | is small; as |V | increases, alg311 becomes the best. Let us now try to identify
situations when these two heuristic algorithms do not perform well. This enables us to
examine the functioning of each of these two algorithms, and leads to ideas for obtaining
algorithms with improved performance no matter which V is used.
Algorithm alg211
Consider the following example: let X = {1, 2, . . . , 2m}, C = {C1, . . . , Cm+1} and
V = {1, . . . ,m}, where Ci = {i,m + 1}, 1 6 i 6 m, and Cm+1 = X. Figure 6.1(a)
illustrates a graphical representation of this example for m = 3, where the closed curve
indicates V = {1, 2, 3}. Now we can see that
score211(C1) = · · · = score211(Cm) =
1
1
= score211(Cm+1) =
m
m
= 1.
In the first iteration, alg211 might therefore choose Cm+1, and then terminate. In
this case, the cover contains m elements that do not belong to V , whereas a minimal
cover {C1, . . . , Cm} contains only one element that is not in V . However, the heuristic
algorithm alg311 is able to compute the minimal cover {C1, . . . , Cm}, because cost3 is
designed to select those C whose elements outside V also belong to other members of
C.
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Figure 6.1: A graphical representation of the minimal cover problem instances
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Algorithm alg311
Now consider this example: let X = {1, . . . , 2m}, V = {1, . . . ,m} and C =
{C1, . . . , Cm+1}, where Ci = {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . ,m,m + 1,m + 2, . . . , 2m − 1},
1 6 i 6 m, and Cm+1 = {1, . . . ,m, 2m}. Figure 6.1(b) illustrates a graphical repre-
sentation of this example for m = 3, where the closed curve indicates V = {1, 2, 3}.
Then
score311(C1) = · · · = score311(Cm) =
1
m− 1
m− 1
m
=
1
m
= score311(Cm+1) =
1
m
.
At the first iteration, alg311 might choose C1, then select C2 at the next iteration, then
C3, . . . , finally selecting Cm before terminating. The resulting cover contains m − 1
elements that are not in V . However, the minimal cover is {Cm+1}, which contains
only one element that is not in V . In this example, alg311 is not able to choose those C
which have fewest elements outside V , while alg211 can compute the optimal solution
{Cm+1}.
Combining alg211 and alg311
We have illustrated an infinite family of instances in which the solution by each of
alg211 and alg311 might be far away from the exact one. However, there is an interesting
characteristic of these two algorithms: when one of them, for example alg211 does not
perform very well for some instances, the other one, alg311, is always able to obtain a
minimal cover for those instances. Therefore, we consider a new scoring function that
can provide an appropriate combination of score211 and score311, and always stand out
with the best performance no matter what size of V is used. We propose a scoring
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function that takes the average of score211 and score311, that is
score411(C) =
1
2
(score211(C) + score311(C))
We implement the heuristic algorithm alg411, and evaluate the quality of alg411 by
comparing with alg211 and alg311. Table 6.3 summarizes the results for alg211, alg221,
alg311 and alg411. It can be seen that alg411 is always best no matter which V is chosen.
|V | First Second Third
id s d id s d id s d
3 alg411 90.21% 0.1026 alg211 88.33% 0.1244 alg221 87.39% 0.1373
4 alg411 90.45% 0.0994 alg211 88.41% 0.1235 alg311 88.17% 0.1250
5 alg411 91.58% 0.0874 alg311 89.91% 0.1054 alg211 89.48% 0.1109
6 alg411 94.09% 0.0597 alg311 92.82% 0.0733 alg211 91.86% 0.0830
7 alg411 96.24% 0.0377 alg311 95.74% 0.0428 alg211 94.42% 0.0563
Table 6.3: The results for alg211, alg311 and alg411
Algorithm alg411
We also believe that the performance of algorithm alg411 compares favorably with
other algorithms that compute approximate solutions for other NP-hard problems. As
we discussed in Section 6.2, there is a greedy algorithm for the set cover optimization
problem that is known to compute a good approximate solution. Indeed, the cardinality
of the solution it computes is never more than h(n) times the cardinality of the optimal
solution, where h(n) is the nth harmonic number and n is the cardinality of X [24].
Recall that we generated 10000 different instances of C for X = {1, 2, . . . , 10}, which
can be also used as the test data for the set cover optimization problem. We ran the
greedy algorithm to compute an approximate set cover and an exhaustive search to
compute the optimal set cover. We found that the greedy algorithm computed the
optimal set cover 87.36% of the time. In contrast, for the minimal cover problem,
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alg411 had a success rate of 90.21% for |V | = 3, rising to 96.24% for |V | = 7. In other
words, we have grounds for believing that alg411 is a good heuristic algorithm for the
minimal cover problem.
6.4 Concluding remarks
As the minimal cover problem is NP-hard, we developed 18 different heuristic algo-
rithms using three different cost functions, two different ways of computing the cost
function at each iteration, and three different ways of combining cost and benefit at each
iteration. We conducted some experiments to evaluate the average case performance
of each of these algorithms. More specifically, we generated 10000 different instances
of C for X = {1, 2, . . . , 10}, and varied the cardinality of V to compute the success
rate and the mean deviation of each of algorithm. Our results show that the heuristic
algorithms alg211 and alg311 have a better performance than the other algorithms, but
alg211 and alg311 have different performance when the cardinality of V is chosen from
small to large.
Then we defined a new heuristic algorithm alg411 with a new scoring function
score411 that combines the scores (score211 and score311) of the two best algorithms.
Our results show that the heuristic algorithm alg411 has the best performance, irre-
spective of the choice of V .
An interesting possibility in future work is to formally examine why alg211 and alg311
have different performances when |V | is chosen differently. We believe that the answer
to this question is useful to establish an approximation ratio for the best algorithm
alg411 we obtained in the experimental work in this chapter. In particular, we hope to
establish a bound for the ratio
|USi | − |V |
|UDi | − |V |
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where Si is the cover computed by alg411 for instance i and Di is the minimal cover of
instance i (see the work of Johnson [54], Chvatal [24] and Feige [37] on the set cover
problem, for example).
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
Broadly speaking, the overall contribution of this thesis is to address several issues
related to the use of role hierarchies in role-based access control. We have explored
applications of the OP-RBAC model in order to address the perceived deficiencies of
inheritance within a role hierarchy. We have also developed new advanced RBAC mod-
els that accurately capture the relationship between usage and activation hierarchies,
and the interactions between spatio-temporal constraints and a role hierarchy. Further-
more, we have defined and studied a number of important computational problems that
could arise in various RBAC models, including those models we developed for multiple
role hierarchies and spatio-temporal constraints.
In the next section, we present the contributions of this thesis in more detail, and
outline some directions for future work in Section 7.2.
7.1 Summary of contributions
In Chapter 3 we considered three applications of the OP-RBAC model developed by
Crampton [29]. The most important innovation in the OP-RBAC model is that per-
missions can be inherited in one of three ways within the role hierarchy: by more
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senior roles, by less senior roles and by no other roles. These permissions are called up
permissions, down permissions and neutral permissions respectively. This approach to
permission inheritance has some correspondence with the Bell-LaPadula model, where
up permissions correspond to read-type access rights in the Bell-LaPadula model, down
permissions correspond to append-type access rights and neutral permissions corre-
spond to write-type access rights. We demonstrated OP-RBAC provides a natural way
of simulating a number of Bell-LaPadula models with a single role hierarchy, hence
making it simpler than existing approaches to this topic [69, 72, 73, 81]. In addition,
we show that OP-RBAC can be constrained to support the assignment of compound
permissions (write permissions) and incorporate limited support for discretionary ac-
cess control policies of the Bell-LaPadula model. We believe no existing work attempts
to address these two features in role-based models. Furthermore, we introduced a new
variation of the Bell-LaPadula model in which every object is associated with two se-
curity labels, one governing read access and one governing append access. This model
is useful to provide suitable access control for an audit file, for example. We also il-
lustrated that OP-RBAC can simply implement this new version of the Bell-LaPadula
model with the addition of few constraints.
The second application of the OP-RBAC model was shown to implement dynamic
separation of duty constraints on two roles that have a common senior role and for a
user to activate the senior role. We may require that all sensitive permissions assigned
to the two junior roles are neutral permissions, and a user who activated the senior role
is not able to acquire the sensitive permissions. This is not possible in standard RBAC
models.
Finally, we constructed an OP-RBAC configuration that is equivalent to an ER-
BAC96 configuration with respect to the same access requests are authorized. The
similarity between ERBAC96 and OP-RBAC arises because both models use the same
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role hierarchy for role activation, and OP-RBAC can make use of up and neutral per-
missions to implement permission usage in ERBAC96. Of course, the motivation of
this application is to illustrate the power and flexibility of OP-RBAC.
In Chapter 4 we developed a novel extended RBAC model (ERBAC07) based on
RBAC1. Compared with existing work, such as ERBAC96 and GTRBAC, ERBAC07
proposes a new constraint on the relationship between role activation and permission
usage hierarchies, which enables ERBAC07 to have the most appropriate inheritance
semantics. We also introduced a graph-based formulation of RBAC1, which is useful in
determining which access requests are authorized. We then extended this graph-based
formulation to explain the authorization semantics of ERBAC07. These graph-based
formalisms provide the basis for the semantics of our spatio-temporal RBAC models.
We defined three spatio-temporal RBAC models: RBAC=ST , RBAC
+
ST , and
RBAC−ST , motivating the development of these models using simple scenarios. These
models extend the basic RBAC1 model with very little additional syntax, have clear,
well-defined authorization semantics, and are designed to be compatible with RBAC1
and the ANSI-RBAC standard. We also introduced the concept of trusted entities on
each of three spatio-temporal RBAC models: for such entities spatio-temporal con-
straints may be ignored, in order to deal with certain scenarios. In addition, we de-
veloped three spaio-temporal ERBAC models to support spatio-temporal requirements
in ERBAC07. We believe that our spatio-temporal RBAC and ERBAC models are
simpler, more expressive and more flexible than existing spatio-temporal models.
Equally important, we considered the implementation of our spatio-temporal RBAC
models in practical applications, which have not previously been investigated for any
existing spatio-temporal models. The existence of spatio-temporal constraints and a
role hierarchy may result in complex computations when checking access requests. We
proposed a way of improving the efficiency of access request checking by pre-computing
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spatio-temporal enabling conditions over the transitive closure of (part of) the RBAC
graph. In addition, we proved that flat RBAC+ST is able to encode most spatio-temporal
requirements that defined on RBAC=ST , RBAC
+
ST and RBAC
−
ST , although this comes at
the cost of larger UA and PA relations. Nevertheless, request evaluation time, which is
more important, is likely to be significantly reduced in a flat RBAC+ST system. On the
other hand, if a role hierarchy is required, we showed how to eliminate spatio-temporal
constraints on roles by limiting constraints to outer nodes and edges, such as users and
user-role assignments. In short, we believe that our models can be efficiently and easily
implemented, in contrast to existing models.
In Chapter 5 we developed a mathematical framework that provides a context for
identifying a number of computational problems that are variations on the standard
set cover problem. The motivation for studying these variations is to formally establish
the complexity results for a number of important problems in RBAC. In particular, we
defined the minimal cover problem that is a generalization of the set cover problem,
and proved that this problem is NP-hard. This complexity result is then used to
determine the complexity of the IDRM-availability problem and the user authorization
query problem. In addition, we introduced the irreducible cover problem that is a
restricted form of the set cover problem. We proved that the irreducible cover problem
isNP-hard, which in turn establishes the complexity of the RSSoD generation problem.
In Chapter 6 we designed a number of heuristic algorithms to answer the minimal
cover problem based on the ideas of the greedy algorithm for the weighted set cover op-
timization problem. We conducted experiments to evaluate the average performance of
these algorithms. From our experiments, we found that one of the heuristic algorithms,
alg411, has the best performance with at least 90% rate of computing an exact solution
to the minimal cover problem. In summary, we believe that Chapter 5 and 6 make
significant contributions to the understanding and practical solution of the minimal
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cover problem.
7.2 Future work
There are many opportunities for extending the work presented in this thesis. In the
following section we will outline these extensions.
In Chapter 3, OP-RBAC is illustrated to provide a direct implementation of the
Bell-LaPadula models with the addition and modification of a few constraints. The
natural extension of the ideas in Chapter 3 is to develop a general multi-level secure
model based on OP-RBAC with the consideration of trusted subjects and complex
permissions. The basic idea is to enable the general model to combine the strong
security properties of the Bell-LaPadula model with the flexibility of the RBAC model.
In other words, we would like to develop formal statement of the security properties of
the general model when constrained in the ways described in Chapter 3, and attempt
to develop a result that is analogous to the “Basic Security Theorem” for the Bell-
LaPadula model [12]. The next phase of the work will be to implement the general
model in a prototype system that provides an opportunity to evaluate the suitability
of the model.
In Chapter 4 we developed a novel ERBAC07 model on which there are two in-
teresting directions for future work. In Chapter 5 we examined the complexity of
generation of SMER constraints on RBAC96 to enforce a SSoD policy. The complexity
arises when converting the SSoD policy into a equivalent set of RSSoD constraints. We
would like to investigate a simpler approach to this problem by directly generating ap-
propriate constraints on the usage hierarchy of ERBAC07 to enforce the SSoD policy.
In addition, it has been suggested that a desirable feature in GTRBAC is to define
“upward delegation” in multiple role hierarchies, which allows a user to delegate a per-
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mission to roles more senior than the role to which the permission is assigned [55]. We
would like to extend existing delegation models [7, 33, 95] or develop a new delegation
model for ERBAC07 to deal with complex delegation operations through multiple role
hierarchies.
In Chapter 4 we also constructed a number of spatio-temporal role-based models
and discussed the use of these models in practice. A first priority of future work on those
spatio-temporal models is to investigate spatio-temporal separation of duty. We would
like to formally classify various spatio-temporal separation of duty constraints, and
propose efficient mechanisms for enforcing those constraints. For example, consider
a spatio-temporal separation of duty constraint that specifies no user is allowed to
activate roles r1 and r2 at any spatio-temporal domain D. We can simply enforce this
constraint in RBAC=ST by defining that λ(r1)∩λ(r2) = ∅. In other words, we might be
able to use spatio-temporal constraints as a mechanism for enforcing spatio-temporal
separation of duty constraints. These questions will occupy our research in the short
term.
Another interesting research direction of the work in Chapter 4 is to extend the
model to any partially ordered set of entity attributes, not just space and time. For
example, imagine that there are several security domains within an organization and
that each domain is associated with a security clearance. Then some entities or entity
assignments are only enabled when the user belongs to an appropriate domain. Ad-
ditionally, we would like to study spatio-temporal requirements in a workflow system,
and plan to extend our spatio-temporal models to support such systems.
In Chapter 5 we established complexity results for the minimal cover problem and
some auxiliary problems. An immediate priority in future work is to investigate whether
these complexity results can be applied to some other problems in the context of RBAC,
for example, the role mining problem [61, 90].
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A further potential area of research is to identify more interesting problems and
establish their complexity results within the framework we built in Chapter 5. Recall
that the concept of minimal container is concerned with minimizing the number of
elements outside V that are included in any container of V . Similarly, we might be
interesting to find a least upper bound of V in PCov with respect to subset inclusion.
More formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 7.2.1 Given X, C and V ⊆ X such that V 6∈ PCov, we say T ∈ PCov is
an irreducible container of V if T is a container of V and for all T ′ ∈ PCov such that
T ′ ⊂ T , T ′ 6⊇ V .1
Proposition 7.2.1 Any minimal container is an irreducible container.
Proof Let T be a minimal container of V and suppose, in order to obtain a con-
tradiction, that T is not irreducible container. Then there exists T ′ ∈ PCov such
that V ⊆ T ′ ⊂ T . Hence, there exists a container of V such that |T |′ < |T |, which
contradicts the fact that T is minimal container. 
Note, however, that T is an irreducible container of V does not necessarily imply
that T is a minimal container of V .
Example 7.2.1 Let X = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let C = {C1, C2, C3}, where C1 = {1}, C2 =
{3, 4} and C3 = {1, 2, 4}. Then PCov = {{1}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}. Let
V = {4}, then irreducible containers of V are {3, 4} and {1, 2, 4}, but {1, 2, 4} is not a
minimal container of V .
We intend to define a number of problems associated with irreducible container,
and establish the complexity results for those problems. Most interestingly, we would
1An equivalent definition is that there does not exist T ′ ∈ PCov such that V ⊆ T ′ ⊂ T .
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like to explore any problems in the context of RBAC and other access control models
that are related to the irreducible container problems.
On the other hand, we are interesting in extending the minimal container problem
to a weighted minimal container problem. One obvious formulation is to associate
a weight with each element of X, and the weighted minimal container problem then
seeks to minimize the total weight of elements outside V . In this case, the minimal
container problem is a subcase of the weighted minimal container problem where the
weight of each element ofX is constant. Hence the weighted minimal container problem
is NP-hard. We would also like to examine the applications of the weighted minimal
container problem and design heuristic algorithms for this problem based on the idea
of our heuristic algorithms for the minimal cover problem.
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